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Abstract
Access control is a fundamental aspect of securing building environments that is
an emerging trend adopted across critical infrastructures. This thesis introduces
a building information modelling approach for access control critical infrastruc-
tures, especially smart building environments. Because of the physical and logical
nature of access control requirements in smart buildings, a converged approach
for access control is required to eciently and reliably implement security oper-
ations in these complex environments.
We review the state of the art in current access control technologies, cov-
ering commercial products as well as in the research domain. In doing so, we
identify the shortcomings of current approaches for spatial access control and
their limitations in moving forward with smart building technologies. To inform
our proposal of a new access control approach, we examine the access control
requirements of smart building environments through our interaction with in-
dustry practitioners with real world scenarios that are expected to be catered for
in future access control systems.
This thesis is the rst to utilise building information modelling capabilities in
a security context by proposing a novel authorisation framework for access con-
trol in smart buildings using building information models. This authorisation
framework utilises building information models in three key stages of access con-
trol: policy specication, policy administration, and decision-making. We argue
that the capabilities available through building information models can not only
create improved access control processes, but also create a cohesive integration
environment for smart buildings and enable a converged approach for securing
physical and logical assets alike.
This thesis further studies building information modelling and the related
technical standard Industry Foundation Classes in the context of using them as
core spatial data models for access control. We utilise graph theory to introduce
iii
a formal representation of building information models. We further utilise this
formal representation in order to state special access control policy rules. We
then consider policy language requirements for an authorisation framework using
building information models.
We propose a new policy language extension to XACML, with BIM specic
data types and functions based on the IFC specication, which we call BIM-
XACML. Using this policy language model we show how access control conditions
based on object relationships and spatial relationships can be expressed using
building information model terms in policy rules.
Finally, we outline our implementation of a physical access control administra-
tion tool based on our authorisation model and illustrate how various functions
using building information models are utilised in dierent access control pro-
cesses. The testing of this proof-of-concept demonstrator indicates the technical
viability of our concept of using building information models for access control
applications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Smart buildings and security-sensitive critical infrastructures such as airports,
military facilities, ports, chemical manufacturing plants and the like rely on
a plethora of electronic systems for their day-to-day operations. These sys-
tems manage processes and operations such as heating and ventilation, lighting,
surveillance and physical security to name but a few. By connecting these subsys-
tems to a common control network, information from one system can be made
available directly to another system and used in making dynamic operational
decisions.
The very connected nature of smart buildings that makes it possible to in-
tegrate disparate systems also increases our reliance on information networks
to access and control both physical and information resources. This change is
outpacing our ability to secure these resources with the current approaches of
separate access control operations that can often result in unsafe security mea-
sures. We believe that a convergence of physical and logical access control is
necessary in order to make these emerging activities safer. Such a convergence
would enable stakeholders of facilities to use the same access control mechanisms
for both physical access to security sensitive areas of buildings and to access
network connected facility management systems and other information systems.
The convergence of physical and logical access control would improve security
operations if it were realised and this is one of our motivations for this research.
In smart building environments, an integrated facility management approach
is required to enable ecient operation of the disparate systems in a coordinated
1
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way. It is becoming more common to see building information models (BIM) at
the heart of facility management systems [63]. BIMs contain detailed logical rep-
resentations of both static and dynamic aspects of buildings. A BIM repository
includes representations of physical objects that comprise building structures
such as walls and windows, objects contained within the building such as air
conditioning ducts and motors, data objects that are created by systems asso-
ciated with the building such as periodic temperature readings in a room, and
representations of processes that occur within the building, such as the process
of bringing a building back to normal operation after an emergency evacuation.
Traditionally, the main application of BIMs has been in facilitating infor-
mation exchange, using a virtual representation of the building that is a direct
analogue of the physical structure, among dierent stakeholders engaged in build-
ing design and construction. More recently, however, there has been recognition
of the potential value of using a BIM after a building is commissioned as a tool
to manage the facility and the increasingly complex processes that occur within
it [39].
In this setting, a BIM can act as a graphical front-end or portal to provide
integrated access to a range of complex but currently independent subsystems
that are essential to the operation of a modern facility. These include heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) control systems, asset management,
fault handling and maintenance systems, re control systems, closed circuit tele-
vision (CCTV) monitoring systems and physical access control systems (PACS).
BIM-based integration of such systems oers eciency gains because the op-
erator no longer needs to independently locate and interact with the object of
interest through multiple `stove-piped' systems. Moreover, the actions required
to respond to an event, such as an emergency evacuation or routine maintenance
of lifts, can be formalised as a step-by-step process or a workow that is managed
in an integrated way through the BIM.
It can be argued that these recent proposals [39] to use BIMs in this way in-
troduce complex security challenges. In particular, an overarching authorisation
system is required to ensure that this powerful monitoring and control capability
is only available to users possessing appropriate authority. The need to maintain
security in an integrated way is becoming a high priority with the ever-increasing
reliance on information and communications technology across all aspects of fa-
cilities operation. This need is particularly pressing in facilities that are exposed
to complex threats at physical and logical operational levels.
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A BIM repository for a functional building holds a multitude of information
detailing the structure and processes within the building. This information is
sensitive from a security perspective as the information constructively controls
real physical processes which need to be protected from accidental or intentional
mismanagement. Furthermore, there may be design and construction aspects of a
building that are condential, such as the location of surveillance cameras or the
thickness of walls surrounding a high security area such as a vault. Maintaining
the security of this information requires a ne-grained access control approach
that reects the varying sensitivity of dierent parts of the repository.
Another key concern in terms of access control in complex environments is
administration, which is the process of creating and managing access control
policy rules. The main challenge is the diculty of comprehending the three-
dimensional nature of buildings from two-dimensional oor plans. The three-
dimensional nature of building environments is a challenge not only for physical
access control, but also for logical access control where access to information
can be determined by location of users or associated resources. In many such
environments, correctness of access control policy rules rely on expert knowledge
of security administrators who gain the knowledge of their environment with
experience. This however has signicant drawbacks both in terms of possibil-
ity for human error as well as dependency on individuals for correct security
implementations.
There has been a number of access control models proposed to support spatial
access control based on geospatial databases. These geospatial databases adopt
a dierent representational approach compared to BIMs, with the latter being a
more suitable spatial data representation for buildings. The access control chal-
lenges for smart building environments have not been the focus of any existing
models. Authorisation models based on geospatial databases may not be suited
for addressing these challenges. This thesis seeks to examine how building infor-
mation models can be used to address these access control challenges in smart
building environments.
1.1 Aims and objectives
The use of spatial attributes in authorisation policies has gained popularity
among researchers in the past decade with the widespread adoption of geographic
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
information systems and the ability to track resources spatially. However, limited
research has been carried out in this area, especially in the context of buildings
that are of a dierent scale and granularity from geospatial applications and
contain more structured data. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
published research on using building information models for access control.
The aim of this research is to investigate and develop a concept of using a
building information model to facilitate access control for physical and logical
resources with a spatial context. With this aim at the onset of the research, we
conceived three main research objectives.
First was to identify the advantages and challenges in using building infor-
mation models for access control. Given the pioneering nature of this research
in terms of using BIMs in an access control context, it was necessary to iden-
tify appropriate requirements and supporting infrastructure for utilising building
information models to connect isolated systems, processes, resources, and users
based on their spatial context and the benets that can be realised by doing this
for security and access control applications. We also wanted to explore these con-
cepts through an implementation and demonstrate the viability of using building
information models for access control applications.
Second was to construct a conceptual authorisation framework to provide
the theoretical foundation for using building information models as core spatial
data models for access control. This framework was expected to use various
aspects of BIMs to address three main challenges in access control for complex
environments: abstract policy specication, access control administration, and
accountability and assurance. The framework was envisaged to control multiple
subsystems under its authorisation domain and improve the accuracy of access
control processes using building information modelling capabilities.
Third was to investigate the concept of converged physical and logical access
control for resources with spatial context through building information models,
and to identify the eect of this approach on overall system management. This
convergence is not unique in itself, but there had been no previous research in
the context of complex authorisation scenarios with building information models
that we considered for this research. It was essential to identify the advantages
and disadvantages of such a converged approach in terms of high-level abstract
policy specication and ecient authorisation management.
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1.2 Contributions and achievements
This thesis has produced a number of research contributions covering various as-
pects of access control, mainly relating to the use of building information models:
the proposed authorisation framework using BIMs, the graph model for BIMs,
and the policy language model for BIM access control. The main contributions
and achievements of the thesis include the following:
Contribution 1: We introduce the concept of using building information mod-
els to facilitate access control in complex environments. The challenges in
access control for smart buildings and critical infrastructures are studied in
the context of complex environments. We provide a detailed analysis of ex-
isting access control models for spatiotemporal authorisation systems and
systematically analyse the shortcomings of these models in the context of
complex environments. A key concept that forms the basis for this research
is building information modelling, so a detailed introduction to building in-
formation modelling and associated technology standards is provided. We
provide an in-depth analysis of the IFC specication and propose a method
that uses the IFC vocabulary for spatial authorisation policies.
Contribution 2: We propose a novel authorisation framework based on the re-
quirements identied, to enhance exibility and eciency of authorisation
processes in critical infrastructure environments. We classify access control
requirements in smart buildings based on resource types as BIM-internal
and BIM-external. The proposed authorisation framework is intended as
a solution for complex access control issues within critical infrastructures
identied in Chapter 2. This authorisation framework utilises building
information models in the three key stages of access control: policy speci-
cation, policy administration, and decision-making.
Contribution 3: We propose a graph theory based representation of building
information models, BIM graph, that can be used to formally represent
how building information models can be used and manipulated in various
access control applications. This research being the rst to utilise building
information models in a security application, this graph model oers a the-
oretical precedent to formally dene various functionalities using building
information models.
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Contribution 4: We propose BIM-XACML, a new policy language extension
to XACML, with BIM specic data types and functions based on the IFC
specication. This policy model caters to the policy specication require-
ments of our authorisation framework. The use of building information
models as a spatial data model for authorisation creates unique possibili-
ties and associated requirements for a policy model and we discuss why the
existing policy models are not suitable for this application. The proposed
policy model allows the specication of access control policies that include
conditions based on object relationships and spatial relationships expressed
in a BIM.
Contribution 5: We present our implementation of a proof-of-concept demon-
strator that utilises building information models to facilitate security ad-
ministration for a physical access control system. This demonstrator show-
cases the viability of the concepts of our authorisation framework using
building information models. With this demonstrator implementation, we
attempt to address common problems in physical access control admin-
istration, identied by industry practitioners and security administrators
which were gathered through our interactions with industry partners of the
Airports of the Future project. We describe the implementation of various
components of our authorisation framework as part of the demonstrator.
1.3 The Airports of the Future project
The research presented in this thesis is part of a larger multi-disciplinary research
project titled Airports of the Future (AotF) [100], which investigates the com-
plexity of modern airports and focuses on safety, security and eciency within
airports while improving passenger experience. This is an integrated multi-
disciplinary research project comprising research programs focusing on infor-
mation, process, people, technology, and space domains of airports. The project
takes a whole-of-industry approach to ensure all aspects of airport operations are
considered in developing solutions that cater to all industry participants.
The AotF project comprises seven broad areas of research: airport informa-
tion modelling, business continuity and incident response management, business
process management, complex systems, human systems, intelligent surveillance
and identity management. In its four year life span, the AotF project has been
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generating outcomes in ve general areas of interest to the air transportation
industry: operations management, border and aviation security, passenger expe-
rience, terminal design, and incident response [134]. This thesis contains research
conducted as part of the identity management program. The identity manage-
ment program focuses on addressing security issues related to access control in
airport environments. This research also draws from close collaborations with
the airport information modelling program.
A central component of the AotF project is the notion of an Airport Informa-
tion Model (AIM). AIM is an airport centric extension of building information
modelling, which can be used as a tool for operational decision support, scenario
analysis and facility management. AIM builds upon BIM technologies to include
operational data from various sub-projects within the AotF project. In its nal
operational stage, an AIM is envisaged to be a living integration platform for
airport operations, building upon existing smart building capabilities.
1.4 Industry engagement
This research was conceived to address access control challenges in airports based
on Airport Information Modelling. Even though the research was conducted as
part of the Airports of the Future project, it was designed to be transferable
to other complex smart building environments that share many of the security
related challenges.
This research being part of the Airports of the Future project was a key
factor in terms of shaping the course of the thesis. The partnership with vari-
ous stakeholders in airport operations provided us with access to collaborators
who are tasked in addressing various security and access control challenges in
those environments. These interactions have helped in designing the research to
address real world problems and also in gathering useful feedback on solutions
proposed through this research.
This partnership enabled us to interact with industry practitioners who are
tasked with managing large operational airport facilities in Australia. This en-
gagement with project partners commenced with initial problem identication
in two steps. First, we requested them to identify the challenges they face in
terms of security and access control within their organisations. These challenges
mainly revolved around administrative challenges in day to day operations.
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Second, we interacted with these industry practitioners about their current ac-
cess control related processes. This enabled us to identify some other issues that
exist within those organisations, which are not openly identied by their opera-
tors. We carried out this two-step process of problem identication throughout
the initial phase of the project at multiple stages.
The continuous engagement with groups of stakeholders in operational en-
vironments enabled us to model our research problem map closer to real world
challenges. The solutions developed through the course of the research were pre-
sented to these partners incrementally and we continuously gathered feedback
through various project communication channels. The proof-of-concept system
developed as part of the research was demonstrated live to a number of stake-
holders on several occasions. These included discussions around newly introduced
functionalities and their value to practitioners in operational environments. Even
though an actual eld trial to produce empirical results on these proposals was
not carried out as part of this research, these informal evaluations gave us a
level of condence in the value of proposed solutions in addressing challenges in
operational critical infrastructure environments.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The remaining six chapters are organised
as follows:
Chapter 2 provides background on access control for securing critical infras-
tructure, spatial data models, and spatial access control models. It draws
a parallel between physical and logical access control to explore the appli-
cability of using a converged approach for access control in such environ-
ments. The chapter then explores various requirements for access control
using building information models and presents a survey of relevant spa-
tiotemporal access control models. Finally, the chapter provides a discus-
sion on policy specication, which also identies shortcomings in existing
policy models to be used with building information models. The survey
of spatiotemporal access control models in this chapter has been published
in:
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Nimalaprakasan Skandhakumar, Jason Reid, Ed Dawson, Robin
Drogemuller, and Farzad Salim. An authorization framework
using building information models. The Computer Journal,
55(10):1244{1264, 2012.
Chapter 3 proposes a novel authorisation framework using building informa-
tion models, providing unied access control over resources contained within
and around building information model repositories. This authorisation
framework utilises building information models in three key stages of access
control: policy specication, policy administration, and decision-making.
The chapter also discusses how access control unication is achieved through
this authorisation framework and how dierent components interact to ad-
dress the previously identied requirements. A preliminary version of the
authorisation framework presented in this chapter has been published in:
Nimalaprakasan Skandhakumar, Jason Reid, Ed Dawson, Robin
Drogemuller, and Farzad Salim. An authorization framework
using building information models. The Computer Journal,
55(10):1244{1264, 2012.
Chapter 4 identies the essential technical details of building information mod-
els that are an integral part of the authorisation framework. It provides a
more in-depth analysis of the IFC specication and how it forms the vo-
cabulary for spatial authorisation policies. The chapter proposes a graph
theory based representation of building information models that can be
used to formally represent how building information models can be used
and manipulated in various access control applications.
Chapter 5 identies requirements for a policy model for the authorisation frame-
work presented in Chapter 3. It presents a new policy language extension
to XACML, with BIM specic data types and functions based on the IFC
specication, which we call BIM-XACML.
Chapter 6 presents the implementation of a proof-of-concept demonstrator that
brings together the concepts presented in the previous chapters of the the-
sis. This proof-of-concept tool utilises building information models to fa-
cilitate security administration for a physical access control system. The
chapter aims to showcase the viability of the concepts of the authorisation
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framework using building information models. It provides technical details
of how the demonstrator was implemented and maps its features to var-
ious concepts and components of the authorisation framework presented
in Chapter 3. The chapter then elaborates on the implementation of the
proof-of-concept demonstrator and discuss how various access control ad-
ministration related functions have been developed using the approaches
proposed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Finally, the chapter discusses var-
ious practical limitations of the demonstrator implementation as well as
other development omissions due to resource constraints. The demonstra-
tor implementation presented in this chapter has been published in:
Nimalaprakasan Skandhakumar, Farzad Salim, Jason Reid, and
Ed Dawson. Physical access control administration using
building information models. In Proceedings of the 4th inter-
national conference on Cyberspace Safety and Security, CSS'12,
pages 236{250, Melbourne, Australia, 2012. Springer-Verlag.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by summarising the research and contributions,
and proposes possible directions for future research.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter will analyse literature related to access control for securing critical
infrastructure, spatial data models, and spatial access control models. The prob-
lem of access control in critical infrastructures with large, complex, and smart
buildings will be examined against the existing access control approaches for such
facilities. The notion of smart buildings in the context of critical infrastructures
will be discussed along with associated access control administration challenges.
This chapter will further draw parallel between physical and logical access con-
trol to explore the applicability of using a converged approach for access control
in such environments.
A key concept that forms the basis for this research is building information
modelling. A Building Information Model (BIM) is an electronic repository of
structured, three-dimensional data that captures both the physical and dynamic
functional characteristics of a facility. In addition to its more traditional function
as a tool to aid design and construction, a building information model can be used
throughout the life cycle of a facility, functioning as a living database that places
resources contained within the building in their spatial and temporal context.
This is a separate domain of research and tool set that is to date mainly used in
architecture, engineering and construction industries. Given the multi-domain
nature of the research presented in this thesis, we provide a detailed introduction
to building information modelling and associated technology standards that can
be used with such tools.
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This chapter systematically analyses the authorisation requirements involved
in the use of building information models for critical infrastructures and smart
buildings against existing access control models. These authorisation require-
ments consider both regulating access to the structured data that exists within
a BIM as well as to external systems and data repositories that can be accessed
via the BIM interface. With a view to addressing these requirements, a survey of
relevant spatiotemporal access control models is presented, focusing on features
applicable to building information models and highlighting capability gaps.
Addressing the access control challenges in critical infrastructures is currently
not the motivation behind any of the existing access control models. Given
the suitability of building information models as spatial data models for access
control, none of these access control models focus on building information models
directly. The set of access control requirements identied through this chapter
will form the basis for the authorisation model presented in later chapters of this
thesis.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The notion of critical in-
frastructure and associated security and access control challenges are briey
discussed in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, the concept of building information
modelling is introduced along with other spatial data models, and the argument
for the choice of the spatial data model for this thesis is presented. Section 2.3
analyses traditional access control models in the context of access control for
complex infrastructure, by introducing a motivating scenario in Section 2.3.1
and identifying a list of functional requirements for access control using BIMs
in Section 2.3.2. The set of features that are required for spatiotemporal access
control are outlined in Section 2.3.3, which is later used in Section 2.3.4 as the
comparison criteria for reviewing a collection of spatial access control models
for BIM applications. Finally, a discussion on policy specication languages is
provided in Section 2.3.5, which also identies shortcomings in existing policy
models to be used with BIMs.
2.1 Security of critical infrastructure
Access control is an important measure in ensuring security for any type of
infrastructure and this is especially important for critical infrastructure. The
Australian Government denes critical infrastructure as:
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Those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and
communication networks, which if destroyed, degraded or rendered
unavailable for an extended period, would signicantly impact on
the social or economic well-being of the nation, or aect Australia's
ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. [7]
This includes facilities such as energy generation plants and distribution net-
works, telecommunication infrastructure, transportation hubs, and military in-
stallations among others. The need to protect such critical infrastructure has
become an important priority during the past decade for governments and in-
dustry alike.
In many developed countries, a substantial number of critical infrastructures
are either owned or operated by private entities on a commercial basis. A key im-
perative of Australian Government's Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy
is \to maintain a secure, resilient and trusted electronic operating environment,
including for critical infrastructure owners and operators"[7]. It is essential to
have commercially viable solutions to manage security in these environments, in
addition to government regulations. Providing adequate security for the critical
assets is a key responsibility of owners and operators of such infrastructures.
They are also responsible for planning security strategies and conducting regular
reviews and assessments in conjunction with regulatory requirements [104].
Even though the term critical infrastructure is dened broadly to include not
only assets, but also networks and supply chains, in the context of this research
the focus is mainly on physical and information assets.
2.1.1 Smart buildings
The notion of a smart building or an intelligent building is not a well-dened
concept, and the denitions vary for dierent domains of the building indus-
try. In the context of this research, smart buildings can be dened as \a build-
ing comprised of advanced and integrated systems for building automation, life
safety, and telecommunication systems." [116] A common characteristic of smart
buildings is that they incorporate information technology into all aspects of facil-
ity management, thus creating an environment where all systems are accessible
through networks. In current smart buildings various individual systems that
have their own electronic network based control capabilities, including heating
and ventilation, climate control, lighting management, re alarms and security
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systems [24]. By connecting these subsystems to a common control network,
information from one system can be made available directly to another system
and used in making dynamic operational decisions [67, 73]. Various functions of
these independent systems in such a connected infrastructure can be centrally
controlled electronically, resulting in signicant cost savings and eciencies, es-
pecially in energy consumption and facility management [28]. The availability
of such connected infrastructure is assumed as a basic feature of smart buildings
for our framework proposed in Chapter 3.
In the context of critical infrastructure, smart buildings can benet not only
in terms of cost savings, but they also enable managing and operating such large
facilities more eciently. A key aspect of security in such environments is the
convergence of physical and logical security operations into a common control
stack [87]. The purpose of physical access control is protecting critical assets
contained within a protected area. However, with smart buildings, many of these
assets can also be remotely controlled through networks. This creates two levels
of access control, to physically protect the asset and to protect the functionalities
of the asset. Unauthorised physical access to such network connected components
must be restricted, which can be otherwise exploited to gain access to those
control systems [65]. In this context, it is desirable to have a converged approach
to access control that can ensure compliance of access control policies at both of
these levels. In certain situations both physical and logical access is necessary
for the same resource related to dierent actions. For example, a printer can be
physically accessed to perform maintenance, which can also be logically accessed
for printing documents. This convergence enables stakeholders of the building to
use common access control mechanisms for both physical access to secure areas
of the facilities and to access the network connected facility management systems
and other information systems [88]. This also enables controlling access to the
large pool of information available through the networked systems in a smart
building.
2.1.2 Access control and security
Access control is a key element in securing critical infrastructure [44]. In terms of
physical access control to spaces, both provision of timely access and preserving
the security of sensitive areas are paramount. A typical large-scale infrastructure
can span across multiple sites with several multi-storey buildings that can host
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multiple zones with unique security characteristics. Further, there can be several
dierent pathways connecting zones. Of particular interest to physical access
control is the fact that there can be normal pathways such as corridors, stairways,
and lifts or there can be indirect pathways such as ceiling spaces, partition walls,
and ventilation ducts. The scale of the facilities and the spatial relationships and
connectivity between the controlled spaces makes the manual administration of
access particularly dicult for security administrators [11]. At the heart of the
problem is the current dependency on human administrators to reason about the
implications of the provision or the revocation of sta access to an area within
these facilities. Specically, it is hard to comprehend the three dimensional
nature of the environment through the use of two-dimensional oor plans, which
are commonly used by administrators for physical access control conguration
and management.
There have been attempts in commercial software products for using building
models in policy administration tools for physical security. Some of the recent
versions of industry standard physical access control systems provide support
for importing computer-aided design (CAD) les of buildings and using them
as visual interfaces for administration. User interfaces that interact with three-
dimensional object displays can benet physical access control administrators,
which needs to convey the details of buildings with multiple dimensions to its
users. Such interfaces with three-dimensional displays are suitable for systems
that need to identify information with depth [123]. Our analysis into current
commercial tools and associated research show that the available user interfaces
are not adequate in addressing the usability requirements behind policy author-
ing. The SiPass solution from Siemens supports 2D maps that can be imported
as AutoCAD les [114]. Gallagher Command Centre (i.e. formally known as
Cardax FT Command Interface) includes a comparable visual interface feature
with oor maps [53]. The Omnipresence 3D Security Platform [51] provides in-
terfaces connecting to other systems, including access control systems. However,
the functionalities provided by these applications are limited to 2D maps and
annotation of spaces. They do not use the spatial information present in build-
ing information models to infer spatial relationships which can be used in access
control policy creation and management.
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It is not only the scale of these physical facilities that complicates the ad-
ministration of access control, but also the changing culture of these organisa-
tions. It is no longer the norm to have all employees at a facility work for the
same organisation [89]. Many individual systems and organisational functions
are outsourced to external contractors and employees attached to these partner
organisations also share the same spaces and resources. This is a dynamic pro-
cess where the people that require access can change frequently. For example,
the heating, ventilation, air conditioning and power management systems can be
independently contracted by dierent operators, whose sta may need access to
various, sometimes highly secure, zones in a facility.
2.1.3 Usability in security administration and manage-
ment
Human-computer interaction is often seen as the weakest link of security in many
systems [97]. In practice, many security practitioners consider access control as a
task that they perform irregularly and many of them do not have the necessary
training [22]. The major motivation behind the current access control tools
and systems has been regulatory requirements for accountability and preventive
measures [12]. Even widely researched and adopted access control concepts such
as Role Based Access Control (RBAC) are in practice hard to grasp for many non-
specialist users who are most of the time the end users of these administration
tools [23]. It has been widely argued [22, 23] that access control systems and
associated administration tools must consider usability as a basic requirement
at their design time. In recent years, research into human computer interaction
in security, also known as HCI-SEC [54], has gained much attention. The main
motivation behind HCI-SEC is that security and usability must complement
each other [9]. It is widely accepted that human errors can be prevented or
minimised with changes to the user-interfaces to a system [86]. A better approach
to handling human error is to provide support at a system level, rather than
blaming them on individuals [103].
In general, resource owners are the people with the best knowledge about
their access control requirements [50]. However, it is often dicult for these
resource owners to express their security needs in computer terms correctly. In
access control, administrators are expected to express the functional goals as user
roles or permissions. It is desirable to express these rules in an intuitive way [69].
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In recent years, there has been signicant interest from industry and the re-
search community into the usability of security technologies [9, 22, 54]. However,
published research into the usability of physical access control administration
tools is limited. The human factors aecting physical access control and how the
functionalities of administration tools hinder or facilitate the process of security
policy creation has been overlooked while the need for eective physical access
control has increased [11].
2.1.4 Converged physical and logical access control
Plant, equipment, machines, etc. in a facility are increasingly computerised and
managed via process control hardware and software (e.g., Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition or SCADA) over Internet-connected networks. They are
evolving to have many of the characteristics of traditional software applications.
Though their authorisation capabilities are relatively immature [68] some can
distinguish dierent users and grant them specic access privileges. For improved
eciency and security, these disparate systems need to be managed in a unied
way.
The concept of security convergence [30] merges the physical security and
logical security operations to ll in the gaps between these two functions and
provides more ecient and eective security. A single authorisation system for
physical security and logical security will enable using two-way interaction be-
tween these two systems in decision-making. For example, the logical access
control can infer location status of a user from the physical access control system
to determine if the user has entered the specied spatial zone before access-
ing a spatially bounded information system. Information from a workow and
scheduling system might be used to congure physical access control rules based
on task location and required access zones. This approach can enhance security
management and access policy denition.
The concept of convergence in access control for physical and logical security
systems is based on a unied repository of user identity data [87]. Information
technology has been incorporated heavily into physical security systems in re-
cent years. This has brought many security issues to physical security systems
that were once specic to information systems. Even though physical security
and information security are managed independently in most organisations, they
share the same goal of securing organisational resources. This two-level approach
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leads to more administration overhead and reduces overall control in security [88].
A converged access control approach gives organisations more control and con-
sistency over security management. There are many common aspects between
controlling access to information systems and physical spaces. The basic subject,
object, and access type relations in information systems can be interpreted as a
person, physical structure and physical access type relations in physical access
control [44]. One of the goals of this research is to apply unied approaches for
access control in heterogeneous systems with physical and logical access control
subsystems.
2.2 Spatial data models
A spatial data model denes how spatial data are stored and represented within
spatial databases. It can also dene how these data could be analysed and manip-
ulated. Spatial data models can be divided into two broad categories: outdoor
models and indoor models. This basic categorisation stems from granularity,
type, and structure of spatial data required for the applications of indoor models
versus those of outdoor models [132, 133]. In spatial access control, spatial data
models play a central role by providing vocabulary for representing location data
of concerned subjects and objects in access control policies.
This section will introduce existing spatial data models that can be used for
spatial representation of buildings and facilities. The rest of this section will
introduce City Geographic Markup Language, Building Information Modelling,
and Industry Foundation Classes, and discuss their features and shortcomings in
the context of access control.
2.2.1 Complex infrastructure and building information
modelling
Building Information Modelling (BIM) is a knowledge management process within
and across the architecture, engineering, construction, and operations industry
domains [112, 122]. In its broad scope, building information modelling includes
policies, processes and technologies that can be used for gathering and managing
\the essential building design and project data in digital format throughout the
building's lifecycle" [98]. Building Information Models (BIM) can be seen as
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centralised repositories of objects and processes within a building. BIMs are de-
signed from the initial design process of the building, and they evolve throughout
the lifecycle of the building. The fundamental purpose of building information
models is to provide a common repository of semantically rich three-dimensional
information that can be used seamlessly in parallel and sequentially by all mem-
bers of the design and construction team, and ultimately by the owner/operator
of a facility throughout the facility's life cycle [39].
Figure 2.1: A BIM showing details of a building granulated at dierent levels
(Source: Gehry Technologies)
Building information models can be generalised as spatial models, such as
in geospatial systems. However, there are some signicant dierences between
the spatial models used in geographic information system (GIS) applications and
building information models. The information structure used in these systems is
the main dierence between GIS and BIM. The spatial representation of objects
is explicitly hierarchically structured in BIMs while they are generally implicitly
related in most GIS applications. Another signicant dierence is in terms of
scale and granularity. A spatial model in a GIS application can cover a larger
area, but they are limited to surface observations and they do not normally
account for any building specic elements internal to walls or ceiling that can be
vital in critical infrastructure environments. Even though GIS applications can
have ner granularity, BIMs have more building specic information at dierent
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granular levels (as shown in Figure 2.1). Building information models can hold
logical relationships between building elements, such as zones and spaces, which
are not normally present in GIS applications.
BIMs support computational geometry that enables spatial analysis func-
tionalities such as path nding. There are tools to formally analyse BIMs in
the Industry Foundation Classes (IFC) format for integrity, quality and physical
safety [42]. BIMs are used in emergency response, evacuation, and recovery sce-
narios to support indoor navigation with path nding capabilities and to provide
important building information with spatial context to emergency responders
and rescuers [105].
Building information models are seamless solutions as spatial data models for
complex and critical infrastructures. In addition to catering to the requirements
for spatially representing the assets and processes within such environments,
BIMs can serve as an integration platform for those facilities. BIMs have the ca-
pability of integrating multi domain systems, and provide a common repository
for all control systems within the facilities. As indicated above, building informa-
tion models are expected to become common practice in future buildings, and all
critical infrastructures [10, 39]. This makes building information models a good
t as a spatial data model for access control in complex critical infrastructures,
especially with recent government endorsements in Australia, Europe, and the
US [20, 43, 90].
2.2.2 Authorisation for building information models
The geometrical and spatial reasoning capabilities of building information mod-
els [40] delivers the opportunity to use them for access control conguration.
These analysis functionalities can be used to identify various aspects of spatial
arrangements that may be overlooked, such as indirect access between spaces,
when access control policy rules are dened or audited manually using oor plans.
For example, a restricted area may unintentionally become accessible through a
complex route via a lower oor. This capability can also assist a security ad-
ministrator who wishes to know if a highly sensitive area is indirectly accessible
from a lower security area via ceilings spaces, ventilation ducts or walls made
from materials that can be easily breached (as shown in Figure 2.2).
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.2: The need for 3D models in security analysis (a) a wall going up to the
underside of the slab of the oor above (b) a wall going up to ceiling height, with
the possibility of access through the ceiling space (Source: Robin Drogemuller)
This is a useful capability when a building is rst being designed and subse-
quently for the facility managers to plan remodelling and partitioning of spaces
subject to dierent access rules. Further, a BIM can also function as an access
control simulator that can be used to analyse dierent access control scenarios
such as path nding for evacuation in response to re in dierent parts of the
building - a capability that could be valuable in developing emergency response
plans [48, 58].
In access control for building information models, a distinction can be drawn
between resources as BIM-internal and BIM-external. This distinction reects
two distinct access control contexts that a BIM authorisation framework must
address: it must be capable of enforcing security policies with respect to the
BIM content as well as regulating access to resources accessed via the BIM but
external to it. For example, a temperature sensor itself would be a BIM-internal
resource, while the temperature data it produces within its subsystem would be
BIM-external data.
Controlling access to BIM content is important, because dierent elements
and spaces within the model are subject to dierent access rules. Much of the
information in a BIM may be operationally sensitive so users should only have
access when they have a legitimate `need to know'. For example, the details of the
critical network wirings need not be visible to an air-conditioning maintenance
operator. Thus, the visualisation of a building information model needs to be
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controlled based on the role, assigned tasks (and possibly other contextual factors
such as time and location) of the user. This authorisation capability also needs
to be included in BIM tools such as design analysis tools, model servers, and
BIM viewers.
Authorisation for the BIM-external case is more challenging. The usage sce-
nario we are interested in involves the use of BIM as a unifying `front end' to
a range of disparate systems each of which may also have its own authorisation
system. For example, the HVAC system may have its own database of users and
their associated roles (maintenance engineer, control room operator etc.) which
determine the operations they can perform. If a control room operator is access-
ing the HVAC system through the BIM, the two authorisation services must be
able to cooperate to enforce the security policy. Ideally, the two systems would
leverage an enterprise-wide identity and access management framework which
would avoid the need to manage duplicate user databases for each application.
Integration of the authorisation systems of the BIM and associated subsystems
presents a range of challenges which we examine in greater detail in later sections.
The use of spatial attributes in authorisation policies has gained popularity
among researchers in the past decade with the widespread adoption of geographic
information systems (GIS) and the ability to track resources spatially. However,
limited research has been carried out in the area of spatial authorisation for
BIMs, which dier from the traditional GIS context, particularly in terms of
scale, how three dimensional data is structured and the granularity of spatial
information for indoor models. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
published research on using Building Information Models for access control.
2.2.3 Industry Foundation Classes
Industry Foundation Classes (IFC) is an ocial International Standard ISO/IS
16739 for open BIM, registered with the International Standardization Organi-
zation. The IFC specication is developed and maintained by buildingSMART
International, a neutral, international and not-for-prot organisation supporting
open BIM initiatives, with regional chapters in Europe, North America, Aus-
tralia, Asia and Middle East [25]. The Model Support Group (MSG) within
buildingSMART International, a group of international experts from buildingS-
MART membership, is responsible for the development and maintenance of the
IFC specication and related data model standards.
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buildingSMART developed IFC as a common data schema to enable storage
and exchange of BIM data between dierent proprietary software applications.
The main motivation behind this initiative was the lack of interoperability stan-
dards in BIM software to support the vast number of native formats to achieve
interoperability in building projects. The IFC specication enables continuous
integration and use of BIMs by dierent stakeholders with dierent software plat-
forms throughout the lifecycle of a building. Such a common standard enables
the use of accepted methods to formally analyse BIMs for integrity, quality and
physical safety [42].
IFC is a commonly used format for BIMs in architectural, engineering, and
construction industries. The IFC data model is used as the interchange le for-
mat between dierent stakeholders of buildings to exchange software independent
building information models. For example, a building information model pro-
duced by an architect using computer aided design software can be used by the
building operator in the facilities management software. The use of IFC standard
enables continuous industry-wide sharing of information for the life cycle of the
building.
IFC is a supported format in major architectural CAD systems and in an in-
creasing number of engineering CAD and analysis systems. Since most buildings
last much longer than the computer software that is used to design them, a ma-
jor benet of the IFC specication is that it supports an ASCII character-based
le format that can be archived to remove dependencies on particular software
vendors.
While the IFC model supports le-based exchange, this is not convenient
for intensive use of IFC-based representations. Model servers are specialised
databases that store information so that it can be continuously accessed and
modied by multiple users. If a building is modelled in an IFC compatible CAD
system, it can then be exported to a model server, where it can be used to
support day-to-day operations. If the facilities management and control systems
are integrated with the model server, the BIM could be maintained up-to-date by
reecting relevant changes in the building from external systems. For example,
when equipment within the building is replaced, the new equipment specications
can be updated in the BIM if such integration is available. This will in turn ensure
that current data is always available for authorisation decision making purposes.
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A building information model in IFC format is organised as an object-based
inheritance hierarchy using an object-relational model [79]. The IFC specica-
tion provides the data types required for BIM classes and objects. Inter-object
relationships are another important aspect of BIMs where shared properties of
objects can easily be accessed and manipulated. IFC Relationship (IFCRel) ob-
jects provide the vocabulary to represent various types of relationships between
objects in a BIM. In Chapter 4, a more detailed discussion on the IFC speci-
cation and object classications is provided, while Chapter 5 presents how the
IFC semantics can be used in spatial access control policies.
The IFC specication also denes a spatial hierarchy: a project contains one
or more sites, a site contains one or more buildings, a building contains one or
more storeys, storeys contain spaces, walls etc. and spaces contain furniture and
ttings. Each object in the model has a standard set of properties, but users can
add non-standard information using the in-built extension mechanisms. While
the above hierarchy is a strict tree structure, systems of objects can be dened
that span multiple storeys or buildings, such as a security control system. A
single object can be part of many systems if necessary. The ability to represent
spatial hierarchy and the availability of inter-object relationships in IFC makes
it possible to utilise this specication to create high level abstract access control
policies. This approach is further discussed in Chapter 5.
2.2.4 City Geographic Markup Language
City Geography Markup Language (CityGML) [61] is an XML based storage
and exchange format for virtual city models. The Open Geospatial Consortium
(OGC) developed Geography Markup Language (GML) [99] as a standard for
storage and transport of geographic information and as a comprehensive mod-
elling language for geographic systems.1 Technically, CityGML is an application
schema of the Geography Markup Language 3 (GML3) [61]. It provides appear-
ance, topological, semantic and geometrical models by dening the classes and
relations for the representation of most three-dimensional urban objects such as
built structures, elevation, vegetations, water bodies, etc.
1GML is an XML based encoding grammar developed by the OGC as a feature based
modelling language that maps the real world geographic information into feature sets. Refer
to [99] for more information.
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In CityGML, the appearance model provides \observable properties" for ob-
ject surfaces, which can be used to represent visual data and other arbitrary
categories such as infra-red radiation, noise pollution, or structural stress. The
CityGML thematic model contains class denitions for important object types
that are required by dierent application areas. Real-world entities correspond
to features such as buildings, walls, or doors in the semantic level. At the the-
matic level, extension modules are dened for dierent application areas such
as transportation, vegetation, or waterbody. The thematic classes can contain
both spatial and non-spatial attributes. Non-spatial attributes are properties
such as creation dates, image URIs, or year of construction. It can also dene
interrelationships like aggregations, generalisations, and associations for feature
classes.
CityGML supports multiple levels of granularity through dierent Levels of
Detail (LOD). This provides ve independent LODs, LOD0 to LOD4, and each
object in CityGML can be represented in dierent levels of resolution. LOD0
has the lowest class of accuracy that is used to model regions and landscapes.
In its basic level, it can represent an aerial image or a map in a two and a half
dimensional digital terrain model. Buildings in this level are represented by ei-
ther footprint or roof edge polygons. LOD1 is a block model in which building
structures are aggregated into simple blocks with no further details. LOD2 has
detailed roof structures and boundary surfaces. LOD3 provides granular details
of roofs and walls including doors and windows. It can represent external ar-
chitectural models and land marks. The levels up to LOD3 in CityGML can be
used to model outdoor spaces.
LOD4 of CityGML attempts to bring indoor and outdoor representations
more closely by considering indoor specic object details. LOD4 provides the
highest level of details of all LODs and it adds interior surfaces of building to a
LOD3 model. The Building module of CityGML enables representing thematic
and spatial aspects of building, including indoor building structure. LOD4 can
be used to represent constructive elements in architectural models. The interior
structure of a building such as rooms, doors, stairs, and furniture can be modelled
in LOD4. Interior installations in LOD4 classify objects that are permanently
attached to the building structure and cannot be moved.
Even though LOD4 provides the foundation for spatial modelling of indoor
environments, it still lacks the functionality and the granularity that may be
26 Chapter 2. Background
needed for applications such as indoor navigation [76, 130]. IndoorGML is a
work in progress towards an indoor spatial modelling based on CityGML. It is
particularly focused on providing a framework for the integration of dierent
positioning and localisation technologies that are used to assist in indoor nav-
igation, but cannot be directly modelled using CityGML [77, 92]. IndoorGML
seems to be relevant to our work, however the details of the model are yet to be
published.2
2.2.5 CityGML vs. IFC BIMs
Both CityGML and IFC are semantic models that are targeted at dierent scales
and scopes of spatial representations [92]. There are three signicant dierences
between CityGML and BIMs with regards to their suitability as a spatial data
model for access control.
First, in CityGML, surface observations of topographic features are used to
derive three-dimensional objects. In BIMs, a generative modelling approach is
used to represent how a three-dimensional object is constructed [93]. BIMs pro-
vide details semantic representations of all building elements. A unied BIM for
a facility would include objects and elements from all domains, such as archi-
tectural, engineering, construction, or facility management. More importantly,
BIMs include representations of hidden objects such as pipes, wiring in-between
walls, ceilings, and oors with a ner granularity. This is an important feature
when we are concerned about all aspects of access control. For example, the
possibility of capturing data from communication cables, also known as packet
sning [4], can only be inferred if the critical network cabling information is
available in the data model.
Second, CityGML does not provide a specic concept for the representation
of storeys [61]. Storeys however play an important role in access control. The
ability to represent multi-storey buildings and objects that share across multiple
stories such as lifts and escalators are important in determining access control.
Thus, it is vital to have a concrete representation within the model to support
this rather than ad-hoc workarounds that are used in CityGML.
2There are recent eorts to standardise IndoorGML under OGC [95]. To this end, the
IndoorGML Standard Working Group [95] was formed in January 2012, however no further
information about the status of the standard is available. Refer to their website for more
details: http://www.opengeospatial.org/projects/groups/indoorgmlswg
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Third, BIMs are used from the preliminary stages of building design and
evolve throughout its life cycle. This provides the possibility for security and
access control design process to be incorporated from the early stages, rather
than as an afterthought.
As discussed earlier, IFC based BIMs have been more widely adopted com-
pared to CityGML, especially among the architecture, engineering, and construc-
tion industries and governments alike. In looking for a spatial data model for
representing complex and critical infrastructure the wider support of industries
and regulatory institutions is important. Due to these dierences and advantages
between the IFC and CityGML representations, IFC based BIMs are considered
as the spatial data model for the authorisation framework proposed in Chapter 3.
2.3 Access control
The term authorisation refers to a security service and related processes that
grant or deny requests made by authenticated users to access resources according
to rules (also referred to as a security policy). Authorisation encompasses both
authentication (are users who they say they are?) and access control (should
the user's requests to access a resource be granted?). Authentication is the
process of establishing a level of condence in the authenticity of a claim [29].
Identity authentication establishes condence that a person can rightly claim an
association with an identier that is unique within a domain, such as a username
or sta number [66, 94]. An authenticated human entity is commonly known
as a user [46]. Some authors distinguish authorisation from access control (i.e.,
access decision making) [57]. When this distinction is drawn, authorisation refers
to the formulation of access policy, which allocates access rights to users, and
access control is the enforcement of the policy via allow/deny responses to access
requests. In this thesis, we assume appropriately authenticated user identity
is made available for authorisation purposes, where the authentication process
can take any form such as identity tokens, passwords, biometrics, etc. Based
on this assumption, we take the more common approach of using both terms
authorisation and access control interchangeably [15], to represent the broader
process of dening policy rules to evaluating policy rules against access requests.
The term logical access control is used to refer to the service that regulates
access to resources that take the form of information and information services.
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Examples of information include: the BIM elements themselves (i.e. BIM content
- the structured objects that represent walls, wiring, pipes etc.) and information
that is generated or stored outside the BIM but made accessible through it e.g.,
digital CCTV footage or the operational status of a pump (made available via
a HVAC control system). An example of an information service is a function
within an asset management system that initiates and subsequently manages the
lifecycle of a maintenance request for a faulty piece of equipment. In contrast,
and consistent with its widely understood meaning, the term physical access
control is used to refer to the service that regulates human access to spaces
within a facility. One of the goals for our BIM authorisation architecture is to
unify logical and physical access control within a single cohesive framework.
A fundamental aspect of access control for complex and critical infrastruc-
tures is the spatial nature of the access control requirements. The key factor
dening spatial access control is the ability to use spatial constraints and condi-
tions as part of access control policy rules. For example, we consider two adjacent
rooms as shown in Figure 2.3. Room 1 can be accessed via Door A and Door
B. Room 2 can be accessed from Room 1 through a connecting Door C, or an
independent Door D. Users with access to Room 1 could open door A and B,
while users with access to Room 2 could open Door D. Only those with access
privilege to both rooms should be able to open Door C. If this scenario needs to
be specied in traditional access control rules, the policy must specify conditions
for each door for each user. For example, a policy rule could be, User X can
open door A and B only. However, it becomes more complex in a large building
with multiple access clearance levels and a large number of users.
A C
B D
Room 1
Finance Archives
Figure 2.3: Physical access control rules using zones
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The integration of the spatial model in policy specication could make this
process more ecient and error free. The policy elements required to specify rules
can be simplied to abstract notions of zone types, and associated security levels.
The spatial relationships can be later used to deduce which doors should be
allowed access. The same rule above can be simplied as, User X can access Room
1 only. An even higher-level policy would be, User X can access nance division
zones, given that Room 1 is assigned for nance division. It may not seem a
large dierence in this scenario, but in a large-scale operational environment,
this could simplify the process of granting access. This will also be useful with
auditing access control policies with the use of spatial relationships between
dierent controlled resources and identify any unintentional access leakages.
In the following subsections, we introduce a motivating example scenario that
serves to illustrate various aspects of spatial access control in building environ-
ments. We then identify a list of functional requirements for BIM-based access
control and common features of spatiotemporal access control models. This in-
formation is used as the basis for our review of existing spatiotemporal access
control models. Finally, we also discuss the options available for policy language
models for this application.
2.3.1 Motivating scenario
There are various requirements that must be satised in order to use building
information models as a tool for access control in such environments. In this
section, a motivating scenario for spatial access control is presented, which will
serve in helping better understand the concepts presented in later sections of this
chapter and in later chapters.
Consider a facility of an organisation that houses multiple divisions, say an
airport. In such an airport, assume independent subsystems are used for closed-
circuit television monitoring, lighting control, temperature sensors, smoke sen-
sors, and physical access control to building spaces.
Suppose Alice is a divisional human resource administrator who authorises
access by employees to dierent spaces in the facility. She is able to approve
and revoke access to users within her division to spaces that are used by her
division and common areas. Bob is the facility's operations manager responsible
for facilities management. He is able to assign both sta and contracted tech-
nicians to perform maintenance on dierent subsystems such as lighting water
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and sewerage. He needs to grant access to a contracted technician only when
there is a current repair or maintenance job. He must ensure that the techni-
cians cannot access sensitive parts of the facility that are not related to their
assignment. Charlie is a computer technician handling the server room, Dave is
a technician for the temperature sensors, and Eddie is an electrician responsible
for the lighting subsystem. They can access the subsystem controllers from the
control room, and Bob controls their access privileges to dierent spaces.
The building areas are divided into zones to which dierent access policies
apply. Multiple divisions use the building control room and a shared server room,
but access is tightly restricted. Further, the general oce area is divided based
on the occupying organisational division such as marketing, human resources,
and nance. The control room houses a command and control application with
controlling interfaces to all the subsystems. These can be accessed by either
the facilities management team or technicians associated with the subsystems.
For example, in a normal operating environment Eddie can access the lighting
subsystem that controls the lighting of the building, but not the temperature
sensors. The command and control system has two-way communication to the
subsystems. The incoming data from the subsystems include the status and
operational data from dierent sensors. The outgoing data include commands
and instructions to control the subsystems, which can be used to change the
operation of dierent devices. These commands can be issued directly to the
devices or to another system that controls the low-level sensors.
Suppose the command and control application is fed with status data from
all subsystems, including each temperature sensor. It can then generate a tem-
perature gradient oor map for the whole building using its knowledge of the
spatial position and context of each sensor. The building information model will
also store the physical position of other elements such as CCTV cameras, lights,
smoke sensors, and door controllers. By representing these active elements on
a 2D plan or a 3D virtual space an operator can interact with them visually to
issue commands or access status data or information feeds. For example, they
could click on CCTV camera icon to view the real-time video stream.
Access control in this organisational scenario can be complex. Alice should
be able to control who can access the control room. Charlie can view the tem-
perature gradient map of the server room only, but Dave can have access for
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the whole building. Eddie can access the status of lighting for the whole build-
ing. He can select a particular room from the spatial visualisation and issue
a shutdown command. However, this can be executed only when Bob assigns
him a maintenance task in that room. The organisational policy also states any
technician entering the server room must be authorised by Charlie in addition to
Bob. These complex access control scenarios are dicult to accommodate using
traditional access control systems. A primary purpose of our work is to provide a
framework that supports these scenarios. We discuss these dierent approaches
in the following sections.
2.3.2 Functional requirements for a BIM-based authori-
sation framework
In this section, we introduce our key requirements for an authorisation frame-
work using building information models. Some of these requirements have been
elicited directly from literature [15, 27, 46, 107], while others were identied by
reviewing the literature in the context of using building information models for
authorisation as well as from our project partners in the Airports of the Future
project.
Spatial data model: We identify that the main aspect of an authorisation
framework using building information models is the ability of using them as its
spatial data model. A spatial data model is required to provide the vocabulary for
naming entities of dierent types with a spatial context in access control policies
and that can be used in access control decision-making functions. The data
model should also include semantics for operations on these objects, including
spatial operations that can complement the core decision-making process.
Objects: An authorisation framework for buildings must enforce access con-
trol for physical spaces, physical objects, and logical objects. These resources
could have a variety of groupings based on feature type, object content, metadata,
and spatial position. In addition, the same authorisation mechanisms should be
able to access control data contained with building information models. The
authorisation framework could utilise the same policies and decision-making pro-
cesses as it relies on the same data model to provide the vocabulary.
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Subjects: Access control enforcement should take into consideration the or-
ganisational functions performed by users. The system should have the capability
to specify rules based on conceptual groupings of users that are based on their
organisational functions or roles. In such an authorisation framework used in
large facilities it is desirable to have role based access control (RBAC) [45] capa-
bilities. Subjects should also have additional attributes, such as current location
for human users and these locations can point back to an entity in the spatial
data model.
Policy: A range of dierent contextual factors should be specied in the au-
thorisation policies for operations that can be executed on controlled resources.
Attributes such as user location, time of request, resource type, resource loca-
tion, and access mode could be used in specifying rules for access control. The
main vocabulary of the policies will be derived from objects of the spatial data
model. To ensure that the authorisation system can be managed eciently,
roles, resources and spaces should be arranged in hierarchies so that policies can
specify constraints at varying granularities. Analysing authorisation policies for
correctness is also an important requirement and some combination of existing
approaches could be used to achieve this [49].
Decision-making: The policy-reasoning component of an authorisation frame-
work is a decision-making point for access requests. Access control decisions
made by the framework should be based on multiple attributes of the subject,
object, action, and the environment. Access privileges assigned to a user and
the function to enable and disable them must be based on a combined spatial
and temporal approach delivering dynamic spatiotemporal permission assign-
ment. This may also include awareness of the state of execution of a structured
work-ow or business process.
Spatial awareness: It is our contention that the decision making point should
be able to interpret user location and resource location from the spatial data
model, and it must be able to utilise spatial functions that operate on these ob-
jects in the decision making process. The spatial data model and an associated
spatial reasoning component should provide spatial functions such as contain-
ment, connectivity, and accessibility that operate on objects contained within
the spatial data model.
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Interoperability: The authorisation framework should be interoperable with
multiple subsystems. It should be possible to integrate geospatial data from
heterogeneous sources in a secure fashion. The access control features enforced
by this framework should complement any existing security mechanisms of the
subsystems. The authorisation framework should act as an additional layer on
top of these systems that can run on dierent technologies. The individual
subsystems can implement their own security policies to protect their data. Thus,
policy interoperability is an important consideration in achieving interoperability
between multiple subsystems. Attributes and targets of the policies should be
interpreted consistently and any mismatch of policy rule semantics and rules
avoided.
Integrity: Integrity of data should be ensured, when it is resourced from and
managed by third party entities. This is essential when dierent subsystems are
integrated. Privacy is also a greater concern in data sharing among multiple
subsystems. It should be able to control and enforce access rules across exist-
ing physical access control systems from dierent vendors. The spatial location
coordinates should be independent of the devices used to capture them. The
use of logical representations for physical locations or zones should be supported
to present a unied location representation, which is essential for interoperabil-
ity between multiple subsystems. The visualisation of the spatial data should
take into consideration the possibilities of inference when the absence of certain
elements could imply the existence of something sensitive.
2.3.3 Features of spatiotemporal access control models
We conducted a survey and reviewed the access control literature to identify pub-
lished spatiotemporal access control models. In analysing published literature in
the context of spatiotemporal authorisation and building information modelling,
we identied the common set of features that can be used to compare the ca-
pabilities of these access control models. Based on this review and analysis of
other survey articles [27], we identify and discuss features in terms of uniqueness,
relevance, and shortcomings for spatiotemporal access control.
We summarise these key features for access control models in Table 2.1. These
features form the basis for of our analysis of noteworthy spatiotemporal access
control models, which will be discussed in detail in Section 2.3.4. The following
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sections describe key features that we have used for a conceptual comparison of
spatiotemporal access control models.
Support for role-based access control
It is desirable to use role based access control [110] for spatial authorisation
frameworks when they are used in large organisations. In such systems, permis-
sions can be associated with roles based on organisational functions performed
by users. By centralising the administration of permissions for large number
of users this can eectively reduce errors and redundancy. It has been argued
that RBAC has a number of advantages over other models of access control,
particularly in simplifying authorisation administration [45]. In the context of
this chapter, RBAC is discussed as a feature for spatiotemporal access control
models.
Four modular variations of RBAC can be identied based on their functional
capabilities [110]. RBAC0 represents essential RBAC capabilities including roles,
user-role assignments, and permission-role assignments. In large organisational
settings, RBAC roles can have capabilities that are overlapping where users of
dierent roles with common permissions. RBAC1 adds the support for role
hierarchies to at RBAC0 as a partial order relationship between roles [109].
RBAC1 denes a seniority relationship between roles through hierarchies and
permissions are inherited among roles. RBAC2 enables separation of duty (SoD)
relations for RBAC [47], which guarantees major errors do not occur without
intentional consent of multiple users [78]. RBAC2 supports both static and
dynamic SoD. Role constraints are evaluated against user role assignments in
static SoD, whereas in dynamic SoD it is against the set of roles activated for
the user in the active session. The fully featured RBAC model, incorporating
RBAC0, RBAC1, and RBAC2 is identied as RBAC3.
Even though RBAC has many advantages, it can be challenging to apply in
many real world settings. A notable criticism is that it is dicult to set up an
initial role hierarchy and assign coherent and correct sets of privileges to individ-
ual roles [75]. In addition, roles need to be under a single administrative domain
or have a consistent denition across multiple domains for proper operation of
RBAC. Thus using RBAC with distributed applications is challenging. Further-
more, many real-world applications, including the BIM-based scenarios we have
described, require access restrictions imposed not only based on roles, but also
considering other dynamic, context-dependent criteria.
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With traditional RBAC, access decisions do not consider factors such as user
location, resource location or system time, which may be as important as roles
for access decision-making in some settings. A number of proposals have been
published that aim to address this issue by making RBAC more context-aware
through the addition of context attributes to decision making [75]. Many of the
spatiotemporal access control models use the conceptual foundation of RBAC in
one of the variations. The notion of role in RBAC is extended to spatial role,
temporal role and spatiotemporal role in some of these models. They also use
the concepts of role activation and deactivation, role hierarchy and other role
based relationships. These models are discussed in the following sections.
Spatial data model
Spatial access control is based on the spatial context of resources and requesters.
A data model is required to provide spatial context to all entities concerned with
the authorisation system. Such spatial information is important for both dening
access control policies and for decision-making procedure based on those policies.
Figure 2.4: Multiple space boundaries
A spatial data model should provide various levels of abstractions for entities
within a building when it is used for access control. For instance, when analysing
accessibility between rooms for physical access control purposes, the thickness
of walls or wirings conduits contained within wall are not the main concern, but
the openings in walls (i.e. doors and windows) and access control through these
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openings. For such physical access control planning and analysis purposes, we
normally only need the rooms (spaces) themselves and the boundaries between
them (Figure 2.4). Such spatial association information from the spatial data
model can be used in the access control process. However, there will be other
instances where the material properties of walls or wiring diagrams are the main
concerns, such as in the context of performing repairs on subsystems that are
connected through those running cables. Thus, the spatial data model must have
entity data for all necessary abstractions, but it must also be possible to expose
this data at dierent abstractions based on needs.
Spatial granularity
In spatial access control, it must be possible to specify access control policy
rules at dierent levels or granularity in spatial terms. Most entities contained
within common organisations can be mapped spatially at dierent levels starting
from a broader town or block level to a narrower building, oor, room, and
even individual elements level. Based on the level of control required the access
control system needs to address protected elements at varying levels of spatial
granularity.
A spatial hierarchy of protected objects simplies the policy denition pro-
cess, where permissions assigned to higher-level objects can be derived at lower
levels. For example, a geospatial system using raster image maps for its spatial
representation can generate maps at dierent resolutions and with dierent sets of
object overlays based on the access control decision. Some access control systems
simply rely on geometric coordinates and others use multi-level logical locations.
The concept of logical locations maps a real world spatial entity through a map-
ping function to an entity in the selected data model. This can provide exibility
in dening and processing access control policies. For example, a controlled door
to a secure server room can be represented by its three-dimensional coordinates
(x,y,z). This can be mapped to a physical location using a mapping function
m that converts the coordinates to a logical representation of type room, and
subtype secure area. The inverse mapping function m' can be used to convert
logical locations into physical coordinates.
The degree of spatial granularity can have both a positive and negative inu-
ence on the eciency of decision making and the expressiveness of authorisation
policies. A ner level of granularity ensures that it is possible to express a wide
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range of access rules and associated constraints. This can also lead to increased
searching and processing time for access control policies and decision-making,
which can negatively inuence the real-time performance of the authorisation
system.
Temporal constraints
Many organisational functions can have limited or periodic temporal duration
and resources have temporal limitation on availability. Therefore, access control
to resources needs to have a temporal dimension in decision-making. The need
for expressing authorisation rules on the basis of temporal relationships in real-
life situations has been recognised by other researchers [18, 94, 129]. Temporal
dependencies allow the derivation of new authorisations based on the presence
or absence of other authorisations in given time intervals [18]. Authorisation
rules can specify a start and an expiration time. Both negative and positive
authorisations can be specied explicitly or derived through rules [16]. Periodic
temporal intervals are used to grant and revoke authorisations automatically [17].
Policy specication
Policy specication denes how access control policies are expressed in an au-
thorisation model. The common policy specication approaches for spatiotem-
poral access control systems include sets, logic-based languages, graph theory
and combinations of these. Access control models such as GSAM and STRBAC,
which are dened using set theory, rely on sets for policy specication. XML
based mark-up languages can be used in access control frameworks for policy
specication. XACML and GeoXACML use logic-based authorisation languages
for policy specication. These logic-based languages can improve the process of
verication, modication, and enforcement of policies, because of their formal
foundations and expressiveness [106].
The basic form of a policy rule can be articulated through the statement:
Subject can perform Action on Object when Condition is satised. In addition to
supporting these four policy constructions, policy specication for spatial access
control should also support spatial context for these constructions where appli-
cable. For example, subject and objects can be space limited and conditions
can be spatial evaluation functions. Section 2.3.5 of this chapter discusses some
existing policy models that are close to requirements identied for access control
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using BIMs, while a policy model designed for BIM requirements is presented in
more detail in Chapter 5.
Policy administration
A proper administration mechanism of access control policies is an important
aspect of any authorisation systems. This is more critical in large organisa-
tional environments with complex access control policy requirements. Policy
administration is the task of creating and maintaining access control policies
by security administrators. An important aspect of policy administration is to
ensure the specic intentions of security administrators are rightly reected in
the access policies they create. A typical large organisation can have thousands
of users, roles, and resources and their access control policies can dene a large
number of complex and ne-grained rights that are managed by dierent ad-
ministrators [64]. In addition to these complexities based on the operations of
the organisation, access control in complex infrastructures that span across large
areas need to have the additional dimension of spatial complexity in policy rules.
Spatial authorisation systems used in such environments must consider the
additional spatial dimension in terms of spatial roles, resources and rights, which
can make policy administration very complex [35]. The task of constructing and
maintaining such complex access control policies is non-trivial and proper tools
and mechanisms are needed. Suboptimal access control policies and adminis-
tration processes can lead to over entitlements or under entitlements, both of
which can have signicant impact on security. Thus, policy administration is an
important feature to consider in reviewing spatiotemporal access control mod-
els. Most of the spatiotemporal access control models that are reviewed in the
following section do not incorporate policy administration in their initial propos-
als. However, this need is commonly identied later and some models have later
extensions that provide policy administration [34].
Spatial data models play an important role in the capabilities of policy ad-
ministration, especially in software tools. In addition providing semantics for
policy rules and establishing the basis for policy administration procedures, spa-
tial data models can provide various visual capabilities that can also be exploited
to perform visual access control policy administration. In Chapter 5, a physical
access control administration tool is presented that explores the use of building
information models in the context of policy administration.
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Multiple policy integration
It is necessary to achieve integration of access control policies when multiple or-
ganisational divisions are combined under one authorisation domain or multiple
subsystems are integrated into a larger system. This integration process must
combine independently dened policies from dierent divisions, while ensuring
independence and administrative autonomy [106]. Policies from dierent author-
ities must be integrated and enforced without ambiguity in an enterprise-wide
authorisation framework. This means that the policy language must support
a range of strategies for resolving conicts between the decisions generated by
dierent individual policies since one may permit while another denies.
The process of policy integration is inuenced by the policy specication
mechanism of each subsystem. It is desirable to have a uniform policy spec-
ication standard across all systems, but this is not practical as it is largely
dependent on vendor technology and the need to accommodate legacy systems.
Logic based policy specication can support policy integration using operators
such as addition, conjunction, negation, closure, scoping restriction, overriding,
and template [21]. For example, the conjunction operator merges and returns
the intersection of two policies.
Physical access control
Physical access control designates the process of regulating access to physical
spaces within a facility. Physical access control is necessary in ensuring security
of assets that are contained within the controlled spaces. In terms of physical
access control, even though at an enforcement level it is achieved by controlling
individual portals such as doors leading to specied spaces, at an access control
policy level more abstract constructs of spaces or zones are preferred.
The importance or value of the space is mainly determined by what is con-
tained within the space. There are benets in a converged approach to access con-
trol as introduced earlier in Section 2.1, where the same authorisation framework
can be applied across logical resources and physical resources. The importance
of this approach is highlighted by the fact that many assets that are tradition-
ally protected by physical access control system are now exposed as information
assets in many instances. For example, in a chemical manufacturing plant the
machinery that deal with dangerous chemicals can be controlled through the
network enabling them to be controlled without the need to be present in the
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same physical location as the equipment. In this context, a converged approach
to access control is important to ensure the policy rules are shared across vari-
ous enforcement points. However, the existing spatial access control models are
not designed to handle this scenario directly in their implementations. In some
cases, such as in Geo-RBAC, where they do not distinguish between logical and
physical resources, it is possible to simulate and extend the models to support
physical access control. In general, this is a feature lacking in authorisation
systems, including spatiotemporal systems.
Logical access control
Logical access control regulates access to information objects and information
services provided through computerised information systems. In spatial autho-
risation, logical resources include the elements of buildings, spatial maps, data,
and information sourced from other connected systems with spatial context such
as CCTV camera feeds. Logical access control is the main focus of the existing
spatiotemporal access control models. While some of these systems focus on
protecting spatial information contained within maps, others focus on protecting
all types of data with spatial context.
To support logical access control to these various assets, the access control sys-
tem must support specifying policies specically addressing logical access control
situations. This includes the need to have objects and actions specic to logical
objects as well as conditional functions related to those. For example, a space
object can be accessed in physical access control, while the same can be viewed
in logical access control. In access control using building information models,
logical access control includes information contained within BIM repository, in-
formation systems connected through the BIM, and information stored outside
the BIM with spatial references to BIM objects. Chapter 3 introduces a classi-
cation for BIM based access control, especially types of access control required
for logical assets connected to BIMs.
2.3.4 Review of spatiotemporal access control models
There has been signicant progress in the area of system interoperability and
system integration in smart buildings. Open Systems Integration and Perfor-
mance Standards (OSIPS) developed by the Security Industry Association (SIA)
is a family of standards enabling integration of security systems such as physical
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access control systems and CCTV camera systems [36]. The main motivation
behind these works are based on interoperability and information convergence.
They do not address some of the key requirements for critical infrastructure,
especially in terms of policy administration and spatial data models. To the best
of our knowledge, there are no previous published access control models that are
addressed directly towards the requirements of critical infrastructures.
In this section, we review a collection of spatial access control models against
the model features identied in Section 2.3.3 and the requirements identied in
Section 2.3.2. We cover six systems in some detail: GRBAC, GSAM, GEO-
RBAC, STRBAC, GSTRBAC, and ESTARBAC. We focus on these models be-
cause they represent a variety of approaches to spatial authorisation. We also
include the GeoXACML standard to this discussion, which has capabilities for
declaration and enforcement of geo-specic access restrictions. We are interested
in its policy framework and capability of integrating access control policies from
multiple stakeholder systems.
GRBAC
Generalised role-based access control (GRBAC) is an early role-based access
control model that introduced the concept of environment roles as distinct from
subject roles [31]. Any system state that can be collected by the system can be
an environment role in GRBAC. An environment role can be based on temporal
context such as time of day or day of the week, or location context such as ground
oor of the building or third room on the rst oor. The environment roles in
GRBAC and the subject roles in RBAC have similar properties including role
activation, role hierarchy, and separation of duty. These roles can be activated
based on the current environment context.
GRBAC can be seen as one of the initial spatiotemporal access control models.
It covers the access control problem as for logical or physical resources. These
concepts can be extended to both physical and logical access control to achieve
a converged approach. GRBAC lacks a spatial data model, and serves only as
a higher-level model for spatiotemporal authorisation. The model specication
is very abstract with no formal foundation. It does not provide any specics
on authorisation rule denition, or spatiotemporal constraints for environment
roles. GRBAC does not address many of the higher-level requirements such as
granular rule specication or policy interoperability between multiple systems.
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This is a dierent approach of using environment roles when compared to later
models that use environment variables and more logic based approaches. Some
of the shortcomings of GRBAC were addressed by later models that we discuss
in this section.
GSAM
The Geo-Spatial Data Authorisation Model (GSAM) proposed by Atluri and
Chun is another pioneering work in considering the combined impact of loca-
tion and time in authorisation decision making [6]. GSAM provides protection
mechanisms that address issues specic to spatial imagery data stored in spatial
databases i.e., Geographic Information Systems (GIS).
GSAM evaluates requests to display or manipulate spatial data and makes
authorisation decisions which may involve rendering maps at dierent detail lev-
els based on criteria such as authorised subjects, objects, and spatiotemporal
constraints. GSAM supports privilege modes specic to geospatial data (e.g.,
zoom-in, overlay, identify, animate and y-by) and includes geometric consid-
erations such as the region of overlap in access requests and authorisation. It
supports geospatial and credential type hierarchies that can be used to specify
authorisations and individual identities or geospatial objects can inherit permis-
sions and obligations. GSAM makes authorisation decisions based on spatial
extent, temporal duration, map image resolution and other spatiotemporal at-
tributes.
GSAM does not provide mechanisms to extend the authorisation mechanism
to other object types such as physical objects or logical system resources. Thus,
in the form described, it cannot be directly used in conjunction with other physi-
cal or logical access control systems, though its general concepts may be adapted.
The temporal aspect of authorisation in GSAM is limited to the temporal terms
attached to the map data. It does not use the temporal conditions of the access
requests in decision-making. The limitations in role-based access control and
specifying organisational roles without geographical constraints limit the use of
GSAM in many environments. The lack of standards in authorisation specica-
tion can cause interoperability issues with multiple systems and supporting other
features like policy migration and cross verication.
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GEO-RBAC
Bertino et al. proposed the GEO-RBAC model[19], extending RBAC with a
spatial model compliant with the OGC (Open GeoSpatial Consortium) simple
feature geometric model [14]. GEO-RBAC is formally dened using the principles
of set theory and uses contextual information such as user position with the
concept of spatial role to make access control decisions.
GEO-RBAC is based on a reference geometric model, spatially aware objects,
spatial roles, and a position model. The reference geometric model is based on
the OGC simple feature geometric model. An object can be composed by one
or more point, line, or polygon types and dierent topological relations can be
applied to the objects in the reference model. This gives the ability of specifying
objects at dierent granularities.
The position model assigns users logical positions that are device/technology
independent, based on their real positions using specic mapping functions. For
example, a real-time location device carried by an employee can transmit their
location as three-dimensional coordinates, which can be mapped to a specic
room, which is identied by its logical label in the position model. The gran-
ularity of these logical positions can depend on the spatial role played by the
user.
A spatial role in GEO-RBAC represents a geographically bounded organi-
sational function, with a role name and spatial boundaries dened by a spatial
extent. For uniformity, this model considers non-spatial roles as a subset of spa-
tial roles having the full reference space as role extent. The basic access control
concepts of GEO-RBAC for logical resources can be extended to physical access
control. Prox-RBAC, an extension of GEO-RBAC, introduces proximity con-
straints into spatial authorisation syntax with continuity of usage [72]. This is
particularly relevant to buildings as the concepts proposed in Prox-RBAC are
more specic for an indoor space model.
GEO-RBAC supports role schema and role instance hierarchies that enable
inheritance of permissions, user assignments, and activations between roles. It
also uses constrained RBAC that extends standard separation of duty constraints
for specic characteristics of GEO-RBAC, such as dierent granularity and spa-
tial dimension [32].
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Temporal access control is a vital requirement in many applications but GEO-
RBAC lacks a temporal capability. This limitation is addressed by later spa-
tiotemporal access control models. GEO-RBAC does not use any policy spec-
ication standard, which could make interoperability dicult. Policy adminis-
tration is also not part of GEO-RBAC but later proposals address this issue by
extending with GEO-RBAC Admin [33, 34, 35]. GEO-RBAC also lacks some
of the important requirements, such as multiple object attributes, and policy
integration.
STRBAC
Ray and Toahchoodee formalised a spatiotemporal RBAC model, called STR-
BAC [101] that considers the interaction of location and time contexts with the
classical RBAC components in access control decision-making. STRBAC is for-
mally dened using set theory. Access control permissions are expressed via
multiple set relations.
STRBAC does not provide any formal denition of a spatial model, but it is
assumed that controlled objects will have devices that transmit location infor-
mation. It uses the physical location and logical location concept, where physical
locations are real-world three dimensional coordinates, and logical locations are
their symbolic representations, such as rooms and oors. Mapping functions are
used to convert between the location representations. Even though, this enables
the ability to having logical representations for spatial resources, which we earlier
identied as a desirable property in a spatial data model, the combination of map-
ping functions with location representations does not adhere to any standards.
This makes this spatial representation more closely coupled with the authorisa-
tion modes, making it not conveniently usable with other systems. STRBAC
uses two temporal information types: a discrete point in time is represented by
a time instant and a set of time instances are grouped into a time interval. This
enables the use of dierent semantics in dening temporal constraints.
Spatiotemporal permissions in STRBAC can be associated with roles, objects,
and operations. Spatiotemporal constraints can be expressed on role activation,
role hierarchy, separation of duty, user-role assignment and role-permission as-
signment. STRBAC supports multiple role hierarchies for permission inheritance
and role activation. Each of these can be unrestricted, time restricted, location
restricted, and time-location restricted. STRBAC can control access to physical
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and logical objects. It assumes every logical object is contained within a phys-
ical object, such as a computer. Access control to physical spaces can also be
achieved by making an access door the controlled physical object. STRBAC uses
sessions to enable pervasive computing requirements. In this mode of operation,
sessions are associated with locations and time durations in which roles can be
activated [102].
STRBAC does not dene any specic spatial data model, making the model
specication more abstract without any details for location representations. This
model is proposed for computing environments with a single administrative au-
thority. Thus it does not address the possibility of multiple authorisation do-
mains or policy integration requirements.
GSTRBAC
Generalised Spatiotemporal Role Based Access Control (GSTRBAC) is a formal
framework for specication and verication of spatiotemporal role-based access
control proposed by Samuel, Ghafoor and Bertino [108]. It incorporates topo-
logical spatial constraints to the existing GTRBAC model [70]. Both logical and
physical access control are possible in GSTRBAC.
GSTRBAC is formally dened using set theory and predicate logic. The spa-
tiotemporal authorisation functions in GSTRBAC use logic operations for deci-
sion making. GSTRBAC uses a lightweight formal modelling language, Alloy,
for its policy specication framework. This includes policy composition, visual-
isation, and conict resolution processes. It enables the policy administrator to
validate policies before implementation.
GSTRBAC uses spatial constraints in role enabling, user-role assignment,
role-permission assignment, and role activation. The spatial constraints are based
on physical locations and virtual locations, but the model does not specify any
spatial data model for these locations. It evaluates constraint expressions in the
temporal domain to make access control decisions. However, the permissions do
not have a spatiotemporal context. GSTRBAC introduces the concept of spatial
separation of duty constraints, preventing a user from activating multiple roles
simultaneously based on where the role is activated. The spatial role hierarchy
enables permission inheritance based on the role activation location.
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ESTARBAC
The Spatiotemporal Role Based Access Control (STARBAC) [2] model proposed
by Aich, Sural and Majumdar covers the fundamental requirements for access
control with conditions in both space and time domains. It is based on proposi-
tional logic and uses logical operations on various spatiotemporal commands for
access control evaluation. The Enhanced STARBAC (ESTARBAC) [1] extends
the capabilities of the STARBAC model. It includes the concept of spatial sep-
aration of duty and algorithms for access control evaluation, which are not part
of STARBAC.
ESTARBAC is formally dened using set theory and set operations. Spa-
tiotemporal evaluation functions are also used in access control decision making.
ESTARBAC does not use any standard spatial data model. It supports dierent
granularities of spatiotemporal attributes. A physical point is the fundamental
spatial unit and a collection of physical points is dened as a logical location. A
time instant is the fundamental time unit and periodic expressions are used to
specify temporal authorisation rules.
In ESTARBAC subjects, objects, and permissions can be associated with a
spatiotemporal extent. An entity in the spatiotemporal domain conned in a
spatiotemporal zone is referred to as a spatiotemporal extent. Access control
policies in ESTARBAC are dened using role extent and permission extent con-
straints. A role extent combines organisational role with spatiotemporal extent
and a permission extent combines organisational capability with spatiotempo-
ral extent. A user can activate a role and can execute any permission available
to the role only when the role extent and permission extent satisfy the user's
spatiotemporal extent.
ESTARBAC uses XML for policy specication and uses a policy loader for
loading and processing policies into the system. This standardised approach for
policy specication allows the model to implement some important requirements,
such as interoperability, multiple policy integration, and policy integrity evalu-
ation. However, as proposed, ESTARBAC is intended for use under a single
policy administrative point, and integration of policies from multiple entities is
not part of the model specication. The access-controlled objects are limited to
logical objects with spatiotemporal context. It is possible to extend this model
to support access control for physical objects and physical spaces.
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GeoXACML
Geospatial eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (GeoXACML) denes
a geospatial extension to the XACML standard by OASIS. Matheus [85] pre-
sented an approach for the declaration of spatial, class-based, and object-based
access restrictions using the XACML standard specically for geospatial applica-
tions. This was later standardised by the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) as
the Geospatial eXtensible Access Control Markup Language Encoding Standard
(GeoXACML) [84]. Spatial data types and spatial authorisation decision func-
tions based on the OGC Simple Features and GML standards are incorporated
into XACML with this extension.
The spatial model of GeoXACML is based on the OGC simple Feature Ac-
cess Geometry Class Model. This enables interoperability with the OpenGIS web
services standard. GeoXACML denes uniform resource names according to the
XACML extension points to incorporate geometric attribute values. Multiple
levels of GML geometry types are used for the geometric attribute values[80],
including Point, LineString, Polygon, MultiPoint, MultiLineString, and Multi-
Polygon.
GeoXACML policy language can be used to declare complex spatial restric-
tions with rule constructs. Complex constraints between permission geometry
and the resource object's geometries can be expressed through spatial conditions.
The GeoXACML specication does not provide any formalisation of the stan-
dard. However, it should be possible to apply the Defeasible Description Logics
based formalisation of XACML[74] to GeoXACML, as both standards follow the
same authorisation principles. An authorisation decision in GeoXACML is made
by traversing policy trees and using rule-combining algorithms. Logic operators
are used to combine the outcome of subroutine rule constructs into single access
decision. Integration of policies from external namespaces is an integral part of
XACML and the same is available in GeoXACML.
GeoXACML is dierent from the other access control models discussed before.
It is essentially a policy language and implementation framework. It can be
congured to support dierent modes of spatiotemporal access control to both
physical and logical resources. GeoXACML also supports the XACML RBAC
Prole [3] extension that supports the notion of roles for RBAC models that
includes support for hierarchical and constrained RBAC. XACML also has a
published specication for policy administration and delegation. There is also a
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GeoXACML specic layered administration model for distributed administration
of complex spatial access control policies [64].
Summary of review
We have analysed some of the important spatiotemporal authorisation models
in this section. Each of these models has strengths and weaknesses as shown
in Table 2.1, allowing them to satisfy dierent sets of requirements. We have
identied the important shortcomings of these models particularly in relation to
an authorisation framework using building information models.
In the access control models reviewed above, none of them are fully concep-
tually consistent to adopt BIMs as their spatial data models. However, there
are certain features of dierent models that are desirable for access control us-
ing BIMs. Role based access control is a common feature across most models
reviewed and a similar approach is appropriate for access control using BIMs.
GeoXACML species multiple geometric classes for spatial objects, a similar
approach with BIM specic object classication is a benecial feature. Another
desirable feature is a standards based policy specication such as in ESTARBAC
or GeoXACML. This can be useful when access control policy rules are expected
to be shared across multiple systems.
In most existing spatial access control models, spatial data models or spatial
representation for objects is included as part of the access control models. A
majority of these models use three point coordinate systems as the spatial base.
The combination of vector maps with digital raster images is commonly used
in many geospatial applications. By combining spatial models within access
control, not only the access control policies becomes closely coupled to those
object representations, it also restricts the use of such spatial data in other
applications, such as facility management applications in smart buildings. A
better approach is to decouple the spatial data model from the authorisation
model. In Chapter 3, we present our authorisation framework which takes this
decoupled approach to have external building information models as core spatial
data model.
It is desirable to have a exible spatial data model, such as a building infor-
mation model, that can streamline spatial data management. It is also desirable
for this data model to be standards compliant to achieve interoperability between
other systems within the same organisational environment. By using a spatial
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data model that has the ability to represent objects at an abstract level spatial
representation, low level object representations are removed from the access con-
trol policies. This is a signicant factor in terms of managing changes, where
policies that are written at a higher abstraction need not be changes for changes
in physical environment. For example, if spaces are represented by spatial coor-
dinates in access control policies, every spatial change will require changing all
policy rules that have reference to that space. In contrast, by using an abstract
representation of labelled zones, reecting the spatial changes only in the spatial
data model will ensure the availability of correct policies without any changes to
policy rules. A more in-depth look into the application of BIMs in this capacity
is provided in Chapter 5.
As a spatial data model, a building information model can provide granular
information about the relationships between controlled building elements. The
notion of adjacent spaces and ow analysis of controlled spaces can be performed
by utilising building information models. Most of the access control models we
have discussed do not use any spatial data model that has as rich information set
as a building information model. GSAM is a notable exception that uses a richer
spatial data model, which is a combination of vector data maps and raster image
maps. These vector data maps are conceptually similar to building information
models, but on a larger scale with lesser details of individual buildings. The
use of logical object hierarchies with physical spatial attributes is the common
approach in most of these systems. With building information models, more
detailed object representations of buildings as well as inter object relationships
can be utilised for access control, which is not a possibility with the approach in
GSAM. In addition, GSAM is mainly focused towards maps, where it addresses a
two-dimensional problem, opposed to the three-dimensional nature of buildings
that are represented using building information models. Even though some of the
access control processes can be performed using basic spatial functions described
in these models, the use of building information models can yield a more diverse
set of functionalities not only with access control processes, but also in terms of
wider integration with facility management and operations infrastructure. More
in depth discussion of various functionalities that can be achieved using building
information models is provided in Chapter 4.
Policy specication is another important element in access control. It is nec-
essary to have a formalised policy specication mechanism to integrate systems
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from dierent vendors under the same authorisation framework. GSTRBAC
and ESTARBAC use standardised approaches to policy specication, but they
do not elaborate on policy integration issues. The GeoXACML policy frame-
work encapsulates the requirements of policy integration. With the exception
of GeoXACML, none of the existing spatiotemporal access control models ad-
dresses the need for policy integration, in terms of multi-level policy specication
or multi-vendor subsystems. In Chapter 5, we introduce a policy language model
for building information models.
Spatial visualisation and evaluation of access control policies can improve the
level of condence of the access control framework by ensuring that the policy
rules are correctly implemented and enforced in the system. A well-structured
spatial model is necessary to achieve these requirements, especially when policy
rules are based on spatial identiers. It is possible to implement some of these
requirements on top of some of these models. However, such ad-hoc inclusion
would not ensure close integration between the authorisation framework and the
spatial model. A close integration between these would enable two-way informa-
tion sharing, which can deliver advantages not only at policy management level,
but also in access control decision making. Most of these access control models
do not provide converged access control natively. They are designed either for
logical access control or for physical access control. In Chapter 6, we present a
proof-of-concept demonstrator that can be used to illustrate the advantages spa-
tial visualisation for access control administration by using building information
models for access control.
This review identies various features and shortcoming of existing access
control models for using building information models as spatial data models.
In the rest of this thesis, we present a framework of components and describe
how it can be used for access control using building information models. This
framework is not a complete access control model, but it serves as a starting
point for developing an access control model using building information models
that could address the shortcomings of the reviewed models.
2.3.5 Policy language models
In an authorisation framework, policy specication serves as a vital concept.
While an authorisation model focuses on the process of decision making based
on access control requests, a policy model focuses on the standards for policy
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specication such as vocabulary and semantics of representing the access control
policies and associated processes that are interoperable across systems. In this
section, we discuss the XACML policy standard and its geospatial extension
GeoXACML, and identify shortcomings and gaps in the context of using them
for BIM applications.
XACML and GeoXACML
In Section 2.3.4, GeoXACML was discussed in the context of an access con-
trol model. However, GeoXACML and XACML (on which GeoXACML is based
upon) are also policy specication languages. eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) is a standard for an access control policy language dened
in XML. XACML also has an authorisation architecture that includes a mech-
anism for evaluating access requests against rules dened in policies to arrive
at authorisation decisions [91]. The initial version of XACML was later sup-
plemented by the XACML RBAC Prole [3] to support the notion of roles for
role based access control. Complex access control policies can be uniformly ex-
pressed using XACML. It allows standard evaluation of access control requests
across heterogeneous platforms. The separation of authorisation decisions from
enforcement mechanisms provides resource owners the ability to enforce policy
decisions in their locally preferred manner [81].
The standard XACML specication does not include any spatial object data
types, but it denes extension points that can be used to support additional data
types and functions. Geospatial eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(GeoXACML) [84] adds support for simple geometry object types in XACMLus-
ing GML encoding [99]. This extension enables the creation of geometric access
control policies for geographic data in the form of two-dimensional map data.
GeoXACML enables the specication of conditions in access control policies us-
ing dierent topological functions such as contains, crosses, disjoint, overlaps,
touches, or equal, which can be applied over objects identied through two-
dimensional maps.
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Shortcomings for BIM requirements
Despite its spatial capabilities there are signicant limitations in GeoXACML [124],
especially in the context of BIM access control. First, GeoXACML does not al-
low policies representing ne-grained access to three-dimensional spatial environ-
ments due to the two-dimensional limitations imposed by its spatial data model.
This is a serious limitation because the ability to represent multi-storey buildings
and objects that extend across multiple stories such as lifts and escalators in a
three-dimensional environment is important for BIM-based authorisation. Sec-
ond, GeoXACML is inecient for specifying ne-grained resource objects due to
the limitations of its spatial data model which requires detailed object specica-
tions based on coordinate geometry. In contrast, BIMs encode three-dimensional
representations of building structures in an object hierarchy. Third, GeoXACML
has limitations in specifying access control policies using identiable and human-
readable labels as opposed to geometric specication of objects. For example,
it is desirable to have identiable names such as Room 13 or Level 2 in access
control policies, which can directly correlate to objects in a BIM. The exercise of
adopting GeoXACML for BIM-based access control in this context would result
in decreased usability and functionality as the level of detail in BIMs cannot al-
ways be represented in map based spatial databases. In Chapter 5, a new policy
language extension to XACML is proposed to support BIM specic semantics
and constructs based on IFC.
2.4 Conclusion
Access control is a key aspect in securing critical infrastructure. This chapter
identied the basic characteristics of critical infrastructures and discussed the
unique security and access control challenges in such environments. In this con-
text, the notion of smart building is introduced along with its own challenges,
mainly in terms of access control convergence. The need for a user friendly
approach to security administration is also emphasised, for access control ad-
ministration and management.
Spatial data models dene the mechanisms of representation and storage of
spatial data. Based on current endorsements from industry and governments
around the world, we established that building information models based on the
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IFC specication is the commonly accepted spatial data model for smart build-
ings. Building information models can function as central repository for data
generated through subsystems in smart buildings environments. In its current
maturity, security and access control are not the primary concern for building
information modelling and an appropriate approach is required to address these
challenges.
A set of features necessary for access control using building information mod-
els were identied from literature and from our project partners in Airports of
the Future project. Based on these features, the state of the art spatial access
control models were reviewed. This review established the advantage of building
information models for spatiotemporal access control in conned spaces.
In the next chapter, we introduce an authorisation framework using build-
ing information models that addresses the challenges identied in this chapter.
In the rest of the thesis, we propose a formally dened building information
model representation and a policy language model that support this authorisa-
tion framework. We also present a proof-of-concept demonstrator to establish
the technical viability of using building information models in this context for
access control.
Chapter 3
An Authorisation Framework
using Building Information
Models
This chapter proposes a novel authorisation framework using building informa-
tion models, which provides unied access control over resources contained within
and around building information model repositories. This authorisation frame-
work is intended as a solution for complex access control issues within critical
infrastructure, as identied in Chapter 2 Section 2.1, in terms of both admin-
istration and technology. It seeks to address the set of functional requirements
for access control using building information models listed in Chapter 2 Sec-
tion 2.3.2. This authorisation framework utilises building information models in
the three key stages of access control: policy specication, policy administration,
and decision-making.
The notion of building information modelling and its capabilities of eciently
representing critical infrastructure were presented in Chapter 2 Section 2.2. It
was further established that such building information models could be used as
spatial data models for access control. This chapter begins by classifying the
type of access control requirements around building information models based
on resource types. The two main categorisations of access control for building
information models and access control using building information models covers
a wide range of systems and resources that are associated with critical infras-
tructure.
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The notion of access control convergence is a fundamental aspect of this
framework. This chapter discusses how access control unication is achieved
through the proposed authorisation framework and how dierent components
interact to address the previously identied requirements.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 classies
access control requirements for BIM resources. The authorisation framework
using building information models is presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 intro-
duces the concept of unied access control using building information models.
Section 3.4 discusses practical applications and related issues of the framework.
Section 3.5 provides concluding remarks.
3.1 Forms of BIM-based access control
It is essential to clarify the context of spatiotemporal authorisation in real world
applications to understand the need for an advanced authorisation framework
using building information models. In Figure 3.1, we show various typical infor-
mation ows between entities in an authorisation framework that uses a BIM.
Each information ow, or each arrow point in the diagram, introduces an access
control requirement. The type of access between the systems also dictates the
level of access control required on the information ow. It is sucient to have
read only access to a BIM repository for a visualisation tool that uses BIM ele-
ments to render a building structure. The same BIM repository can be analysed
and modied by an analysis tool that would require read and write access. In
some scenarios, such as in a command and control system that can control var-
ious processes within BIM repositories, additional types such as control access
may be required. In addition to the systems that can access and interact with
BIM repositories directly, there will be systems that can have their outputs feed
into the BIM repository as data feeds. Some of these systems can also take BIM
data as input indirectly through other systems that interact with BIMs directly.
These dierent access scenarios can have dierent access control requirements
based on how they utilise BIM data.
We have grouped the access control requirements from various information
ows into two major categories: BIM content and external resources. The ex-
ternal resources are further categorised based on their interaction with BIMs as
BIM-aware and BIM-unaware. In this section, some of the operational scenarios
of these access control categorisations are discussed.
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Figure 3.1: Information ow between a building information model and subsys-
tems
3.1.1 Access control for BIM content
Building information models of a functioning building can be seen as centralised
repository for all building related operational data [13]. Such a repository not
only contains BIM object data, but also acts as a dashboard for any other data
associated with BIM objects. In access control for BIM content, the focus is on
controlling access to data contained within a BIM repository.
We identity two distinct types of resources requiring controlled access in a
BIM repository: rst, the building elements and their associated attributes (i.e.
elements that can be represented as IFC objects); second, any data or information
fed from external sources that is stored in a separate data store, but closely
coupled to existing BIM elements via their unique identiers. This data store
can be used to archive data generated by external systems that have no native
spatial awareness, to give the data spatial context e.g., temperature readings
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from sensors linked to the HVAC system can each be stored together with the
unique identier of the BIM object representing that sensor. The data can then
be analysed and represented spatially.
There are multiple modes of access required for BIM internal data as shown
in Figure 3.1. For example, a visualisation tool may only require read access to
BIM objects to render a oor plan and overlay temperature gradients based on
sensor readings from a linked data repository. Systems that can manipulate the
BIM and make changes to building elements or internal data will need read and
write access. For example, an analysis tool that performs computational analysis
on elements of the building and stores results back in the BIM comes under this
category. Command and control type systems will use BIMs as a tool and issue
control commands to link subsystems based on spatial relationships of resources
and systems. These systems can also issue commands to external systems to
bring in information updates, such as sensor data.
The concept of using a building information model as a unied interface and
data repository for dierent subsystems is central to leverage BIMs for facilities
management [39, 62]. As previously noted, the spatial context provided by a
BIM can make otherwise independent subsystems easier for users to interact
with. For example, a CCTV camera feed could be accessed by clicking on a
camera icon on a oor plan. However, not every system or user needs to be
given access to every information feed when they have access to the BIM. The
security policy may restrict access to data from CCTV camera feeds to on-duty
security operators who are present in the control room. Further, the policy may
authorise remote CCTV access to emergency response ocials but only when
the system recognises that an emergency has been declared. Users who hold the
role of computer technician can be granted access to view only the CCTV feeds
for the server rooms by selecting the relevant rooms on the visual map. The
BIM stores information on which individual cameras are in each room and the
low level access privileges can be compiled from this spatial context. This same
principle can be applied for access control to other types of logical resources that
have a spatial context.
Clearly, the resources and information that can be accessed via a BIM vary
in sensitivity and the BIM authorisation system needs to be able to record and
enforce complex access rules as our examples have illustrated. Unfortunately,
current BIM tools and BIM servers implement only the most basic access control
3.1. Forms of BIM-based access control 59
features if any at all. Model development tools from commercial vendors do
implement some role-based access controls [8, 60], but these are focused on the
design phase, not a building's operational phases that are the principal concern
of our framework. The ability to provide access control to resources linked to
BIM objects, but contained within external systems is also not addressed by
these tools.
3.1.2 Access control for external resources
In an ideal incorporation of building information models in facility management,
all objects (physical and logical), systems, and processes that occur within the
facility will have their representation in a BIM. Some of these resources are
not essentially part of the BIM repository, but they still have a reference rep-
resentation to resources within a BIM. Plant, equipment, machines, etc. in a
facility are increasingly computerised and managed via process control hardware
and software (e.g., Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition or SCADA) over
internet-connected networks. They are evolving to have many of the characteris-
tics of traditional software applications. Though their authorisation capabilities
are relatively immature [68] some can distinguish dierent users and grant them
specic access privileges. For improved eciency and security, these disparate
systems need to be managed in a unied way. In access control for external
resources, the focus is on leveraging this spatial reference information in BIMs to
express and enforce the access control for these objects, systems, and processes.
Access control for external resources includes logical access to information
systems and information resources, and physical access to physical objects and
locations, all connected within a spatial and logical context via a BIM. This
context information is used in access control decision making. As we will discuss
in the next section, this approach also enables the integration of physical access
control with logical access control with signicant security-related advantages.
There are two main types of systems that are served under this category:
systems using the framework for policy management and decision-making, and
systems using the framework only for policy management with own decision-
making. This covers a wide array of systems that are expected in a typical
critical infrastructure environment where this framework could be deployed, but
it also ensures support for existing systems and legacy systems to utilise the
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advantages of the framework in terms of policy management and the use of
BIMs. This approach also ensures a unied way of administrating access control
across the wide array of systems with dierent underlying technologies from
dierent vendors by utilising policy transformation, which will be discussed in
later section.
3.2 Authorisation framework
In Chapter 2 Section 2.2 and in the above section, we identied the forms of
access control mechanisms that are required when using building information
models as core spatial data models. In this context of spatial authorisation using
building information models, we need to utilise various access control related
technology components as well as other building information related tool sets.
This process brings in knowledge and expertise from two signicantly distinct
domains of research and technology to address a common goal. Given the nature
of the components involved in this process, we designed a framework to organise
these otherwise disparate tool sets into functional groups that can be used to
explain the interactions between them.
The authorisation framework using building information models, shown in
Figure 3.2, is an integrated authorisation framework for unied access control.
This authorisation framework unies physical and logical access control oper-
ations into a common authorisation platform. This authorisation framework
functions as an overarching access control system for BIM elements, internal re-
sources, and external resources. It also facilitates integration with other access
control systems and legacy systems, enabling wider implementation in currently
operational environments.
The components of the authorisation framework are conceptually divided
into two categories: external spatial modules and authorisation framework mod-
ules. External spatial modules are components that predominantly interact with
building information models directly. Authorisation framework modules facili-
tate the access control processes of policy specication, policy administration,
and decision-making.
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual model of the proposed authorisation framework
3.2.1 External spatial modules
The authorisation framework relies on the following external modules for spa-
tial and building information modelling related operations. These components
have a greater dependency on the platform and implementation of systems that
provide functionalities to manipulate BIMs. Some of these external components
are shared across dierent systems such as facility management systems and
building control systems, thus they are not exclusively part of the authorisation
framework. The specics of internal implementations of these modules are out
of the scope of the framework, but it is expected they follow acceptable industry
standard protocols that are accessible to the other components of the frame-
work. We discuss further on these external modules in Chapter 6, where we
present a proof-of-concept demonstrator implementation of access control tools
using building information models.
BIM / Model server
Building information models are the central part of this authorisation framework
and the BIM layer consists of BIMs that are loaded into a model server. A
BIM model server is a repository of building information models that are shared
across multiple systems [62, 115]. BIM les originate from multiple stakeholders
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of the facility that are converged into one BIM repository in the model server.
The BIMs in the model server are continuously updated with any changes and
modications to the building, reecting the latest version of a building at any
time. The model server can provide current version of BIM to external systems
including the authorisation framework. In Chapter 4, we provide a more formal
description of how building information models are used for access control in our
authorisation framework, and a more detailed discussion of the IFC specication
and how BIM forms part of the access control vocabulary.
Spatial reasoning
The spatial reasoning module provides the spatial reasoning functions required
for authorisation framework. The BIM analysis tool analyses BIM data and
provides computational results at dierent points of the authorisation procedure.
This includes dierent spatial functions such as locating access doors to a space,
reachability analysis based on a specied starting and ending points, or obtaining
the list of temperature sensors contained within a given space.
Visualisation engine
The visualisation engine will generate 3D and 2D representations of BIM data to
be used by dierent processes of the authorisation framework such as spatial rea-
soning and policy transformation. This module will also act as the enforcement
point for access control over the BIM elements in visualisation. This can also act
as an interface for the users to interact with the building information model at
dierent stages of the authorisation process, such as policy creation based on vi-
sual representation and policy simulation and testing. For example, this module
can be utilised to visualise access control policies overlayed on BIM visualisation
or generate visualisations for the policy transformation module. The command
and control operators would be able to use visualisations of BIMs to control all
aspects of building operations including granting and revoking access to users.
3.2.2 Authorisation framework modules
The authorisation framework facilitates access control processes and related func-
tions through the set of authorisation framework modules. These components
have more interdependency of their functionalities and the interaction interfaces
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are part of the authorisation framework. Authorisation framework modules are
further divided into two layers. The authorisation layer includes a Policy Decision
Point (PDP), Policy Administration Point (PAP), and Policy Information Point
(PIP). This layer adopts the XACML architecture [91] with the main extensions
to the XACML standard relating to the additional spatial capabilities of the
PDP. The access layer provides service interfaces to external systems to provide
and manage access control functions, to both logical and physical resources. This
builds the basis for interoperability and compatibility with existing and legacy
systems. We present a policy model for access control using building information
models in Chapter 5, which discusses some of the components in this section in
more detail.
Policy administration point
The PAP stores and manages policies generated from the policy transformation
module. This will be used by the administrators to maintain desired access rights
for a set of policies. It provides managed policies to the PDP for access decision
making.
Policy information point
The PIP provides external information for access decision-making. This includes
information from external sources, such as the spatial reasoning module and other
subsystems. The spatial reasoning functions will be provided through an exter-
nal service to the authorisation framework and it will require an intermediate
translation point.
Policy decision point
A BIM-aware PDP will be able to evaluate access control rules with BIM at-
tributes and spatial functions. This will be in extension of the standard XACML
PDP by implementing functionality that would allow making authorisation de-
cisions from BIM specic access restrictions.
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Policy transformation
The policy transformation module functions as the central entity to generate
platform independent access control policies with a spatial dimension for the au-
thorisation framework. It will utilise spatial reasoning to derive the necessary
access privileges based on a given criteria. For example, the administrator can
grant physical access to a specic space in the building by selecting the initial
point of entry and the target space on the BIM visualisation. The spatial rea-
soning module can analyse the possibility of access between these two points and
identify the controlled doors that need to be given access. The transformation
module can also identify any conicts such as the need to pass through an area
that requires higher access clearance. The policy transformation module also
provides the means to transform and translate high-level platform independent
access control policies to the specic formats used by dierent sub-systems, such
as a proprietary physical access control system.
Access control interface
The Access Control Interface will provide access control decision-making capa-
bilities to external systems. Subsystems can use the authorisation framework
through this interface to make access control decisions that can then be enforced
within the systems. The authorisation framework will be able to handle ac-
cess requests for both logical and physical resources, thus it provides a unied
interface to dierent systems.
Access information interface
An access information interface will be used to enable external decision making
with BIM knowledge. There will be systems that use their own access decision
making, such as a proprietary physical access control system. These systems
can also use some components of the authorisation layer as external services.
For example, an external application can utilise the spatial functions for its own
authorisation decision making. A physical access control system that uses its own
decision-making functionalities can still use the spatial capabilities and unied
policies from the authorisation framework.
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3.2.3 Access control processes
Building information models and associated capabilities can provide new possi-
bilities in various stages of access control. We designed the authorisation frame-
work to utilise building information models in three key stages of access control:
policy specication, policy administration, and decision-making. Each of these
processes use a dierent set of components of the authorisation framework along
with BIMs to achieve desired results. Here we discuss how the framework com-
ponents interact in each access control process.
Policy specication
Access control policy specication is the process where a security ocer of a
facility or anyone with delegated privileges creates access control policies that
specify which users can access which objects under which conditions and perform
which actions [119]. This process of creating access control policies is a critical
task in any authorisation system. The use of multiple attributes such as spatial,
temporal, and other constraints makes access control rules complex to dene,
maintain and audit. We propose a mechanism that utilises BIM and its spatial
model to make this process more intuitive for privilege administrators.
Building information models provide a visual user interface for policy cre-
ation. The policy transformation module of the authorisation framework will
utilise both `spatial reasoning' and `visualisation engine' to achieve this. Object
and action parts of the access policy quadruple can be selected directly from
the visual rendering of a BIM, which will provide the list of selected object and
associated actions. Some spatial conditions such as connectivity between spaces
can also be visually selected.
Access control policy visualisation provides a visual representation of au-
thorisation policies. The system operators will be able to visualise the access
possibilities for a user or a group of users using the spatial model. For exam-
ple, ne-grained physical access control rules, which determine whether a user
can open a particular door, can be geometrically analysed and displayed graphi-
cally on a oor plan of the building to visualise the areas of the facility that are
accessible to a particular employee.
The ability to visualise access control policies is essential for simulating emer-
gencies and evacuation plans [38, 55]. Access control patterns change during an
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evacuation event and physical access control to doors and control spaces are re-
congured to enable emergency response and recovery. The ability to test policies
for these dierent scenarios is useful in eliminating unwanted access situations.
This can be used in conjunction with an emergency response subsystem and
assist emergency response teams in planning.
Policy administration
Once an initial access control policy for a facility is created, it will evolve when
new users are added and spaces and objects contained within that have access-
control changed. Thus, access control policy administration plays an important
role in ensuring the eective and correct enforcement of access policies over-
time [111].
Given the objects and actions in policies are from building information mod-
els, changes to spaces will be directly reected in access control policies. The
`visualisation engine' will be used to render policies on top of building spaces and
see the changed conditions for visual verication by a security ocer. Security
ocers can also select individual user roles or users and visually check the objects
and spaces they have access based on current policy. This will require the use of
spatial functions from both `spatial reasoning' and `visualisation engine'.
Decision-making
The access control policies generated from the above processes will then be used
in decision-making of access control requests. Building information models would
enable additional functionality to this process in terms of operating spatial con-
ditional functions on BIMs.
This authorisation framework provides two interfaces that operate in distinct
ways of decision-making. The `access control interface' makes decisions within
the framework while the `access information interface' enables external decision-
making with the use of same policies and BIM functions.
The decision making process of the authorisation framework follows the XACML
standard with the dierence of the ability to use BIM specic spatial function in
policies that can be interpreted in `spatial reasoning' through the `policy infor-
mation point'. This enables the use of spatial conditional functions, which can
simplify the policy rules.
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3.2.4 Access control policy elements
In all the above access control processes one interconnecting aspect is the access
control policy. Access control policy is a vital aspect of the authorisation frame-
work and in its simplied form, access control policies can be represented as a
set of quadruples of subject-object-action-condition relationships.
Objects: In all types of access requests, to both objects within and external of
BIMs, they will have corresponding BIM objects to which the access refers. In
the case of access to BIM objects, the request would identify the object. For other
accesses, such as access to a space, the request would identify the corresponding
space object or door object in BIM. Thus, access policies can have a unied
way of representing resources. Either they can be IFC class based or individual
objects can be represented using their globally unique identiers (GUID).
Actions: Each access request would specify an action the subject intends to
perform of the specied resource. These actions will vary depending on the type
of the resource. For logical resources within a BIM server, create, view, modify,
or delete can be typical actions types. For an access request for physical access
control to a space, the access type would be to open a given door. Thus, the
access policies should be able to support dierent categories of actions based on
the resources.
Conditional functions: The relationships between building elements in a
BIM might not necessarily correspond to the physical elements. There can be
logical relationships such as zones and ownership. It is useful to have the abil-
ity to specify access rules based on these relationships. These can be based
on functions that can operate BIM elements as inputs and compute dierent
relationships from the BIM.
Building information models provide the vocabulary for annotating objects
and actions in access control policies. Each object within a building will have a
corresponding element in the BIM. These BIM objects will also hold attributes
that specify actions that can be performed on these objects. For example, the
entrance door to a room will be represented in the BIM by a `door' object with
action attributes `open' and `close'. Additionally there can be `conditions' that
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are based on spatial functions such as connectivity and containment, which re-
quire BIMs to specify and compute results. Chapter 5 provides a more detailed
description of access control policies and a policy model for access control using
building information models.
3.3 Unied access control using building infor-
mation models
The unication of access control processes is one of the key aspects and advan-
tages of the authorisation framework using building information models. The
term unication is used to emphasise the possibility of using a common frame-
work to address dierent types of access control requirements. There are two
major categories of authorisation addressed through the unication aspect of
this framework: BIM content and external resources. The information ow di-
agram in Figure 3.1 shows the dierent information ows between entities of
the authorisation framework based on this categorisation. The unication also
addresses two additional processes of the authorisation framework: providing
converged access control for both physical and logical resources, and supporting
legacy systems through policy transformations. In this section we identify these
aspects of access control and present how the authorisation framework supports
these access control processes.
3.3.1 Converged access control
As briey introduced in the previous section, integration of physical access con-
trol with logical access control can result in signicant security-related advan-
tages [87, 88]. The main advantage comes from the integration itself, which
brings awareness of access policies and rules of both modes, which are otherwise
managed by separate tools and systems. This cross awareness is useful with
most operations in typical organisations, as most of the tasks would involve the
utilisation of both logical and physical resources. The convergence of merging
physical and logical access control operations under a single authorisation sys-
tem in such environments would enable conguring access to both physical and
logical resources for a task assignment from a single input point.
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The convergence of access control can be ecient and economical in terms
of both human and systems perspectives [30]. The consistent security manage-
ment can reduce administration overhead and streamline access control provision
across multiple systems under the organisation. The use of same administration
tools will eliminate the need for switching between systems, and increase user
familiarity with the systems. In an operational point, it is possible to perform
cross-certication of access credentials of users, which can be used to enforce
rules such as user must have accessed a physical space before gaining access to a
logical resource. The combined identity and access repository can also be used
for risk analysis for both physical and logical resources as they are in many cases
inter-dependent.
The policy language we propose in Chapter 5 along with the authorisation
framework support access control convergence and policy integration, by provid-
ing a way of consistently naming and referring to the essential concepts of access
control policies such as subjects, objects, conditions and actions. The authori-
sation framework achieves convergence of access control for physical and logical
resources by using the same object vocabulary structure provided through BIMs.
These IFC based entity types can be used for referencing both object types in
access control policy rules and authorisation requests.
All physical objects including space objects that are part of the building
will have reference objects in a BIM that can be directly used in policy rules.
Alternatively, for logical objects such as information resources, the same BIMs
objects can serve as location attributes to provide the spatial context for these
objects. For example, a video feed from a CCTV camera can be given an at-
tribute reference to a space object where the particular camera is located within
the building. This approach allows the use of same object vocabulary and entity
hierarchy based on IFC to specify and use policies for both physical and logical
objects. This convergence of access control enables the authorisation framework
to use the same administration processes without the need for any modica-
tions for both physical and logical access control as well as for access control
to logical information resources without any spatial context. This also enables
automation and centralisation of various access control processes such as policy
administration and management.
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3.3.2 Access control policy transformations
A common roadblock in implementing a new authorisation framework within
existing organisations is the need to support the existing systems within those
environments. In the context of access control, there will be many systems
that already have their own access control mechanisms and given the nature of
commercial system procurements in many cases there will not be any common
technology standard across the various systems. If the access control manage-
ment processes of these systems are not brought into a singular framework, it
would defeat the purpose of unication.
The framework is able to integrate various systems to provided centralised
access control administration in two ways based on where decision making hap-
pens at subsystems level. The PDP internal to the framework can be used for
centralised decision making for external subsystems through the Access Control
Interface. This, however, would require these systems to be developed or mod-
ied specically to support the framework. In many operational environments
with legacy systems, it is necessary to support a wide array of systems with their
own authorisation capabilities that do not delegate decision making externally.
The Access Information Interface of the authorisation framework enables the use
of centrally managed access control policies to be distributed to such external
systems. This process enables use of spatial information to generate policy rules
in formats specic to those systems.
The access information interface is implemented as a service interface to im-
port and export access control policies from external systems. This interface
could support various native formats that are required by dierent systems and
convert them to a format which is compatible with the policy transformation
module. The policy rules imported from external systems are managed along
with all the policy rules within the framework. These policy rules can be ma-
nipulated in a single point thus any interdependencies can be reected across all
the systems. Once the policy rules specic for systems are created or changed
the specic rules can be exported back into the systems through the same access
information interface reverse transformation process.
There are certain drawbacks with delegating decision making and distribut-
ing system specic access control policy rules to external systems. The main
downside with this approach is the loss of some spatial capabilities and richer
context information that are available through BIMs, when the policy rules are
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transformed to system specic rule formats. The transformed policies would
only be able to support the contexts that are directly supported by the systems.
Another related disadvantage is rule updates being updated in batches that can
result in some decision points not having the latest rule sets. There will also be
instances where it is much desirable to use decision making external to the central
authorisation framework, especially for physical access control where availability
of decision making and required higher level of condence can be achieved by
distributed decision making using local controllers spread across buildings.
3.4 Discussion
The main motivation of the authorisation framework using building information
models is to utilise the rich spatial information contained within a BIM and also
provide an eective way of controlling access to information that is contained
within a BIM repository. The access control policy rules are used in controlling
access to dierent BIM objects such as building elements and spaces. Main
parts of a critical facility and its representation in a BIM may be operationally
sensitive so users should only have access when they have a legitimate need.
For example, an air-conditioning maintenance operator at an airport would have
mobile devices that can access and query the BIM server to visualise and view
pump and duct locations, but the details of the critical network wirings need not
be visible to them. Thus, the visualisation of a building information model needs
to be controlled based on the role, assigned tasks (and possibly other contextual
factors such as time and location) of the user. The information they can visualise
to perform their job must be governed by the access control policy.
Computerisation and network-based control makes it possible to access sys-
tems remotely. This increases the likelihood that they will be maliciously at-
tacked. For example, a disgruntled ex-employee may be able to operate or dis-
able equipment via an Internet connection to cause damage or nancial loss to
the organisation [26]. To combat remote access threats, certain types of access
need to be restricted, for example, based on the location of the resource and the
user. Even if a user has been granted access privileges to a control system (e.g.,
HVAC, lighting, wastewater) the security policy may stipulate that they need
to be physically present in a particular location to execute critical functions.
Therefore, the maintenance electrician may be permitted to monitor equipment
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status remotely, but he must be physically present in the control room to issue
shutdown commands. The integration of physical and logical access control and
a spatial model can allow this condition to be enforced. The framework can
verify if the user has entered the designated space via the physical access control
subsystem, before granting access to the information system.
Our approach to spatial policy creation, visualisation, and enforcement gives
greater assurance that high-level security policies are correctly implemented
based on our authorisation framework in Figure 3.2. Consider our example sce-
nario in Chapter 2, where Alice, the administrator, needs to congure access to
a new employee joining their division. She has already dened the spaces occu-
pied by her division using interactive Visualisation Engine module and stored in
the BIM. The framework system can compute the other zones and doors that
must be accessible to reach that space with the least privilege required, based on
geometric reasoning from the Spatial Reasoning module. These spaces can be
referred to in access policies via a logical tag e.g., Finance Division Zone. Alice
simply needs to assign the new employee the role of Finance Division member
and the authorisation framework will utilise the relationships in the BIM to as-
sign the required ne-grained access privileges to the new employee using Policy
Transformation functions. This can be done automatically via a rule that says
nance sta can access the nance zone.
Dynamic generation of access control privileges is a desired feature of an
authorisation framework. For example, Bob can assign Eddie for repairs to
dierent parts of the building each day via individual jobs generated through
an asset management system linked to the BIM. The location of the eected
equipment and the status of the jobs can be used to automatically assign and
revoke physical access privileges in the physical access control system. Such a
capability can be further expanded to incorporate access control policy creation
as part of dierent organisational processes with business process management
tools. This capability of dynamic generation of policies not only enables easy
management of multiple systems, it also ensures all the policies are updated
accordingly when changes are detected in individual systems. These capabilities
are enabled through Access Information Interface and Policy Transformation
module of the authorisation framework.
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This authorisation framework relies on the dierent components as discussed
in Section 3.2, however we do not specify any standards for these individual com-
ponents except for BIMs. There are various communication standards used in the
building industry for interaction between systems. In an ideal implementation
of this authorisation framework, existing communication protocols such as BAC-
net [5] and OSIPS [36] should be utilised to achieve greater interoperability. We
assume the components and subsystems that are part of this framework would
support the required functionality to achieve the overall goal of the framework.
For example, BIMs are a central component of this framework and many of the
capabilities of the framework rely on a well-formed BIM with certain objects and
relationships. This can be seen as a key external requirement of the framework
and we discuss this further in the next chapter.
The authorisation framework using building information models introduces a
set of components to address the requirements previously identied in Chapter 2,
Section 2.3.2. The components have been described in terms of their function
and interaction, though prescription of implementation-specic details has been
avoided, since this would be inconsistent with the level of abstraction required
of a framework. For example, we do not specify the mechanics of the authorisa-
tion decision making component. Instead we include an abstract authorisation
component which makes decisions when requests are submitted. We introduce
our authorisation policy language in Chapter 6.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a framework to utilise building information models as
spatial data model for access control. The authorisation framework using build-
ing information models is a novel approach for spatial access control. This is
a pioneering work in utilising building information models in this role. With
the adoption of building information models across industry, especially for fa-
cility management, this authorisation framework presents a starting point for
incorporation of the same tools for security and access control administration.
We provided a classication for access control when using building informa-
tion models. Two categories were identied based on access control requirements
for various information ows in an environment where building information mod-
els are utilised. Access control for BIM content includes all information contained
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within a BIM repository. This covers building elements as well as information
feeds from systems that are stored as part of a BIM repository.
The proposed authorisation framework utilises building information models
in various processes of access control to provide a unied access control im-
plementation across various system environment. We discuss how the dierent
components of the framework interact in the standard processes of policy speci-
cation, policy administration, and decision-making. The framework also serves to
provide a converged approach for physical and logical access control. In addition
to this, supporting legacy systems through policy transformation is an aspect of
the framework that can ensure adoption of such a system within environments
that already have dierent functional systems.
In this chapter, we have not discussed technical details of the individual
components of our authorisation framework. In Chapter 4, we provide a more
technical oriented introduction to IFC based building information models and
present a graph model for building information models. Chapter 5 focuses on ac-
cess control policy related components and processes. In Chapter 6, we provide a
more detailed discussion of implementation concerns related to the authorisation
framework and outline a roadmap for adopting this authorisation framework in
operational environments.
Chapter 4
Building Information Models for
Access Control
The research presented in this thesis is the pioneering work in the application of
building information models in a security domain. The use of BIMs as spatial
data models for any security applications including access control has not previ-
ously been established. In Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 background on spatial data
models and the rationale behind the choice of building information models as the
central component of our proposed authorisation framework were outlined. This
chapter identies the essential technical details of building information models
that are part of the authorisation framework proposed in Chapter 3.
Industry foundation classes are the accepted industry standard for represent-
ing building information models. This chapter provides a more in-depth analysis
of the IFC specication and how this forms the vocabulary for spatial authori-
sation policies. It further outlines key concepts associated with common access
control scenarios and discusses how they can be expressed and interpreted in
IFC.
This research, being the rst to utilise building information models in a se-
curity application, lacks any theoretical precedent that can be directly adopted.
A graph theory based representation of building information models is proposed,
which can be used to formally represent how building information models can be
used and manipulated in various access control applications.
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 provides a more
technical oriented introduction to the IFC specication. A graph model for
building information models is presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.1.3 discusses
how BIM graphs can be used in practical access control scenarios. Section 4.3
provides concluding remarks.
4.1 Industry Foundation Classes
The Industry Foundation Classes (IFC) specication is the industry standard
data schema for data storage and exchange of shared building information mod-
els between dierent disciplines in building and facility management industry
sectors. The IFC specication is developed and maintained by buildingSMART
International as a common data schema to enable storage and exchange of BIM
data between dierent proprietary software applications [25]. Industry Foun-
dation Classes Release 4 (IFC4) (formerly IFC2x4) is the latest IFC platform
released in March 2013 and any subsequent discussion of the IFC schema in this
thesis is based on IFC4 [79].
The objects in a BIM can be represented using dierent classication of ob-
ject classes in IFC specication. A building information model based on the
IFC specication is organised as an object-based inheritance hierarchy using an
entity-relationship model. The IFC specication includes a data scheme repre-
sented in EXPRESS schema specication as well as an XML schema specication
and reference data represented in XML property and quantity denitions. The
IFC specication provides various data types required to represent BIM classes
and objects. The specication includes terms, concepts and data specication
items originating from disciplines of architecture, engineering, and construction
industry sectors.
There are three main le formats dened in IFC: IFC-SPF, IFC-XML, and
IFC-ZIP, each representing data using various encodings. The most widely used
format is IFC-SPF, dened in STEP-File (ISO 10303-21) format in which each
line corresponds to a single object record. IFC-XML, dened in STEP-XML (ISO
10303-28), is mainly intended to achieve interoperability and exchange with XML
based tools. IFC-XML is less commonly used in practice due to its large size
compared to IFC-SPF when representing common building models. IFC-ZIP is
a compressed form of an IFC-SPF le in ZIP encoding.
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The IFC data schema is compartmentalised into four conceptual layers and
each layer maps to an individual schema. The resource layer is the lowest layer
containing all individual schemas with resource denitions. These resource de-
nitions do not include a unique identier and they could only be used with the
denition declared at a higher layer. The core layer contains most general entity
denitions, including the kernel schema and the core extension schemas. The en-
tities dened in the core layer and above carry a globally unique identier. The
denitions in the kernel schema of the core layer are of central interest to this the-
sis. The interoperability layer contains entity denitions for products, processes
and resources that are used across several disciplines and used for inter-domain
exchange of information. The domain layer contains entity denitions for prod-
ucts, processes and resources that are specic to a certain discipline and used for
intra-domain exchange of information.
4.1.1 IFC kernel schema
The IfcKernel schema denes the core data model of the IFC specication. It
provides the abstract denition of the IFC architecture with the basic seman-
tics for an object model with objects, relationships, and properties. IfcRoot is
the common super type for all IFC entities except for those dened in an IFC
resource schema. All entities dened in the IfcKernel schema inherit directly or
indirectly from IfcRoot, which is the abstract root class for all IFC entity def-
initions. The main capability that is inherited from IfcRoot is the assignment
of a globally unique identier (GUID), ownership information and attributes for
name and description. The IfcKernel schema also provides the foundation for
future extensions to the specication by providing proxy denitions, type object
denitions, property set denitions, and property set template denitions.
The rst level of specialisation within the entity hierarchy is the objects de-
nitions, relationships and property denitions. Object denitions (IfcObjectDe-
nition) are generalisation of any semantically treated item within the IFC model.
It stands for all physically tangible items such as walls and columns, physically
existing items such as spaces, and conceptual items such as grids and virtual
boundaries. These object denitions can be further specialised into object oc-
currences (IfcObject) for any individual object. Relationships (IfcRelationship)
are dened as objectied relationships between entities within the IFC model.
The relationship denitions uncouple the relationships semantics from the object
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attributes and any relationships specic properties are directly attached to the
relationship object. Property denitions (IfcPropertyDenition) are generalisa-
tion of characteristics that can be assigned to multiple object denitions. The
property denitions are mostly used to represent specic information of an object
type. These property denitions are applied to objects using relationships.
IfcRoot
IfcObjectDefinitionIfcRelationship IfcPropertyDefinition
IfcObject IfcTypeObject IfcContext
IfcRelAssigns
IfcRelAssociates
IfcRelDecomposes
IfcRelDefines
IfcRelConnects
IfcRelDeclares
IfcProduct
IfcProcess
IfcControl
IfcResource
IfcActor
IfcGroup
IfcSpatialElement
IfcSpatialElement
IfcBuilding
IfcSite
IfcBuildingStorey
IfcSpace
IfcSpatialZone
Figure 4.1: IFC kernel schema tree
In IFC, we are particularly interested in objects and relationships and their
entity subtypes as shown in Figure 4.1. The IFC objects and relationships are
used as the basis for our spatial data model that provides vocabulary for ac-
cess control policies. The following sections look at fundamental entity types of
objects and relationships in IFC. In addition to these fundamental types, other
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subtypes of these objects and relationships are also used as part of our spatial
data model. These entity types of objects and relationships will be discussed in
more detail in subsequent chapters where they will be used as part of our access
control vocabulary.
Objects
The object entity subtype tree contains six fundamental entity types in the IFC
model. These entity types are all derived from IfcObject and form the second
level of specialisation within the IFC class hierarchy under the object branch. All
physically existing or tangible objects that may be dened by shape representa-
tions and have a location in the coordinate space fall under the categorisation of
products (IfcProduct) and subtypes. IfcSpatialElement is one of the signicant
subtypes of IfcProduct, especially in terms of access control applications. As
shown in Figure 4.1, IfcSpatialElement serves as the super-type entity for den-
ing spatial structures and spatial zones. In addition to tangible objects, IFC
can also represent actions taking place in a project with the intent of acquiring,
constructing, or maintaining objects through processes (IfcProcess). Another
important entity type for access control is groups (IfcGroup) that are arbitrary
collections of objects. Concepts that control or constrain other objects are rep-
resented bycontrols (IfcControl) and concepts that describe the use of an object
mainly within a process can be represented by resources (IfcResource). Actors
(IfcActor) are human agents that are involved in a project during its full life
cycle. These entity types can be used not only for objects in a BIM, but also as
reference attributes to assign spatial context to external data objects.
Relationships
The relationship entity subtype tree contains six fundamental entity types in the
IFC model. These entity types are all derived from IfcRelationship and form the
second level of specialisation within the IFC class hierarchy under the relation-
ship branch. Assignment (IfcRelAssigns) is a generalisation of relationships that
denote a specic association through which a client object applies the services
of other supplier objects, or through which one object may navigate to other
objects. Association relationships (IfcRelAssociates) refer and associate external
sources of information to objects or property denitions. Decomposition relation-
ships (IfcRelDecomposes) dene the general concept of elements being composed
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Figure 4.2: Two rooms connected through a door, in three-dimensional rendering
(left) and two-dimensional oor plan (right)
or decomposed through hierarchy of parts and composition of objects. Deni-
tion relationships (IfcRelDenes) are used to dene the properties of the object
instance. Connectivity relationship (IfcRelConnects) handles the connectivity
of objects. Declaration relationship (IfcRelDeclares) handles the link between
object denitions and property denitions and the declaring context.
4.1.2 IFC for access control
There are hundreds of entity types for objects and relationships dened in the
IFC specication. The extensive data types are useful in representing entities
from various domains of building industries. From this exhaustive list, a select
group of objects and relationships are identied, which are key to representing
many concepts relevant for access control scenarios. This section lists concepts
that are essential for access control and discusses how they are represented in or
extracted from IFC. This is not meant as a denitive list of entity types that are
useful for access control, but it serves as a starting point for understanding how
IFC data is used for access control.
Let us consider a simple building structure with two adjacent rooms connected
through a door as shown in Figure 4.2. The code snippet in Listing 4.1 shows
how this simple two room arrangement is represented in IFC-SPF format. This
example listing only contains selected lines of code for demonstrating how objects
of dierent IFC entity types are created and other relative information such as
distances are represented. Each line in the data portion of the le refers to one
entity instance. #NUM is used to identify each line uniquely as well as to cross
reference attributes in other instances.
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DATA;
#1= IFCORGANIZATION($,'Autodesk Revit 2014 (ENU)',$,$,$);
#5= IFCAPPLICATION (#1,'2014','Autodesk Revit 2014 (ENU)','Revit')
;
#6= IFCCARTESIANPOINT ((0. ,0. ,0.));
#31= IFCAXIS2PLACEMENT3D (#6,$,$);
#32= IFCLOCALPLACEMENT (#1090 ,#31);
#35= IFCPERSON($,'','Nimal',$,$,$,$,$);
#79= IFCPROJECT('1s7zxP_Av6DPVwRyAAKuDO ' ,#41,'Project Number ',$,$
,'Project Name','Project Status ' ,(#68 ,#76) ,#63);
#85= IFCPOSTALADDRESS($,$,$,$,('Enter address here'),$,'','Sydney
','NSW','Australia ');
#89= IFCBUILDING('1s7zxP_Av6DPVwRyAAKuDP ' ,#41,'',$,$,#32,$,'',.
ELEMENT.,$,$,#85);
#95= IFCAXIS2PLACEMENT3D (#6,$,$);
#96= IFCLOCALPLACEMENT (#32 ,#95);
#98= IFCBUILDINGSTOREY('1s7zxP_Av6DPVwRy9rh7sV ' ,#41,'Ground Floor
',$,$,#96,$,'Ground Floor ',.ELEMENT .,0.);
#126= IFCSPACE('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4CJ ' ,#41,'2',$,$,#110 ,#122 ,'
Room',.ELEMENT.,.INTERNAL.,$);
#257= IFCSPACE('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4F1 ' ,#41,'3',$,$,#244 ,#255 ,'
Room',.ELEMENT.,.INTERNAL.,$);
#1023= IFCDOOR('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4DC ' ,#41,'M_Single -Flush :0813 
x 2134mm :175418 ',$,'0813 x 2134mm' ,#1021 ,#1014 ,'175418 '
,2134. ,813.);
Listing 4.1: IFC Code for the two room arrangement
In this listing, #6 denes an IfcCartesianPoint (0,0,0) that is used as a ref-
erence axis coordinate for other object instances created later. For example, in
#98, IfcBuildingStorey refers to IfcLocalPlacement #96, which in turn refers to
IfcLocalPlacement #32 and IfcAxis2Placement3D #95, of which #95 refers back
to the original IfcCartesianPoint as its IfcAxis2Placement3D. A space object can
be seen as a key concept for access control purposes. IfcSpace is the entity de-
nition for spaces in IFC and #126 and #257 show denitions for the two spaces
in Figure 4.2. The common attribute among entities that are under IfcRoot,
such as IfcProject, IfcBuilding or IfcSpace, is a GUID, which is very useful in
the context of access control polices.
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Some key concepts essential for access control scenarios include: zones, prop-
erty sets, adjacency of spaces, portals connecting spaces, and size of spaces. Here
we outline these concepts and how they are mapped in IFC using individual ex-
amples.
Zones: In IFC, zone is a concept to grouping building spaces. A zone (IfcZone)
is a group of spaces or other zones, and these spaces and zones do not need to
be hierarchical. IfcZone is a subtype of IfcSystem, which itself is one of the
subtypes of IfcGroup. IfcGroup and its subtypes are particularly useful concepts
for access control. These entity types can be used to consolidate resources into
groups and dene common access policies. With zones, a space can be grouped
into an IfcZone with an IfcRelAssignsToGroup relationship. A space can belong
to one or more zones and spatially non-adjacent spaces can be grouped under one
zone. This ability to group spaces into zones is a key concept and requirement
for physical access control. For example, in an airport, administrative areas can
be grouped under dierent agencies that operate in those spaces and these spaces
could span across dierent parts of the airport.
Property sets: In IFC, the concept of property sets enables one to associate
a set of properties, which are usually in the form of (name, value, unit) triple, to
objects or object types. The ability to associate properties with object types is
particularly useful as it enables extending existing IFC object types with addi-
tional properties, such as security classication for spaces, which are required for
access control scenarios. A property set (IfcPropertySet) can contain a single or
multiple properties (IfcProperty). The actual property values can be of dierent
data types: single value, enumerated value, bounded value, table value, reference
value, list value, and combination of property occurrences. A particular object
type, such as IFC space, can be related to a single or multiple property sets. By
applying property values to object types, these properties are reected across
all the occurrences of that object type. For example, a security classication
property for space object types will be available for all space objects of that
type.
In the code snippet in Listing 4.2, the property set denes identity data for a
space. #206 and #208 dene two individual properties of data type single value
and these two properties are grouped as property set Identity Data in #217. #219
associates this property set to the space object dened in #126.
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#126= IFCSPACE('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4CJ ' ,#41,'2',$,$,#110 ,#122 ,'
Room',.ELEMENT.,.INTERNAL.,$);
#206= IFCPROPERTYSINGLEVALUE('Name',$,IFCTEXT('Room'),$);
#208= IFCPROPERTYSINGLEVALUE('Number ',$,IFCTEXT('2'),$);
#217= IFCPROPERTYSET('2NgI9_UZj3dBkXWdoJtMlD ' ,#41,'Identity Data'
,$ ,(#206 ,#208));
#219= IFCRELDEFINESBYPROPERTIES('0MoYREDRr7F9_XZVxHNN3D ' ,#41,$,$
,(#126) ,#217);
Listing 4.2: IFC code dening identity data property for Room 2
Adjacency of spaces: In IFC, adjacency of two spaces can be dened through
the space boundary relationship (IfcRelSpaceBoundary). IfcRelSpaceBoundary
relationship denes the relationship between an element and a space it bounds.
This relationship can be used in two dierent settings to dene adjacency of
spaces: direct adjacency and adjacency through boundary elements. Direct ad-
jacency applies when one space is the bounding element to the other spaces. This
would be normally be used when there are no physical separation between the
concerned spaces. A more common setting would be adjacency through bound-
ary elements. If we consider the setting in Figure 4.2, the two rooms are adjacent
spaces separated by a wall, which is a bounding element for both spaces.
#126= IFCSPACE('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4CJ ' ,#41,'2',$,$,#110 ,#122 ,'
Room',.ELEMENT.,.INTERNAL.,$);
#257= IFCSPACE('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4F1 ' ,#41,'3',$,$,#244 ,#255 ,'
Room',.ELEMENT.,.INTERNAL.,$);
#567= IFCWALLSTANDARDCASE('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4Bh ' ,#41,'Basic 
Wall:Double brick - 270:175261 ',$,'Basic Wall:Double brick - 
270:99977 ' ,#547,#565,'175261 ');
#1269= IFCRELSPACEBOUNDARY('1YH_yBdrv3$Ouey8N$kVae ' ,#41,'1stLevel
',$,#126 ,#567 ,#175 ,. PHYSICAL.,.EXTERNAL .);
#1275= IFCRELSPACEBOUNDARY('2O20oS6xz3VxiP5mWrO$PJ ' ,#41,'1stLevel
',$,#257 ,#567 ,#291 ,. PHYSICAL.,.EXTERNAL .);
Listing 4.3: IFC code for adjacency of two spaces through a wall
The code snippet in Listing 4.3 shows how two space object are dened as
being adjacent through a wall element. #126 and #257 dene two IfcSpace objects
for the rooms in Figure 4.2, and #567 denes the wall in between the rooms. The
IfcRelSpaceBoundary relationships in #1269 and #1275 dene the two spaces are
bounded by the wall. The information present in these code lines can be used to
infer that the two spaces are indeed adjacent.
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Portal connecting spaces: The concept of portals connecting spaces can be
considered as a key requirement for physical access control as it determines which
spaces can be accessed through given portals. In IFC, this can be achieved using
the same IfcRelSpaceBoundary relationship used for space adjacency, with the
portal as the bounding element for the spaces. In Listing 4.4, #1023 denes a
door object that connects the two rooms in Figure 4.2.
#126= IFCSPACE('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4CJ ' ,#41,'2',$,$,#110 ,#122 ,'
Room',.ELEMENT.,.INTERNAL.,$);
#257= IFCSPACE('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4F1 ' ,#41,'3',$,$,#244 ,#255 ,'
Room',.ELEMENT.,.INTERNAL.,$);
#1023= IFCDOOR('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4DC ' ,#41,'M_Single -Flush :0813 
x 2134mm :175418 ',$,'0813 x 2134mm' ,#1021 ,#1014 ,'175418 '
,2134. ,813.);
#1271= IFCRELSPACEBOUNDARY('2j1rdfu_56lv42_N2y40U9 ' ,#41,'1stLevel
',$,#126 ,#1023 ,#195 ,. PHYSICAL.,.EXTERNAL .);
#1279= IFCRELSPACEBOUNDARY('1h9g4FsF53JRQY8tqDeP0q ' ,#41,'1stLevel
',$,#257 ,#1023 ,#331 ,. PHYSICAL.,.EXTERNAL .);
Listing 4.4: IFC code for two spaces connected through a door
Size of spaces: Size of a room or space is normally dened using Gross-
FloorArea or NetFloorArea denitions, which are IfcElementQuantity entities
attached to the space object by IfcRelDenesByProperties relationship. In List-
ing 4.5, the size of space #126 dened in #132 is associated with the space in
#137.
#126= IFCSPACE('0TfBs6opjCRuKNDRVvM4CJ ' ,#41,'2',$,$,#110 ,#122 ,'
Room',.ELEMENT.,.INTERNAL.,$);
#131= IFCQUANTITYAREA('GSA BIM Area',$,$ ,139.439450000001);
#132= IFCELEMENTQUANTITY('0vYo185WnEXABYmgu$hWj4 ' ,#41,'GSA Space 
Areas ',$,'GSA BIM Area' ,(#131));
#137= IFCRELDEFINESBYPROPERTIES('1IFRVAqnr6BAcnB0UOZkP8 ' ,#41,$,$
,(#126) ,#132);
Listing 4.5: IFC code for two spaces connected through a door
These entity types and relationships will form the basis for using IFC based
access control policies in the proposed authorisation framework as well as for
generating the BIM graph from raw data that is presented in the next section.
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4.1.3 Discussion
As briey discussed in Chapter 3, a well-formed BIM with certain objects and
relationships is a key requirement for this authorisation framework. This is
something that is not always there in many excising organisations. However,
it could be generated from existing data sets such as CAD drawings. We also
anticipate BIMs to be an integral part of future buildings and we can see this
trend in many currently commissioned projects. This does not always ensure
that a well-formed BIM with all required information will be readily available.
A key factor contributing to this is the openness of the IFC specication.
Building information models based on the IFC specication are a signicant
aspect of our authorisation framework. There have been several data models for
spatial access control as discussed in Chapter 2 and the rationale for choosing
IFC among these competing standards was provided in Section 2.2.5. The key
factors inuencing this choice were the following: IFC was designed specically
for buildings, its openness as a standard and foremost its ability to represent
a wide range of objects and processes within building environments throughout
the life cycle of a building.
The IFC specication provides an extensive list of object and relationships.
This also means that dierent combinations of relationships and objects can
be used to represent the same building property. Thus, our assumption is to
have a standard set of relationships dened as part of the implementation of the
framework and expect the same with any input BIMs.
In Section 4.1 only a selected types of objects and relationship entity types in
IFC were listed. This is not meant as a denitive list of required entity types, but
serves as a list of fundamental entity types that are super types of most possible
entity types. The exact entity types is only required at a policy specication
level and does not aect how the authorisation framework components interacts
on a conceptual level. We further discuss how IFC entity types are used in access
control policies in the next chapter.
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4.2 Graph model of building information mod-
els for access control applications
The advantages of using building information models as spatial data models for
access control were identied in the previous chapter. Even though the domain of
building information modelling is signicantly mature in many disciplines, there
are no security related applications using building information models. The main
disadvantage faced in adopting building information models for a security appli-
cation is the lack of formal representation of BIMs that can be used to describe
various functions associated with such an application. In this section, a graph
theoretic formalism for representing building information models is provided,
which can be used to formally describe access control related functions that use
building information models. This formal model of BIMs serves two main pur-
poses: formally describing BIMs and formally describing functions using BIMs.
This representation of a BIM can be used to easily check for correctness of new
functions for dierent access control processes before implementing them in a
BIM environment.
This graph theory based formalisation was chosen as graph models are widely
used in indoor and outdoor navigation applications, and navigation where path
nding is one of the fundamental concepts used in access control situations.
Graph theory based formalisations are commonly used to represent buildings
for the purposes of indoor navigation [56, 82]. We recognise that a building is
best described using graphs for the purposes of navigation because it is a more
intuitive approach to best map the commonly used functions. A graph model
closely matches to our application of building information models for path-nding
and navigation. Spaces and portals in buildings, which are the key elements of
concern for these applications, map to nodes and edges in graphs. We need a
representation where we can individually address spaces and portals, and apply
conditional constraints on them. A graph is the most suitable representation for a
building for our purposes, in which we can identify nodes and edges and associate
constraints to them. We can calculate distances between selected nodes (spaces)
through selected edges (portals), which is the underlying function of path nding.
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4.2.1 BIM graph
BIM graph, the graph theory model of building information models for access
control applications, is based on hierarchical graphs. These hierarchical graphs
can map the multi-storey nature of most buildings elegantly and help separate
functional areas of the building into dierent layers. There are dierent ap-
proaches to organizing graphs in multi-layered hierarchies, but for the purpose
of building information models we propose a simple form of hierarchical graph
that is partitioned based on building storeys as (Building ! Storey ! Spaces),
which closely resembles the organisation in IFC architecture.
This approach is similar to the graph model presented in [121], where hier-
archical graphs were used to represent buildings for the purpose of pedestrian
indoor navigation. The BIM graph diers in how the graph is formulated, and
it uses IFC models instead of oor plans as information source for building the
graphs. BIM graph also has limited hierarchy levels to map only the essential
levels of spatial structures required for a building.
Denition 1. (BIM graph) Let N be the denitive set of spaces and E be
the denitive set of portals contained in a building information model B. A
hierarchical graph H, with respect to a base graph G that corresponds to B with
k number of storeys, is dened by a complete partitioning of k  1 non-empty,
connected sets of nodes fN1; :::; Nkg. Each set of Ni  N includes Si, a sub-
graph subi(G), that corresponds to storey-i of the building in B and to a node in
the hierarchical graph H. Si = (Ni; Ei  E) with Ei = (n1; n2) 2 Ejn1; n2  Ni.
EH  E corresponds to portals in B that are connecting spaces ni 2 Si and
nj 2 Sj where ni is a space in storey-i of B and nj is a space in storey-j of B.
Further, for any eij 2 EH with eij = (ni; nj) ni 6= nj.
The elements of N and E in a BIM graph can be associated with additional
attributes. For example, edges can have various attributes such as path distance
through the portal, security clearance of the portal, size of the portal (door width
or height) and type of the portal.
Denition 2. (Node Attribute) For a node ni 2 N , attr(ni) = f(key; value)g
is a set of key-value pairs that can designate various properties of the particular
space element in the BIM.
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Denition 3. (Edge Attribute) For an edge eij 2 E, which is a path connecting
spaces ni and nj, attr(eij) = f(key; value)g is a set of key-value pairs that can
designate various properties of eij.
A path is a very fundamental construct in many applications using building
information models, especially in navigation and access control. In its simplest
form a path is a sequence of spaces and portals that needs to be passed through
to reach from a starting point to an end point.
Denition 4. (Path) A path between two spaces na and nb is a sequence of
nodes and edges in the form of Pab = fna; ea1; n1; :::; ni; eij; nj; :::; nbg
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Figure 4.3: BIM graph diagram
Figure 4.3 shows a BIM graph for a simple two storey building. In this
graph, lift and stairs are connecting portals that connect dierent storeys. The
floornodes  spacenodes are coloured dierently from space nodes just to iden-
tify them as the nodes that connecting portals can connect. The building node is
a container node that does not participate in most applications using the graph
such as path-nding. In the following section, we explain how such a BIM graph
can be extrapolated from a BIM based on IFC entity classication.
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4.2.2 Building a BIM graph from a BIM
We extract the BIM graph from a building information model based on the object
type classication of the elements. This process relies on a well formed source
BIM that encapsulates all the relevant object types to map to a BIM graph. Both
nodes and edges are objects in a BIM and we use the IFC object classication to
separate them when building a BIM graph. Figure 4.4 shows how a BIM graph
can be extrapolated from a BIM for a multi storey building.
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Figure 4.4: BIM to BIM graph extrapolation
The process of extrapolating a BIM graph from a BIM involves two key steps.
First, an IFC based BIM le needs to be parsed to identify all the objects that
represent nodes and edges. All spatial structures and spaces present in a BIM
are members of N and any portals between spaces are members of E. Portals
can be any structures or objects connecting spaces and provide access between
the connected spaces, thus some spatial structures can also be members of E.
However, we require all BIM elements to be part of either N or E but not both.
All members of E will also have the information of the spaces they connect. This
information and the list of objects can be used to generate a BIM graph. This
graph will, however, not have all the attribute information attached to the nodes
or edges, which are vital for many functions using the BIM graph.
The second step of the extrapolation involves associating attribute informa-
tion to the edges and nodes of the BIM graph. This information can be gathered
directly from the BIM objects or inferred from any property sets associated with
these objects. The security clearance of a portal is an attribute that can be
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derived from the adjacent spaces. It can be either the higher or the lower value
of the two. The size of a portal can be used to calculate a path to move ob-
jects of certain sizes and eliminating any options that may pose any hazards for
such movements. The type of a portal attribute is useful in calculating paths for
special needs such as wheelchair accessibility.
A connecting path between two spaces can be in dierent forms for an actual
implementation using BIMs. For example, the path distance can be calculated by
simply connecting the centre points of the spaces or connecting the centre points
of the portals. It can also take into account the furniture and other navigational
hazards, which can change the distance of a path signicantly.
4.2.3 Access control functions using BIMs
The formal denition of BIMs in the form of a BIM graph can be utilised in
formally dening various applications that use BIMs. This is useful to present
dierent functions manipulating BIMs that are essential at dierent stages of
the access control process. In this section, we present two such functions as
an exercise to illustrate this approach: path nding and accessibility. These
functions are most commonly used in many access control scenarios. The same
approach can be extended to other similar functions manipulating BIM data.
We will be revisiting dierent applications of these functions in the reminder of
this thesis.
Path nding
The path nding function (Algorithm 1) calculates a path between given two
spaces na and nb. The resulting output is in the form of a path Pab if there is an
accessible path between the given spaces. This function can calculate dierent
subtypes of paths such as shortest path, least secure path or least access size path.
Each of these functions have applications in dierent access control scenarios and
the same algorithm can be further extended to other types of conditional path
nding.
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Algorithm 1 ndpath(na; nb; H)
Input: H: BIM graph, na: Space node, nb: Space Node, type: Path type search
condition
Output: Pab=false
Hsc = Remove from H edges and/or nodes that violate search condition
pathsab = Run shortest path algorithm on Hsc for (na; nb)
if pathsab = empty then
return false
else
Set pathsab set of paths Pab
end if
The key idea behind this algorithm is to create a sub-graph of H, Hsc, by
removing all the nodes and edges that violate the given search conditions. If
no search condition specied H = Hsc. Hereafter we can run any shortest path
algorithm on Hsc to nd the path that would also satisfy the given search condi-
tions. The algorithm returns false if no matching paths are found, or it returns
a set of paths connecting na and nb if multiple matching paths with the same
properties are found.
The path type search condition violations can be based on either node at-
tributes or edge attributes. For example, if the path time search is based on
least access size, which denes the smallest size of portal that is allowed in the
path, the violation condition would be based on the size attribute of the edges.
For all conditions, a shortest path algorithm will operate over the navigation
graph and when a particular edge violating the condition is encountered, that
path is discarded and the next the search proceeds to the next best option. For
least secure path, the security clearance can replace the distance and the same
shortest path algorithm can be used. This algorithm does not dictate the use of
any specic shortest path algorithm, which enables developers of this function
to use any standard algorithm such as Dijkstra's algorithm [37].
Let us refer back to the building diagram and BIM graph extrapolation
shown in Figure 4.4. We can use this graph to compute a path between dif-
ferent spaces. For example, we could calculate path PS103S203 between S103 and
S203 through the lift. In this case, there are two path options without any con-
ditions: P 1S103S203 = fS103, D1030, Floor1, Lift1, Floor2, D2010, S201, D2020,
S202, D2030, S203g passing through space S201 and P 2S103S203 = fS103, D1030,
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Floor1, Lift1, Floor2, D2021, S202, D2030, S203g skipping space S201. If condi-
tional search for passing thorough the least number of doors is enforced, P 2S103S203
would be the path of choice.
Accessibility
The accessibility function (Algorithm 2) identies if a particular user has access
to a destination location nend from their current location nstart. This function
uses breadth-rst search of the graph to identify all possible non-cyclical paths
between the start and end locations (allPathsab) and cross veries that with
access privileges of the given user.
Algorithm 2 accessibility(user; nstart; nend)
Input: user: An identier for user/role,
nstart: current location,
nend: destination,
Output: Pab=false
Set accessibility = false
for all Pab 2 allPathsab do
for all ni 2 Pab do
if canaccess(user; ni) then
Set accessibility = true
continue
else
Set accessibility = false
break
end if
end for
if accessibility = true then
return Pab
else
Progress to next best path
end if
end for
return false
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This algorithm loops through all the paths present in the allPathsab set that
is already generated using the path nding function with no search conditions.
For each path selected, the search will go through individual nodes to compare
it with the users access privileges and if the user does not have access to the
space designated by the node, the search will skip to the next path. If there is an
accessible path, which is a path with all nodes accessible by the user, the search
returns the resulting path.
Let us now assume a disruption in the building, which results in the closure
of S201. This would render S202 and S203 not accessible as node S201 would
be removed from the graph and any path passing through the node will become
invalid. This basic example shows how this can be applied in a real scenario,
however it is much more useful in a complex building spanning across multiple
oors, which is hard to comprehend for a human operator. They can use these
functions through their control interfaces to assist them in making informed
decisions at various stages of access control administration.
4.3 Conclusion
The multi-disciplinary nature of this research requires detailed exploration of
technologies and standards specications from dierent domains used in this re-
search. This chapter introduced the Industry Foundation Classes, the technical
specication that is to be used to represent building information models. IFC
forms the basic vocabulary for access control using building information mod-
els as spatial data models and this introduction of the selected portion of the
specication sets the stage for later chapters where IFC is signicantly utilised.
The primary contribution of this chapter is the proposed graph theory based
formal model for building information models, BIM graph. This addresses the
lack of any formal models for building information models specically for access
control purposes. The research presented in this thesis, being the pioneering
work to utilise building information models as spatial data models for access
control, lacks the formal precedence compared to other spatial models. The
use of graph-based techniques is common in many navigation and path nding
applications. It is the most common approach for existing indoor navigation
applications. The use of BIMs for such applications is not widely developed,
thus we do not have any existing graph models for BIMs. The proposed graph
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model for building information models encapsulates objects associated with most
access control applications in a building. This graph model serves as a starting
point for testing access control related function using BIMs before these are
implemented.
In addition to providing a graph model for BIMs, this chapter provided an
extrapolation mechanism for generating BIM graphs from IFC based BIMs. This
process relies on the IFC entity type classication and the relevant entity types
that were highlighted in Section 4.1.1. This chapter also introduced approaches
on how a BIM graph can be used to present functions using BIMs that are used
in access control applications. The main purpose of the two functions provided
in this chapter is to demonstrate how a BIM graph can be used in real-life
application scenarios. We will go into more detailed scenarios and applications
of these functions and BIM graph in subsequent chapters.
The IFC based object specication introduced in this chapter forms the basic
vocabulary for policy specication for the policy model presented in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6, BIM graph is used as the formal foundation for the implementation
of access control related functions using building information models.
Chapter 5
A Policy Model for Access
Control using Building
Information Models
The use of building information models as a spatial data model for authorisation
creates unique possibilities and associated requirements for a policy model. This
chapter identies the requirements for a policy model for such an access control
system and discusses why the existing policy models are not suitable for this
application. We present a new policy language extension to XACML, with BIM
specic data types and functions based on the IFC specication, which we call
BIM-XACML. The solutions outlined in this chapter allow the specication of
access control policies that include conditions based on object relationships and
spatial relationships expressed in a BIM.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Motivating example
scenarios are provided in Section 5.1 and BIM specic access control policy re-
quirements are summarised in Section 5.2. The policy structure and the semantic
policy model for access control using BIMs are identied in Sections 5.3 and 5.4
respectively. In Section 5.5, a BIM specic extension to XACML called BIM-
XACML is proposed and a policy model infrastructure that handles IFC-based
access control policies and access requests is presented.
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5.1 Motivating examples
The following scenarios are used to illustrate the various policy language require-
ments for an access control system using building information models.
Let us consider a situation where an electrical maintenance company is re-
quested to perform a repair on the lighting system on the second oor of a
building. This task requires an electrician to have access to the wiring diagrams
for a particular area. The BIM for the full building contains all wiring and
electrical diagrams, including some critical and sensitive parts that need to be
hidden from normal access. In this scenario, the electrician needs access only to
the parts of the wiring diagrams that are relevant to his assigned task, namely,
the specic part of wiring related to lighting systems and this should only be
allowed when he is physically located in the designated area of operation since
o-site access has not been approved. For example, the electrician should not be
given access to wiring diagrams related to surveillance systems or alarm systems.
The policy language must support the denition of policies that reect these
security requirements including conditions that can specify spatial and functional
inter-object relationships. This enables controlled ltering of BIM objects based
on their functional relationship with a subsystem (i.e. belonging to the lighting
subsystem) and their spatial placement (i.e. located on the second oor). The use
of access control conditions based on object and spatial relationships of objects
cannot be achieved directly in existing policy models that are not based on BIMs.
The exercise of mapping BIM relationships into a database model supported by
existing systems would eliminate the dynamic nature of a BIM repository and
the associated advantage of being current in an operational environment.
The following policy in Listing 5.1 shows the required access control rules for
the above scenario. This policy utilises two BIM relationships: AssignsToGroup
and Decomposes. BimObject is the object for which access is requested and
the relationship AssignsToGroup tests the membership of an object to a group,
while the relationship Decomposes tests the containment of an object within
another object. In this scenario, the policy rules test if the object is part of the
LightingSubsystem, if the location of the object is contained within a spatial
zone assigned to the user and if the user is within a spatial zone assigned to
them.
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Electrician can Read BimObject if
AssignsToGroup(BimObject , LightingSubsystem) = True ,
Decomposes(BimObject.location , Subject.AssignedZone) = True ,
Decomposes(Subject.location , Subject.AssignedZone) = True
Listing 5.1: Rules to allow the electrician to read object
We have assumed that the electrician works for an external contractor and
does not have regular access to secured areas within the building. The policy
requires that he only be given access to the spaces where he needs to perform
his job. He would also need access to spaces on a path connecting from a public
access area to the maintenance area.
This scenario would require a dierent set of conditions specifying the con-
nection relationship and containment properties in an access control policy. This
is also not achievable using existing models, as they would not explicitly support
these properties in their spatial representation and any implicit method would
add an unnecessary additional layer of transformation. However, a BIM based
approach would involve the use of relationships such as Connection and Decom-
position or other functions that operate on a BIM that can calculate connectivity
and containment of paths and spaces.
The following policy in Listing 5.2 shows an access control rule required in
this scenario. These policy rules test if the requested object BimSpace is Second
Floor, Building Y or if the requested BimSpace connects to the spatial zone
assigned to the user and is contained within a path assigned to the user.
Electrician can Enter BimSpace if
BimSpace = Second Floor , Building Y,
OR {
Connects(BimSpace , Subject.AssignedZone) = True ,
Decomposes(BimSpace , Subject.AssignedPath) = True
}
Listing 5.2: Rules to allow the electrician to enter space
5.2 Policy requirements for BIM access control
In Chapter 2 Section 2.2, we identied two signicant dierences between typical
geospatial databases and BIM repositories: the existence of inter-object relation-
ships and the availability of three-dimensional spatial relationships. These rela-
tionships are critical to a BIM repository. The above scenarios illustrated that
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topological and spatial properties inferred from a BIM using these relationships
can be used to dene access control policies that reect real-world security re-
quirements. This necessitates a policy model that can support such annotations
of BIM objects and relationships in access control policies.
The key to an eective access control policy model for BIMs lies in the ap-
propriate use of relationships that exist between objects in a BIM. These re-
lationships can be categorised as object relationships and spatial relationships.
The object relationships are derived from properties that associate dierent ob-
jects, while spatial relationships are used to denote relative spatial placement of
objects from one another.
Object relationship: Two BIM objects are said to have an `object relationship'
if there exists a shared property between the two objects that satises a
given criteria. These criteria, such as belonging to a group or being assigned
to a process would form the type for the relationship.
Building information models signicantly dier from other spatial databases as
security properties of individual objects can often depend on their relationships
with other associated objects. The combinations of multiple objects can form
a higher-level object and the security requirements for such objects can be in-
terdependent based on inter-object relationships. For example, a wiring object
that belongs to the lighting subsystem can be assigned to the lighting subsystem
group object using the object relationship of type AssignsToGroup. This rela-
tionship can be used for access control when limiting access to wiring objects
that belong to the lighting subsystem.
Spatial relationship: Two BIM objects are said to have a `spatial relationship'
if one object is spatially placed in reference to the other based on a given
criteria. These criteria, such as containment or adjacency, would form the
type for the relationship.
There can be complex three-dimensional spatial relationships between objects
and the spaces they are contained within, and these relationships are explicitly
encoded in a BIM. This would result in an access control system that not only
looks for the basic spatial attributes of subjects and objects, but also their re-
lationship with the environment. For example, a server room in a building can
be contained spatially within the second oor of the building and this can be
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denoted in a BIM using a spatial relationship of type Contains. This relationship
can be used in an access control policy when limiting access to the server room
contained within the second oor of the building.
Thus, there are two key requirements for a policy model for an access control
system using building information models. First, it must be possible to enforce
access control based on object relationships. The ne-grained three-dimensional
object relationships that exist in a BIM are an essential part of required access
control. For example, a map-based database can represent dierent oors and
spaces of a building, but it cannot eectively represent the objects and the rela-
tionships between these objects as such details are not normally present in these
databases. The need for object relationships in access policies is demonstrated
in the example (in Section 5.1), where the electrician was allowed to view objects
grouped with the lighting subsystem.
Second, the policy model should enable access restrictions based on spatial
relationships. In the case of objects that span across multiple oors or spatial
zones in a building, their spatial relationships are a critical property in access
control. The spatial data constructs that are supported by GIS systems are
based on surface observations of topographic features that are used to derive
three-dimensional objects. BIMs provide detailed semantic representations of all
building elements. This is an important feature when we are concerned about
all modes of access control, for BIMs and using BIMs. These dierences can-
not be eciently addressed using the existing policy models due to the lack of
relationship information present in their spatial data models. The example (in
Section 5.1), where the electrician was allowed only to enter spaces that are con-
tained within the path assigned to them, shows how spatial relationships in a
BIM can be used in access control policies and some of the functions required
for establishing that.
There can be a multitude of ways to control access to objects or compound
objects in a BIM. For example, access to objects can be controlled based on the
business processes or organisational projects to which they belong. Alternatively,
access rights can be based on the object ownership in case of a shared BIM
controlled by multiple stakeholders. Currently, there is some support for basic
access control in commercially available BIM tools. These security features are
mostly related to the creation and management of BIMs in a shared environment
with multiple stakeholders such as architects and engineers. These functionalities
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are limited to locking access to parts of BIM data for read or write operations and
generating dierent views of the BIM repository based on these conditions. The
policy model for access control using building information models should have
the necessary functions and capabilities to specify all modes of access restrictions
on BIM and non-BIM objects at dierent granularities.
5.3 Policy structure for BIM access control
This policy model performs rule-based access control [107]. The access control
policy set (AP) comprises multiple access control policy rules (AR), which are
the basic building block for declaring and enforcing access restrictions. Each
policy rule consists of four elements: Subject, Object, Action, and Condition,
the evaluation of which results in a Permit or Deny decision.
AR = fS;O;A;Cg ! fPermit;Denyg
Subjects (S) can be either users or user roles, however, the classication of
user roles and authentication of users are out of the scope of the policy model.
Objects (O) in this policy model can be any resource including any BIM
object specied according to the IFC standard. They can use dierent levels of
abstraction or granularity based on access control requirements. It is possible to
have access restrictions based on classes of objects or individual object instances.
Actions (A) that can be specied in an access control rule depend on the class
of object and the mode of operation. The same objects can also have multiple
actions that can be allowed on them. The type of actions that can be specied in
a policy are application dependent. For example, a user can be allowed to `enter'
a space in a building in a physical access control setting and they can `view' the
same space in a logical access control setting.
Conditions (C) are a set of assertions that can be evaluated to True or False.
The combined result of these Boolean assertions determines whether the subject
is allowed or denied to perform the action on the object.
We now discuss objects and conditions in detail because they dier for access
control using building information models. Both subjects and actions are appli-
cation and implementation specic, thus they do not inuence a generic policy
model using building information models.
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5.3.1 Objects
An object in this access control policy model can be a BIM object class, an
individual object in a BIM or an external data object that references or relates
to a BIM object. In addition, objects in a BIM can be individual objects, as
well as compound objects where multiple sub-parts create a larger object. For
example, a typical object in a physical access control scenario would be a space
or a zone. However, these are labels for a collection of smaller objects such as
rooms or hallways, which in turn are a collection of multiple building elements
such as oors, walls, and ceilings. As we have noted, in a BIM representation,
objects are organised in an object hierarchy, which can also be utilised in access
control policies. For example, access restrictions for a space can be specied
as access to the individual space object or the door lock object based on the
requirements.
Relationship Objects are logical constructs for representing dierent rela-
tionships between other types of objects in a BIM. These relationships are a key
component in access control using building information models and an integral
part of the conditions architecture of this policy model.
Path Objects are three-tuple representation of a path between two points
in a building under a given criteria. We introduce path objects specically to
support dierent access control conditions based on path. A path can be dened
as (StartPoint, EndPoint, PathCriteria). Both StartPoint and EndPoint are
spaces within a building and PathCriteria is a search operation that denes the
specic path between the given points. For example, the shortest path between
the entrance and eighth oor of a building can be dened as (Entrance, 8thFloor,
Shortest).
5.3.2 Conditions
A condition is specied as a Boolean expression that is evaluated at runtime.
The following types of policy conditions can be used to specify access restrictions
that can be applied through the policy model using building information models.
They can be either relationship based or object based.
Denition 5. A relationship-based condition (CR) is an expression that can be
evaluated for two given objects by testing the existence of the given relationship
between the two objects.
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As we have emphasized, inter-object relationships are one of the unique ad-
vantages available in BIMs that can be used for various access control purposes.
The existence of such relationships can be stated as conditions in access control
rules and the outcomes can be evaluated as true or false. These relationships
can be used to specify both spatial and non-spatial conditions based on the type
of relationship.
Denition 6. An object-based condition (CO) is an expression that can be
evaluated for a match between two objects or an object and an object-class.
We have introduced an object classication specically for access control for
non-BIM data objects. This object classication can be tested in policy condi-
tions for the source object properties of data objects. Such a condition can be
either based on the classes of objects or individual objects.
We introduce these conditions specically for an access control framework
that uses building information models (in addition to these, other non BIM-
specic conditions are also supported such as time-based conditions). To illus-
trate, the following rule and condition dene the access restrictions for part of
the example scenario provided in Section 5.1.
AR1 = fElectrician;BimObject; Read; C1g;
C1 = f(IfcRelAssignsToGroup; LightingSubsystem; True)g;
AR1 2 AR
C1 2 C
The condition C1 tests if the object BimObject has an IfcRelAssignsToGroup
relationship to LightingSubsystem.
The relationship-based conditions in this policy model can be specied us-
ing BIM relationships. Both relationship-based conditions and conditions using
access control functions follow the IFC-based BIM object hierarchy. The rela-
tionship between BIM objects can only be derived through querying the BIM.
The policy model should support relevant functions that can be used in condition
statements to extract the existence of these relationships between objects. The
following section describe dierent functions that can be used in conditions and
their semantics.
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5.4 Semantic policy model
To the best of our knowledge, declaration of access restrictions using spatial
constructs from building information models is not supported in any existing
access control policy model. To enable such spatial restrictions using BIMs,
the access control policy model should support additional object data types and
access control functions that can be used to represent and test access control
conditions against BIM object and relationship semantics. In this section, we will
rene the previously described policy structure with specic data and language
representations.
5.4.1 Object data types for BIM
The access control framework and the policy model presented in this thesis use
building information models as underlying spatial data structure based on the
IFC specication. The object elements in access control policy rules can be
either BIM classes or object instances. The class-based access restrictions use
IFC class names and object-based access restrictions use the IfcGloballyUniqueId
of objects as dened in a building information model. The IFC specication
supports hundreds of detailed object types, which are not all necessary for access
control scenarios. Thus, any implementation of this policy model can be limited
to a set of object classes based on specic requirements.
The objects in a BIM can be represented using dierent classications of ob-
ject classes from the IFC specication. IfcKernel schema denes the data model
of the IFC specication and is the most abstract part of the IFC architecture.
It provides basic semantics for an object model, like object, property, and rela-
tionship. There are three fundamental entity types in the IFC model, objects
(IfcObject), relations (IfcRelationship), and properties (IfcPropertyDenition).
IfcObject is the abstract super type that stands for all physically tangible
items, such as a wall or a beam, physically existing items, such as spaces, or
conceptual items, such as grids or virtual boundaries. It also stands for processes,
such as work tasks, for controls, such as cost items, for resources, such as labour
resource, or for actors, such as persons involved in the design process.
There are seven fundamental entity types in the IFC model, which are all
derived from IfcObject. They form the second level of specialization within the
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IFC class hierarchy under the object branch: products, processes, controls, re-
sources, actors, project, and group. In this policy model, we will be directly
using the object types product and group, while indirectly mapping object types
of actor and resource to other existing constructs such as users/roles and con-
ditions. Thus, the two main second level IFC object types used in this policy
model are IFCProduct and IFCGroup.
A product in IFC representation is any physical object available in a BIM.
They may be physically existing or tangible. Products may be dened by shape
representations and have a location in the coordinate space. IfcProxy is a kind
of a container for wrapping objects which are dened by associated properties,
which may or may not have a geometric representation and placement in space.
This policy model does not semantically dierentiate any subtypes of IFCProduct
and any accepted third level object type under product can be used in access
control policies.
A group is an arbitrary collection of objects which can be used to dene
spaces or objects as part of a subsystem. IFCSystem is subtype of IFCGroup
that is used to organise combinations of related parts within a building product
or subsystem, that can be composed based on a common purpose or function they
provide. For example, this construct can be used to group objects associated with
the lighting subsystem or heating, ventilation and air-conditioning subsystem. A
system is essentially a functionally related aggregation of products. The grouping
relationship to one or several instances of IfcProduct (the system members) is
handled by IfcRelAssignsToGroup.
5.4.2 Access control functions for BIM
The conditions specied in access control policy rules are based on Boolean asser-
tions that are evaluated through functions. The following types of functions can
be used to specify dierent condition assertions in policy rules. The relationship
between BIM objects dened through IFC relationships can be used directly in
many access control situations. These object relationships are static in nature
and stored with the BIM data. In some situations, it is desired to use dynamic
assertions in the form of spatial or topological functions. These functions can
utilise the BIM data and other data to calculate a result in real-time.
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IFC relationship functions
The concept of relationship (IfcRelationship) in IFC is the objectied relationship
between BIM objects. This allows relationship specic properties to be kept
directly in a relationship object and to uncouple the relationship semantics from
the object attributes. Relationships can be either 1-to-1 relationships or 1-to-
many relationships. We propose to use these relationships as functions that are
evaluated on objects, where the existence of a relationship can be tested. These
relationships are encoded and available in the BIM data and are a preferred way
of evaluating assertions in many access control conditions.
There are ve fundamental relationship types in the IFC model, which are
all derived from IfcRelationship: namely assignment, association, decomposition,
denition, and connectivity. These are the second level of specialisation within
the IFC class hierarchy under the relationship branch. The policy model supports
using all second level relationships and all their subtypes that are specied in
IFC. The following IFC relationship functions are particularly useful for various
access control scenarios:
 IfcRelAssigns: The assignment relationship is a generalization of `link' rela-
tionships among instances of IfcObject and its various subtypes (IfcRelAs-
signsToProcess, IfcRelAssignsToProduct, IfcRelAssignsToControl, IfcRe-
lAssignsToResource, IfcRelAssignsToActor, IfcRelAssignsToGroup). A link
denotes the specic association through which one object (the client) ap-
plies the services of other objects (the suppliers), or through which one
object may navigate to other objects.
 IfcRelContainedInSpatialStructure: This objectied relationship is a sub-
type of the IfcRelConnects relationship. This relationship is useful in
dening hierarchical spatial containment, which denes the relationships
of physical elements being contained within a spatial structure. Any el-
ements of the subtypes of IfcProduct are valid contained elements, while
any elements of subtypes of IfcSpatialElement are valid spatial containers.
The predened spatial structure elements in IFC are site, building, storey,
and space.
 IfcRelDecomposes: The decomposition relationship denes the general con-
cept of elements being composed or decomposed. The decomposition rela-
tionship denotes a whole/part hierarchy with the ability to navigate from
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the whole (the composition) to the parts and vice versa. Decompositions
may be constrained by requiring both the whole and its parts to be of the
same type, thus establishing a nesting relationship (IfcRelNests). They
may also require some form of physical containment, thus establishing spe-
cial types of aggregation relationships (IfcRelAggregates).
Spatial containment is one of the key concepts in spatial access control. Two
dierent containment relationships can be dened in IFC, for hierarchical spatial
containment and for aggregation within an element assembly. These two types of
containments can be dened using IfcRelDecomposes and IfcRelContainedInSpa-
tialStructure relationships.
BIM access control functions
In addition to objectied relationships from the IFC specication, we dene addi-
tional functions for which there are no specic denitions in the IFC specication.
These functions are more dynamic in nature compared to the relationships en-
coded within a BIM and they can be used to evaluate conditions at runtime for
a specic instance of the BIM. They use objects from BIMs as inputs and they
are used for access control decision making and policy administration purposes.
A key function required for physical access control to spaces is one which
enables computing accessibility between spaces. Another important function is
testing if an access requested space is part of a path connecting two spaces,
which can enable access to that requested space. These can be computed by
functions using basic relationships dened in IFC as inputs. For the purpose
of our research, it is sucient to have these functions available and use them
in access policies and decision-making. The results of these functions cannot be
practically encoded into a BIM for all possible instances, thus we need a separate
set of functions in addition to the relationships.
Accessibility: Access control policies can have accessibility as a condition,
by evaluating an assertion that there is accessibility between two spaces and
a usable path is available under given constraints. A usable path can include
either normal access paths or abnormal access paths based on the requirements.
This function needs to operate during run time as the criteria for accessibility
is very much dependent on individual scenarios. This function is also useful for
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policy creation by calculating accessibility between spaces before granting access
to users.
This function could be implemented based on our BIM graph and Algorithm 2
provided in Chapter 4, where a graph of BIM objects is built in which spaces are
represented by nodes and accessible paths are represented by connecting links.
The accessible paths for various conditions can be computed by traversing the
graph and eliminating the links that do not satisfy the conditions [131].
InThePath: The path objects that are introduced in this chapter and the
InThePath function can be used in conditions that require the requested resource
to be on a path connecting two points in a building. For example, a policy rule
can specify that a user can access any spaces that are in the path with the least
security clearance connecting the entrance and the network room in a building.
This function would use the same mechanisms used for computing accessibility
to arrive at the requested path between the given objects. It would then traverse
the selected part of the graph to see if the requested object matches any of the
objects in that part.
5.5 BIM-XACML: A policy language using BIM
We earlier identied the lack of any access control policy languages for sys-
tems that use building information models. The combination of using building
information models as spatial data models based on the IFC and ifcXML speci-
cations for data representation, and a BIM specic extension to XACML would
address the identied limitations of existing policy languages. In this section,
we present BIM-XACML, a policy language for building information models us-
ing the extension points available in XACML. The data types and functions
dened in the previous section will be the main additions to XACML standard.
Some components of the standard XACML architecture will be extended for
BIM functionality while other components will be modied to interact with the
components of the authorisation framework presented in Chapter 3. This exten-
sion to XACML follows a similar pattern to the GeoXACML [84] extension for
geospatial databases. This will enable anyone who is familiar with that standard
to easily adopt or transform into the BIM world.
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Figure 5.1: XACML data ow with authorisation component interactions
5.5.1 Policy framework
The policy framework combines the XACML architecture and the authorisation
framework described in Chapter 3. The key components of XACML that are
adopted into the policy framework are Policy Decision Point (PDP), Context
Handler, Policy Information Point, and Policy Repository. The `policy transfor-
mation' module of the authorisation framework maps to the `policy administra-
tion point' in the standard XACML architecture. The `spatial reasoning' module
provides BIM specic computational capabilities for authorisation through the
policy information point. The `access control interface' is a conceptual module
that could be implemented as part of a context handler.
The combined data ow diagram in Figure 5.1 shows the exchange of mes-
sages between components for an access control request. The policy administra-
tor denes policies and policy sets using policy transformation based on building
information models [118], which are saved in the policy repository (1). The ex-
ternal access control request to perform an action on a resource is received by
access control interface (2). This request is sent to the context handler with
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subject, resource, action, and environment attribute details (3). An XACML
request context is created at the context handler and an associated policy eval-
uation request is sent to the policy decision point (4). The policy decision point
optionally queries back the context handler for attributes of the subject, resource,
action, and environment required to evaluate the policies (5). The context han-
dler obtains the attributes by querying a policy information point (6). The policy
information point queries spatial reasoning when required (7) and returns the re-
quired attributes to the context handler (8). The context handler returns the
requested attributes to the policy decision point (9). The policy decision point
continues evaluating the policy and sends the response context (with the autho-
risation decision) to the context handler (10). The context handler responds to
access control interface (11).
The main purpose of the dierentiation of components is to logically group
similar functionalities of the policy framework to better understand the authori-
sation process. These components can be implemented either on a web services
architecture or as an application server. The policy model does not specify
or require any implementation infrastructure as long as the required functions
and interfaces are supported. In addition, implementations have the choice of
combining functionalities of components as long as they still support the same
information ow for access control operations. For example, the implementation
of access control interface, context handler, and policy information point can
be combined in a software development point, while still maintaining the logical
compartmentalisation of functionalities of these components.
5.5.2 BIM-XACML
We present an IFC-based BIM-specic extension to XACML called BIM-XACML
in this section. The major additions to XACML are the introduction of new data
types and functions to support access control using building information models.
These data types are based on the object classication detailed in Section 5.3.1
expressed using the IFC specication. These objects can be both BIM objects
and data objects referenced to BIM objects. The new functions can either be
IFC relationship functions or BIM access control functions as detailed in Sec-
tion 5.4.2. The IFC relationship functions test for the existence of all type of
IFC relationships between BIM objects while BIM access control functions such
as accessibility and in-the-path test for commonly occurring access restriction
conditions.
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<AttriuteValue DataType="http://www.iai -tech.org/ifcXML/IFC2x3/
FINAL#IfcBuildingStorey">
<IfcBuildingStorey id="bu1st1">
<GlobalId >7qXakT6cDAD2uccVPFcs $1</GlobalId >
<Name>First floor </Name>
</IfcBuildingStorey >
</AttributeValue >
Listing 5.3: XACML Encoding for a BIM object data type
The newly introduced data types and functions will have IFC-specic URIs
that can be matched in the PDP and Context Handler. The information on IFC
matched attributes can be inferred using the spatial reasoning module through
the policy information point. For example, if the context handler matches a
condition function URI to an IFC relationship function, a condition evaluation
request will be forwarded to the spatial reasoning module, which can in turn use
BIM data to arrive at a result and return it to the context handler. The spatial
reasoning module must support all access control specic queries from BIMs, as
these functions are not part of standard BIM tools.
XACML supports dening new data types by extending the abstract class
AttributeValue, in addition to the common data types such as string, integers,
and dates. The new data types for IFC specic data types have the namespace
with the common root URI http://www.iai-tech.org/ifcXML/IFC2x3/FINAL
and the internal representation follows the ifcXML specication. The IFC class
names will be suxed to the common URI base to create URIs for each object
types.
The policy snippet in Listing 5.3 shows how the First oor of a building is
dened using ifcXML and AttriuteValue. The DataType attribute species the
type of BIM object, which is IfcBuildingStorey. The id value of the IfcBuilding-
Storey attribute is a human readable identier for the object that can be used
in policy rules. The GlobalId is the unique identier for the object that will be
used across the applications in identifying BIM objects. The Name is a textual
descriptive label that mainly serves the purpose of human readability of policies
and rules.
XACML also supports implementing new functions using the Function in-
terface, though a FunctionBase helper class. The BIM specic extension adds
both the IFC relationship functions and the access control functions described in
the previous sections. For these we introduce a new common URL base http://
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<Condition >
<Function FunctionId="http: // localhost/bim/ifc2x3/function#
IfcRelDecomposes"/>
<AttributeValue DataType="http: //www.iai -tech.org/ifcXML/IFC2x3
/FINAL#IfcSpace">
<IfcSpace id="bu1sp4">
<GlobalId >7qXakT6cDAD2uccYUIFcs $4</GlobalId >
<Name>Management Area</Name>
</IfcSpace >
</AttributeValue >
</Condition >
Listing 5.4: XACML Encoding for a condition with IFC relationship
localhost/bim/ifc2x3/function#{IFCRelationship} or http://localhost/
bim/ac/function#{FunctionName} based on the type of function. These func-
tions are used in the <condition> elements of policy rules to enforce spatial,
non-spatial, and combined restrictions. They are referenced using a FunctionId
attribute in the <function> sub-element.
The example in Listing 5.4 shows a policy rule condition that tests if the
requested object is contained within the Management Area. The FunctionId
species the evaluating function that is IfcRelDecomposes. This condition tests
if there is a relationship between the requesting object and the object in the
condition. For example, if the request is for building storey bu1st1, the func-
tion would test if there is a IfcRelDecomposes relationship between bu1st1 and
bu1sp4.
These IFC relationship functions are dierentiated only at the policy level.
The spatial reasoning module will provide one function interface to evaluate all
IFC relationship functions. This function will take the relationship type and two
BIM objects as inputs and evaluate if the given relationship exists between the
two objects in the BIM. This unied testing is possible as all relationships are
objectied in BIM and testing for the existence of such an object would give a
Boolean result as required by the condition functions.
5.5.3 Access control policies for example scenarios
Let us consider the example scenario outlined in Section 5.1 where an electrician
is given access to view BIM objects that belong to the lighting subsystem. The
sample BIM-XACML policy in Listing 5.5 uses IFC objects and functions to
dene access rules for this scenario. These policy rules specic to a maintenance
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task can be generated by an asset management system in an automated manner
when a maintenance job is created. Integration of the asset management system
and the authorisation framework allows just in time provision of access rights
and the timely revocation of privileges when the task is completed, as indicated
by the closure of the work order in the asset management system.
<Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="access0012">
<Description >Permission for temporary electrician </Description >
<Target >
<Subjects >
<Subject >
<SubjectMatch MatchId="&function;string -equal">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="
urn:someapp:attributes:role" DataType="&xml;string"/>
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">Electrician </
AttributeValue >
</SubjectMatch >
</Subject >
</Subjects >
<Resources ><AnyResource/></Resources >
<Actions >
<Action >
<ActionMatch MatchId="&function;string -equal">
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="
urn:someapp:action:action -id" DataType="&xml;string"/>
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">READ</AttributeValue >
</ActionMatch >
</Action >
</Actions >
</Target >
<Condition FunctionId="&function;string -equal">
<Apply FunctionId="http: // localhost/bim/ifc2x3/function#
IfcRelAssignsToGroup">
<AttributeSelector RequestContext="Building01" DataType="http:
//www.iai -tech.org/ifcXML/IFC2x3/FINAL#IfcProduct" />
</Apply >
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">LightingSubsystem </
AttributeValue >
</Condition >
</Rule>
Listing 5.5: BIM-XACML policy for example
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The subject in this rule is matched through the role assigned to the user which
is given as a user attribute. This particular rule does not impose any limitations
on accessible objects using the resources tag, thus it uses an AnyResource tag to
indicate the rule can be matched for any object in BIM. This rule allows the sub-
ject to perform read action on matched objects, which can enable the electrician
to view a BIM visualisation of desired objects. The condition tag of the policy
rule which is used to match and select objects uses the IfcRelAssignsToGroup
relationship to match objects that belongs to the LightingSubsystem.
<Request >
<Subject >
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:someapp:subject:subject -id"
DataType="&xml;string">
<AttributeValue >TU001113 </AttributeValue >
</Attribute >
</Subject >
<Resource >
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:someapp:resource:resource -id"
DataType="http://www.iai -tech.org/ifcXML/IFC2x3/FINAL#
IfcElectricalCircuit">
<AttributeValue >7qXakT6cDAD2uccDDFer $6</AttributeValue >
</Attribute >
</Resource >
<Action >
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:someapp:action:action -id"
DataType="&xml;string">
<AttributeValue >READ</AttributeValue >
</Attribute >
</Action >
<Environment/>
</Request >
Listing 5.6: BIM-XACML encoded access request for read action on a BIM object
The policy rule in Listing 5.5 matches to an access request if the request
context contains a BIM object as resource and that BIM object belongs to the
LightingSubsystem. The XACML encoded request in Listing 5.6 shows an access
request that would match with the above policy rule and Listing 5.7 shows the
Permit response for this request.
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<Response >
<Result >
<Decision >Permit </Decision >
<Status >
<StatusCode Value="urn:someapp:status:ok"/>
</Status >
</Result >
</Response >
Listing 5.7: BIM-XACML encoded response for the access request
Let us see how this example request would be processed through the compo-
nents described in Figure 5.1. The request comes through the context handler
to the PDP, which will start to gather all the attribute values from the context
handler. The context handler will match the BIM specic attributes and gather
that information through the spatial reasoning module. Once the request con-
text is returned to PDP, it will be matched with the relevant policies. When the
PDP encounters a condition function with a BIM specic URI, it will forward
that to the context handler, which will in turn get that attribute evaluated in
the spatial reasoning module through policy information point. This response
is passed back as a Boolean result to the PDP that will continue to process all
other matching policy rules and arrive at an access decision. This nal decision
is then returned back to the requesting entity.
5.5.4 Abstract policy specication
A key aspect of our proposed authorisation framework is dening access control
policy rules at a high level of abstraction, which can result in resilient policy
specication that is less susceptible to environmental changes. This aspect of the
authorisation framework is achieved through IFC entity types such as groups and
zones that can be used for logical grouping of objects in a BIM. For example, in
terms of physical access control, all spaces belonging to the `nance department'
can be grouped under the `nance zone' and this label can be used in policy rules
as object identiers.
With these relationships dened in a BIM, in the event of any change in
spaces occupied by the `nance department' or remodelling within the occupied
building area, such changes can be directly reected in the BIM and the high
level policy rules based on abstract entity representations will always remain up
to date. This also makes it possible to automate the generation of low level rules,
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such as those used at door controllers, based on the changes detected in BIM
and reapplying the high level policy set without the need for any intervention by
administrators.
With current approaches, security administrators are required to go back
to ne-grained policy rules to check if all policies are implemented correctly or
need updating after any change in building environments. The use of abstract
entity denitions in policy rules reduces this need to check and verify policies
individually. In the case of physical access control, checking only the mapping of
space objects to zone objects would ensure the correct implementation of policy
rules. This process can be further aided by using interfaces of BIMs that can
help in correctly mapping objects and groups visually.
Abstract policy specication is an important aspect of our authorisation
framework for both physical and logical access control operations. For exam-
ple, in the BIM-XACML policy example shown in Listing 5.5, the condition
refers to an abstract grouping of subsystem for the access controlled BIM ob-
jects. In the event of an object being resigned to a dierent subsystem, the only
change required will be changing the abstract group association in the BIM and
all associated policy rules using the abstract entity will remain up to date. This
is a valuable capability that not only improves eciency of security administra-
tion processes, but also gives policy administrators a degree of assurance on the
correctness of policy rules.
Our approach improves eciency because it does not require any interven-
tion of security administrators and policy generation and management can be
automated to react to the changes within the facilities. This approach may also
improves the accuracy of access control policies as the higher level policy rules
do not need frequent changes. The automated policy generation ensures the
availability of up to date policies and reduce possible errors from individually
updating a large number of policy rules by an administrator.
5.6 Discussion
BIM-XACML, the IFC based policy language extension to XACML presented in
this chapter can be seen as what GeoXACML is for GIS systems. This extension
is necessary as neither XACML nor GeoXACML is capable of encapsulating IFC
based conditions and object relationships in their policies as discussed previously
in Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 in Chapter 2.
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This policy model is based on the IFC specication for entity type vocabulary
and it shares some of the issues resulting from the openness of the standard
as discussed in the previous chapters. The key concern in the context of the
policy model is representing entity types and relationship conditions without any
ambiguity. Given that some concepts can be represented with dierent entity
types in IFC, it is essential to have a mechanism to streamline the process of
creating and maintaining the BIMs that are used in the applications.
In the proposed policy model, we identied only a limited number of ac-
cess control conditional functions using BIMs based on the scenarios we had
already identied. We provided only a high level abstraction for both objects
and relationships and developers can choose specic entity types based on their
applications. It could be possible to explore further in dierent operational sce-
narios to extend this set of functions to support a diverse range of operational
environments.
We have not focused on any implementation or application specic concerns
of our policy model in this chapter. However, any such implementation should
take into account the performance aspects of handling large building information
models in real time scenarios. We assume the conditional functions outlined
in this chapter could be processed through a spatial reasoning component of
the authorisation framework. We provide a more detailed discussion on such
performance concerns based on our own implementation experiences in Chapter 6
Section 6.2.
In this chapter, we also briey discussed how a policy decision point from
standard XACML implementation can be extended to support the newly intro-
duced entity types and conditional functions. However, we do not provide any
further specics on this aspect of the research and we identify this as an area with
future research potential in the context of the larger authorisation framework.
5.7 Conclusion
Access control using building information models requires a policy model that
supports BIM specic object types and conditional functions. None of the ex-
isting policy models address the specic requirements of BIMs or their data
representation specication IFC. This chapter presented an access control policy
model using building information models to address the BIM specic require-
ments.
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This chapter identied requirements for a policy model and a policy language
for access control using building information models. Based on the identied
requirements, a policy structure is described for when building information model
entities are used in access control policies. This chapter also provided a semantic
model for data types and functions that are necessary for an access control system
using building information models.
The main achievement of this chapter is BIM-XACML, a policy language ex-
tending XACML by introducing BIM object and function constructs. This policy
extension enables using IFC based entity types in access control policies to en-
capsulate BIM objects and relationships between BIM objects. The policy model
presented in this chapter combines the XACML architecture with the authori-
sation framework proposed in Chapter 3. This policy model will form the basis
for implementing the policy architecture of the proof-of-concept demonstrator
presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Access Control Administration
using Building Information
Models
This chapter brings together the contributions presented in the previous chapters,
showcasing the viability of these proposals by implementing a proof-of-concept
demonstrator. This proof-of-concept tool utilises building information models
to facilitate security administration for a physical access control system. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the rst implementation of a physical access control
administration tool that utilises a building information model as its spatial data
model. As has been argued in previous chapters, the use of BIMs can make the
administration process more intuitive through three-dimensional visualisation
and spatial analysis.
The implementation of the prototype that is presented in this chapter en-
abled us to represent how some of the common problems identied by security
practitioners and industry partners of the Airports of the Future project could
be addressed through the development of the concepts presented so far in this
thesis. More specically the implementation of this proof-of-concept tool aims
to address two key objectives. The rst objective is to demonstrate that the
capabilities presented as part of our authorisation framework can be achieved
with building information models of realistic scale and complexity. This demon-
strator provides a preliminary insight into implementation challenges that exists
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when using such a system with large building information models. The second
objective is to identify the technical requirements for implementing such a sys-
tem framework for real world practical use. Given this is the rst instance of
using building information models in this context, this implementation gives an
indication as to what sort of technology infrastructure is required to run such a
system framework. With the implementation of this demonstrator, the portabil-
ity of various functions to dierent devices and platforms was investigated. This
implementation was also used to obtain more practical operational data such as
execution times for various functions. The client side of the implemented tool
was tested on various operating systems and platforms including mobile devices
and identied the basic common requirements for those browsers.
At the core of this administration tool is the concept of our authorisation
framework using building information models that was presented in Chapter 3.
Even though the authorisation model is designed to support a converged ap-
proach towards physical and logical access control, our demonstrator implemen-
tation focused on administering physical access control. The visualisation, spatial
reasoning, and policy transformation components of our authorisation framework
were implemented. These components can be interfaced to an external physical
access control system through the access information interface, however, it is not
part of the current version of the tool.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.1, three
main implementation goals are identied. Section 6.2 provides the technical de-
tails of how the demonstrator was implemented and maps its features to various
concepts and components of our authorisation framework presented in Chap-
ter 3. In Section 6.3, we elaborate on the implementation of our proof-of-concept
demonstrator and discuss how various access control administration related func-
tions have been developed using the approach proposed in Chapter 4 and Chap-
ter 5. Section 6.4 discusses various practical limitations of the demonstrator im-
plementation as well as other development omissions due to resource constraints.
Concluding remarks for the chapter are provided in Section 6.5.
6.1 Implementation goals
This proof-of-concept demonstrator implementation of a physical access control
(PAC) administration tool has three main goals:
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1. Reduce physical access control conguration errors in complex spaces,
2. Manage physical access control policies for complex and dynamic environ-
ments with lesser workload to administrators,
3. Perform user friendly analysis on past access history with a vast amount
of access log data.
In attempting to achieve these goals, the challenges in physical access control
administration are conceptually divided into the following three categories: in-
tuitive PAC policy creation, automated/assisted PAC policy management, and
easy to use analysis of access history.
6.1.1 Intuitive PAC policy creation
A fundamental requirement for any physical access control system is the assign-
ment and revocation of the access to physical spaces. This however is a signicant
challenge in many of the current approaches to access control and one of the key
factors leading to many common errors in access control policies. Our interac-
tions with industry partners in the Airports of the Future project indicated that
current security administrators use two-dimensional oor plans as visual aids to
determine the spaces, doors, and resources that they need to give access to end
users. These maps can be digital and part of some of the commercial physical
access control systems or more commonly, simply printed.
In a two dimensional oor plan (similar to Figure 6.1), it is dicult to compre-
hend the three-dimensional nature of the buildings with multiple oors connected
through lifts, stairs, and other access paths through two-dimensional maps. This
is further complicated with the adoption of exible design practices in many
organisations where oor plans change frequently [113]. The current manual
process of assignment and revocation of ne-grained access rights in complex
environments is therefore challenging in practice. With our proposed approach,
3D visualisation of building spaces from building information models is used and
made available as the primary interface for policy creation. This can reduce
the reliance on administrators to correctly conceptualise the complexity of large
interconnected spaces, thereby minimising potential conguration errors.
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Figure 6.1: A two dimensional oor plan showing various spaces on Level 3 of
the Brisbane Airport International Terminal building
6.1.2 Automated/assisted PAC policy management
Another signicant challenge for security administrators of critical infrastruc-
tures is the diculty in managing ne-grained rights assignments. This results
in overlooking the need to comply with least privilege requirements by facilitat-
ing the allocation of the minimal set of physical resources that sta may need
in order to perform their tasks. The identication of the minimal set of access
permissions demands an analysis of the implications of assignment (or revoca-
tion) of permissions to physical resources, e.g., doors, hallways, emergency exits.
For example, it is important for security administrators to determine if a user
is given access to a resource, what other resources they can access, directly or
indirectly. In the case of physical access, if a user is given access to a door, what
rooms and spaces can they reach directly through hallways, and indirectly by
crawling through air-condition ducts or ceiling spaces? Security administrators
must create access privileges not only with space limitations, but also consider
the time dimension and the permission rules that may need to be revoked at the
end of temporary or one-o permission assignments.
The task of managing such complex security policies manually can be very
labour intensive. The associated challenges and eort required can result in
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overly permissive access rights assignments over time, violating the least privi-
lege requirements in access permissions. This challenge is addressed in our imple-
mentation by introducing the capability for automation in access rule creation,
management, and revocation. This includes automation through interfaces that
can take context from external systems such as an asset management system
and creating and managing associated policy rules from those inputs. Interfaces
that allow this sort of integration are provided in our authorisation framework
to manage rights to operate with least privileges required.
6.1.3 Easy to use analysis of access history
The ability to monitor and audit sta access to physical resources can be an
essential requirement in many critical infrastructure environments. It can also
be a dicult process with current approaches. Even though some security audits
are performed due to regulatory compliance requirements, there can be many
useful applications for access log analysis in an operational security perspective.
The common approaches to access control audits can include various data mining
operations on past access records or current access control rules. However, in our
interactions with security operators of airport facilities, the key issue indicated
was the lack of user friendliness of the results from many of the current tools,
which are mostly in the form of textual reports.
Given that the information contained within these reports is hard to compre-
hend; these reports are hardly useful in making any corrective changes to current
system congurations. The tool presented in this chapter uses the same 3D visu-
alisation interface of the building that are used for access control policy creation
and management for access control audit applications. This enables security
administrators to visualise access log data, making it simpler to interactively
analyse and comprehend access logs with an intuitive interface.
6.2 Demonstrator implementation
The proof-of-concept demonstrator implementation of our physical access control
administration tool using building information models is developed as a client-
server application that can be accessed through any modern web browser. The
web client functions as a thin client within a browser which connects to the appli-
cation server that implements all the underlying functionalities. The application
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framework is based on various software components as shown in Figure 6.2. In
this section, a detailed account of the components that were written and gen-
erated as part of this implementation is provided and all the pre-existing tools
and components that were used as part of the software infrastructure of this
implementation are identied.
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Figure 6.2: Software architecture of the demonstrator implementation
6.2.1 Preliminary
The proof-of-concept implementation of the demonstrator is based on the Eclipse
Java Integrated Development Environment (IDE) [126]. Eclipse is an open-
source tool established by IBM, which is accompanied by a large ecosystem
of `plug-ins' and other tools, mostly also available under the same open-source
licence as the IDE. Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) [71] approach is used in
the development of this demonstrator. This enables us to use various tools to
partially or fully automate the construction of some of the software components.
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The demonstrator is written mostly in Java, however much of the Java code is
automatically generated from the models and other artices like rule-based model
transformations and generated serialisers and deserialisers that turn in-memory
model graphs into les and vice versa. The Eclipse Modelling Framework [127]
is used as the basis for modelling the various components of our demonstrator.
There are a number of `out-of-the-box' components used in the development
of our demonstrator. In addition to a web browser, which can be any modern
HTML5 browser with WebGL support, the Tomcat Application Server [125] is
used to host our server application which the browser based client communicates
with. The client application within a web browser is connected to the server
using HTTP over TCP/IP. A set of framework libraries from the Eclipse open
source community are also used within our server as presented below.
Remote Application Platform RAP is a user-interface technology that shows
various panes in the user interface within the Web browser, and manages com-
munications back to the Object Library based on user interactions with the Web
browser [128].
Eclipse Modelling Framework EMF is the means by which we represent
IFC and Property Set Denitions, as inter-linked Java objects whose classes and
implementations are generated from the `.ecore' les shown as input to the RaaS.
Connected Data Objects CDO is an intelligent storage layer that manages
the saving and loading of EMF objects into a database [120].
In addition, the following components are used as part of the fundamental
environment of our demonstrator implementation.
RaaS A Repository as a Service tool from Smart Services CRC is used to
generate code to coordinate the use of EMF, CDO, and database storage. It also
enables the Web Browser client to access the server remotely [41].
Database For the underlying database of our demonstrator any database that
supports Connected Data Objects can be used.
126 Chapter 6. Access Control Administration using Building Information Models
6.2.2 General framework
In this section, the components that are developed for the demonstrator are de-
scribed. These components map to relevant parts in our authorisation framework
presented in Chapter 3.
The main user interface for the demonstrator loads within a browser window
with multiple tab panels (see Figure 6.3). RAP Thin Client is a generated user
interface that is loaded into a web browser, and shows the user a customised
version of the Eclipse IDE as a remote client. Its purpose is to display the
contents of the BIM, and allow for searching and conguring in various modes
of operation. The search and results panels are shared to enable a consistent
experience across dierent modes of operation. The visualisation panel loads
BIM objects and other conditions are superimposed on the same rendered model.
The visualisation engine will generate 3D and 2D representations of BIM data
to be used by dierent processes of the authorisation framework such as spatial
reasoning and policy transformation.
Figure 6.3: Browser based user interface for access control administration with
3D visualisation window
The RaaS-generated code coordinates the storage and retrieval of EMF ob-
jects to the database using CDO, and exposes Web services interfaces to the
clients to access these objects (more correctly graphs of linked objects). The
IFC component allows for the reading and writing of `.ifc' (Part 21) les into
and out of EMF object graphs. These EMF objects form part of the BIM layer
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of the authorisation framework, and function as a BIM server that can converge
BIM les originating from multiple stakeholders of a facility.
In the following sections the key functionalities of our demonstrator are dis-
cussed. We also discuss how they address each of the three main physical access
control administration problems identied earlier. Other implementation con-
cerns are also discussed, including the use of the demonstrator in mobile devices
and touch screen devices, in Section 6.4.
6.2.3 BIM access control functions
The implementation of our proof-of-concept demonstrator includes various func-
tions that map to the spatial reasoning module of our authorisation framework.
These functions provide spatial reasoning functionalities and they are imple-
mented using the BIM graph presented in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4. The BIM
graph is represented through the EMF model shown in Figure 6.6. The portal
objects such as doors are considered edges of the graph, while space objects are
considered nodes of the graph. The BIM access control functions use this BIM
graph according to algorithms provided in Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4.
The path nding functionality can be invoked through the administration
interface as shown in Figure 6.4. This screenshot shows a path search for the
example scenario from Chapter 5 Section 5.1. In this scenario, the path nding
function is called to nd a path to a designated space on the second oor, where
the electrician is required to carry out the maintenance task, from the foyer of
the building. The search can be further constrained by other search conditions,
such as limiting paths to those with doors monitored by CCTV cameras.
In the demonstrator implementation, the accessibility function is used to
identify the spaces that a user can access. This is a combination of spaces that
are directly assigned to the user and the spaces that are accessible from the
assigned spaces. Figure 6.5 shows all the spaces the electrician in the above
example can access with current access assignments.
6.2.4 Policy repository
The meta-model shown in Figure 6.6 is a simplied version of the EMF meta-
model used to generate the policy model for our demonstrator implementation.
The model represents the concepts identied in Chapter 5 and takes an approach
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Figure 6.4: Path nding user interface
Figure 6.5: Accessibility user interface
similar to [75], by combining attribute and role based access control, for the policy
meta-model implementation. This also maps to the authorisation layer of the
authorisation framework, which adopts the formalised XACML architecture [91].
The user model represents the generic role based policy specication. It is
connected to the more descriptive policy model through the assignment class.
Resources are objects contained in the building information model. A specic
instance of an object can be accessed via its globally unique identier (GUID),
6.2. Demonstrator implementation 129
Role
Permission
User
Assignment Resource
Condition
MappedIFCObj
Zones Spaces Doors
User Model Policy Model
Figure 6.6: Simplied meta-model diagram for the implementation of the physi-
cal access control administration tool
which is associated with all IFC objects. Conditions include any relationships or
constraints, including time or binary exclusions. For example, binary exclusion
would allow a user access to only one of the two specied spaces to satisfy sep-
aration of duty constraints. As the XACML data model [91] is used at policy
level, the meta-model policies can be transformed and mapped into the basic
XACML policy elements such as subject, resource, action, and condition.
The policy elements identifying objects use IFC based object classications
that are available through the BIM server. Only the IFC object types listed
in Chapter 5 Section 5.4 are implemented and supported in the demonstrator.
This limitation was necessary due to the resource constraints in developing the
demonstrator, but they are adequate for all the required access control functions
to be implemented and tested.
Even though the policy language extension BIM-XACML, presented in Chap-
ter 5, is used to arrive at this meta-model, we have not implemented the interfaces
for importing or exporting these policies in our demonstrator. A pragmatic de-
cision was made to limit the extent of the policy model to policy storage in our
demonstrator implementation due to resource limitations, assuming that a sim-
ple transformation module would be able to connect this to any external system.
Such interfaces can be generated easily as we have already mapped the necessary
policy elements in the meta-model.
6.2.5 Interfaces
The main focus of this implementation is to demonstrate the capabilities and
advantages of access control using building information models as spatial data
models. This demonstrator implements only a select set of components of the
authorisation framework that are essential to describe these key capabilities.
130 Chapter 6. Access Control Administration using Building Information Models
None of the external interfaces, such as the access control interface or the
access information interface, have been implemented in this demonstrator. The
access layer of our authorisation framework provides access control decision-
making capabilities to external systems via the Access Control Interface. It
also enables external systems that have their own authorisation decision-making
capabilities to utilise the framework functionalities via the Access Information
Interface. These integration interfaces can be based on the policy specication
model dened in Chapter 5 as well as other industry standards such as IFC [25],
BACnet [5], or OSIPS [36].
6.2.6 Demonstrator environment
This section describes the test environment and associated test conditions that
were used in testing the demonstrator. The application server programs were in-
stalled on an Ubuntu server with Intel i7 3.4GHz quad-core processor and 8GB
memory. Given the visualisations are rendered on client applications within web
browsers, there is no graphics processing requirement on the server side. We
have successfully tested the client application on Windows, Linux, Mac OS, and
Android platforms. The BIM visualisation related functionalities were success-
fully tested on a Samsung Galaxy Tab 2 10" tablet device as well as a Samsung
Galaxy S4 smartphone. All testing was performed within a corporate network
with the server connected using gigabit Ethernet while clients connect through
Wi-Fi.
The building information model used for this testing was created using Au-
todesk Revit 2013 software and exported in IFC2X3 le schema. This building
information model was based on the Brisbane Airport International Terminal.
It covered levels 2 and 3 of the building. To give an indication of size, the raw
IFC le that was used as the input for the demonstrator was 6.02 MB, with
11360 elements with individual GUIDs. In the context of our access control re-
lated functions, only spatial structures of the building were included in this BIM.
There were 389 IfcDoor objects and 349 IfcSpace objects present. Objects asso-
ciated with systems such as electrical systems, network wiring, sewerage pipes
and furniture were not included in the BIM. The lack of these objects makes
the model less realistic compared to an operational BIM. However, from a per-
formance perspective, the only function that would be aected by the number
of objects in the BIM is the one that generates the BIM graph from BIM data,
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which requires parsing all BIM objects and selecting the node and edge objects
to build the graph. Except for BIM graph creation, no other function that was
tested in the demonstrator would be aected by the number of BIM objects
present in a BIM, as they operate on an already generated and cached BIM
graph.
6.2.7 Demonstrator testing
With the above mentioned test environment and the test building information
model, we were able to make certain observations related to the performance of
dierent functions in our demonstrator implementation. The goal of performance
testing these functions was to ensure the functions are technically feasible and
operate at a practically acceptable speed. The BIM specic functions are all
computed within the application server and the results are sent back to the
clients. The performance of the tested functions is mainly aected by several
characteristics of BIM graphs. The main aspect that aects execution times of
these functions is the number of nodes and edges in a BIM graph. In addition
to the size of a BIM graph, various attributes that are associated with the graph
nodes and edges also inuence execution times of these functions. For functions
involving search with conditional limiting of nodes or edges based on associated
attributes, execution times can be aected by both of these factors.
The function with the longest execution time is path nding. The complexity
of the path nding problem can be explained using a case from our demonstrator
BIM. For two selected spaces that are located at two ends of the second oor, if
we limit the maximum path length to 8 nodes, the number of possible options is
more than 20 paths. This is a complex task to perform without any tools and
it requires signicantly more time when administrators are to nd these paths
manually using maps only. The use of path nding function can reduce the
complexity of this task and enable administrators to handle even larger path size
options in manageable times. The execution time of the path nding function
is aected mainly by the size of BIM. In our implementation, we identied that
the rst path nding search for each session takes signicantly more time than
subsequent searches. This is due to the fact that in the rst instance a BIM
graph needs to be generated from the BIM. Once generated, it is stored for later
use and subsequent requests are served in similar times even for dierent path
options.
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In terms of measuring these execution times, the measurement depends on
two factors: computation on the server side and output rendering on client side.
There was no network latency in these tests as they were performed in a closed
network. To ensure the execution times reect the user's perception, they are
measured on the client side rather than on the application server side. The path
nding function was executed for dierent path cases and the client side browser
interactions were screen recorded. These screen recorded videos were used to
measure time durations between function initiation and results display.
The tests were performed after a BIM graph was cached by initiating a ran-
dom path search. The testing included a total of 18 trials with dierent path
searches. Three path lengths were tested with lengths of 3 node, 5 node, and 10
node distances. These particular path lengths were chosen based on the spatial
arrangement of the BIM used, on which these paths lengths had multiple options,
when searching without any conditions. The longest practical path for indoor
navigation in a building is normally limited in terms of path length due to the
existence of connecting spaces such as corridors and common areas connecting
dierent functional areas within the building. Three sets of paths with dierent
start and end nodes were tested for each of these path lengths on two dierent
browsers (Firefox and Chrome). All path nding searches were limited to nd-
ing the shortest path between the selected start and end nodes with must pass
through CCTV camera condition applied, which forces path search to choose
doors that are monitored by CCTV cameras. The results from these tests are
tabulated in Table 6.1. The test searches were measured with a time resolution
of 0.1 seconds and the results from these searches did not show measurably sig-
nicant dierence. The averaged execution time for each path length case with
a cached BIM graph is less than one second, which is eectively instantaneous
response from a user's perspective.
Time (in Seconds) 3 nodes 5 nodes 10 nodes
Average ~0.7 ~0.7 ~0.7
Table 6.1: Execution times for path nding function
In addition to the above trials, an additional test case was established to
identify additional search conditions that can aect the execution time of the
path nding function. The foyer area on level 2 was selected as a starting point
and a middle room space on level 3 was selected as the end point for the path
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search. The search conditions must pass through CCTV camera and maximum
security level were applied to path. With these search conditions applied, the
resulting path was of 21 nodes in length, and the path search execution time for
this path was on average ~1.5 seconds in 3 trials. This function was implemented
according to the algorithm in Chapter 4, for which new BIM graphs must be
generated when search conditions are applied. The reason for the increase in
the execution time was due to the recreation of BIM graph when conditions are
applied. The resulting increased time is still an acceptable time on an end users
perspective, and the performance of this function can be improved with better
hardware of the server.
Given that these functions were tested only on a single building information
model, the results cannot be generalised. However, it should be noted that the
BIM used for testing was quite large, which consisted of two oors of an airport
terminal with 389 objects corresponding to edges and 349 objects corresponding
nodes. For larger BIMs similar performance can be achieved with more powered
hardware. For a problem with path lengths of around 10 nodes, the execution
time of path nding algorithm is less than a second even on a fairly modest
hardware that was used for the demonstrator testing. The tests indicate that
a complicated path with signicant path length passing through a number of
doors and spaces can be executed with sub second speeds. This justies a level of
condence that the functions and methods used in the demonstrator can produce
usable results at practical speeds.
In Appendix A, we provide a demonstration oriented overview of this tool.
It is presented in the form of screen-captured videos as a run through of the
functionalities implemented for the demonstrator. We demonstrate these func-
tions based on a number of simple scenarios using the following authorisation
management capabilities.
6.3 Authorisation management using BIM
The proof-of-concept demonstrator tool illustrated in the previous section ad-
dresses the three main physical access control administration problems that were
identied earlier: intuitive PAC policy creation, automated/assisted PAC policy
management, and easy to use analysis of access history. To better illustrate the
functions of our implementation, let us see how an administrator would provide
134 Chapter 6. Access Control Administration using Building Information Models
physical access in an airport environment, controlled and operated by multiple
stakeholders. An airport employee can belong to any of the partner organisa-
tions that operate within the airport. However, their access to shared spaces and
systems must be controlled under a single access policy.
X
A B
C
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P2
Figure 6.7: A two-dimensional oor plan that is typically used to congure phys-
ical access control rules
Let us again refer back to our example scenario from Chapter 5 Section 5.1,
where a temporary electrician is assigned to perform emergency repair on the
lighting systems on the second oor of the airport building. The area where
the maintenance task should be carried out is marked by X in Figure 6.7. In
most airports, there will be pre-approved electricians and other technicians from
contracted companies to perform such tasks. Ideally, they should be given access
only to the space of interest within a limited time frame and the access rights
revoked at the completion of the assigned task. However, in practice these ac-
cess conditions are not ne grained, enabling most employees to access spaces
they need to access even when they are not on duty. The technicians are pre-
authorised to access all the areas they need to access to perform their jobs. For
example, a lift repair technician will have access to all areas where there are
lifts. Furthermore, most of the current access control administration tools rely
on 2D maps of the facility to determine the spaces and resources to give access.
As shown in the gure, there can be multiple entry points for a facility such
as A, B or C (via lift or stairs). For each of these there can be multiple paths
passing through dierent doors that lead to the desired location X. The security
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administrators must determine the most appropriate path when they are giving
access. For a larger facility, the complexity increases with more entry points and
path options, and it can become very hard to comprehend with the aid of 2D
maps. 2D maps are poor in representing 3D environments with multiple oors
connected by stairs, lifts, and ventilation ducts [83]. Furthermore, spatial zones
can be dynamic objects in a facility based on the operational conditions. For
example, the same set of spaces may be assigned dierent security levels based
on the threat level or in response to an emergency evacuation scenario.
It is desirable for the access control assignment process to start from the
request to perform a job. It should not start as an assignment to individual
resources or doors in a physical access control system. The authorisation sys-
tem should be able to compute the list of resources that should be accessible
for the particular job based on operational needs and the facility's overarching
physical security policy. For example, a system policy could say that unaccom-
panied maintenance contractors should only be given access to doors that have
a monitoring CCTV camera xed. It is also desirable to have pre-dened access
patterns for particular resources that comply with system policies. For example,
it is possible to pre-dene an access path for cleaners to access a particular space
within the facility, which can be applied to all users of that class.
6.3.1 Intuitive PAC policy creation
The conguration mode of the demonstrator can be used in creating access con-
trol policies that would be used in the authorisation framework. This addresses
the rst goal identied in Section 6.1, by assisting security administrators in
reducing physical access control conguration errors in complex spaces. Ad-
ministrators can visually select a target resource from BIM that the users need
to be given access. This three-dimensional interface can be more intuitive for
administrators as the required prior knowledge is minimised. For example, an
administrator can select a particular space from the BIM visualisation and as-
sign it to users or roles. The conguration mode of the demonstrator utilises the
following functionalities of the tool:
Manage users: Users can be assigned to one or more roles. Both users and
roles can have resource assignments and conditions.
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Manage resources: Rooms and hallways in a building are mapped as individ-
ual spaces. These spaces can be grouped into the logical relationship of zones.
Each of the individual spaces can have multiple accessible door objects. Access
assignments can happen at all three of these object levels.
Identify paths: An important spatial functionality of this tool is the ability
to determine all potential paths to a destination. It maps physical spaces from
the BIM into a graph with doors as weighted nodes connecting them based on
the security criteria. The administrator can specify the conditions that must
be satised. Some of these conditions include, shortest path, the path that goes
through CCTV camera monitoring, the paths that are currently least crowded, or
those that require the minimum security clearances. These additional conditions
are also attached to the graph links. The path nding functionality uses graph
traversal to identify optimal paths for a given criteria.
Dene conditions: This tool supports the denition of dierent types of con-
ditions that can govern the access policies. Logical inclusions and exclusions of
resources from assignments are allowed with dierent Boolean operators. For
example, a particular space can be excluded from an assignment when a corre-
sponding user or role has access to another specic space. This can be a powerful
feature in applying separation of duty constraints. Each of these conditions can
be time limited based on xed times or relative times.
Assign access rules: Those access conditions with corresponding resources
can be assigned to users or roles as access permissions. This permission-assignment
relationship provides the connectivity between the user model and the policy
model in the meta-model shown in Figure 6.6.
Alert on inconsistencies: The tool has the feature of checking across existing
policy rules when creating a new rule. This alerts the administrators of any
potential inconsistencies across existing rules and new rules. For example, when
a new resource assignment violates an exclusion condition this can alert the
administrator to change policy rules or to remove the assignment.
Propagate access rights: Once access policy rules are dened they can be
propagated to enforcement-level objects. For example, in physical access control
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systems, a policy rule for accessing a space or zone can be transformed into
multiple door access rules that can be uploaded to door lock controllers.
Figure 6.8 shows how administrators can use the tool to automatically calcu-
late all the spaces that they need to give access in order to reach a given space
from a starting point. They can additionally rene these with actions and con-
ditions associated with the resource. There can also be other separation of duty
and least privilege constraints applied to these conditions. The tool then gener-
ates the access control policy rules comprising the Subject, Object, Action and
Condition elements that can be mapped into an XACML policy. These rules
can again be transformed into low-level enforcement policies for a PACS that
controls individual doors based on the GUID properties of the doors computed
through space containment relationships. We note that some rules with complex
conditions may not be supported depending on the capabilities of the PACS.
The same policy can be transformed into the proprietary formats supported by
dierent PACSs from dierent vendors. The reverse of the same transformations
can be used to manage policies from dierent systems in a single tool.
Let us see how this can be applied in the example scenario presented earlier in
Chapter 5 Section 5.1. The end point can be selected as the room shown in red on
Figure 6.8 where the emergency repair task needs to be carried out. The starting
point could be any of the external gates through which the electrician can enter
the airport. There can be multiple paths to this particular room passing through
dierent spaces. In the current access control systems, this access knowledge
will depend on the expertise of the security administrator. Using this tool, the
administrator can calculate dierent path options with dierent criteria such as
lowest security clearance or shortest distance, and the system can identify the
best path option. This path option can then be translated into a list of spaces or
portals that need to be given access. The tool can also automatically alert the
administrator if the only available path requires a higher clearance level than a
maintenance technician can have, for which alternative arrangements, such as an
escort, can be made.
6.3.2 Automated/assisted PAC policy management
The second goal identied in Section 6.1 for physical access control adminis-
tration is managing physical access control policies for complex environments
with less workload to administrators. A part of this problem is the diculty in
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Figure 6.8: Path calculated from initial starting point to the selected space
reporting the current access privileges for a user or a role. Even though they
provide textual lists of user/role privileges, these lists can be long, making it
dicult for administrators to relate the privileges to the spaces they make ac-
cessible within a large facility. To address this issue, the demonstrator enables
administrators to visualise, as accessible spaces, the privileges possessed by a
user or role (Figure 6.9).
Search access control policy: Administrators can perform various search
queries on a policy and rene the search results by users, roles, conditions, etc.
The rened policy rules can also be edited within the tool.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.9: Managing physical access through visualisation: (a) List users that
can access the selected space, (b) Show spaces the selected user can access.
Visualise access control policy: Selected policy set can be visually overlaid
on BIM visualisation. For example, all policy sets corresponding to a space can
be combined and visually overlaid to show users and roles that have access to
the selected space (shown in red on Figure 6.9a) or to show the spaces and zones
the role can access (shown in red on Figure 6.9b). This also allows one to edit
the specic policy sets from the visualisation.
Analyse access control policy: The tool can analyse the loaded access pol-
icy against existing conditions to nd inconsistencies and violations. This can
be useful when auditing sets of existing rules from an external physical access
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control system that are loaded into the authorisation framework. For example,
administrators can view all the spaces that are accessible by a user at normal
times or under emergency conditions. These spaces can be highlighted on a
visualisation of the building.
Security administrators can load existing access control policies for particular
users or roles and visualise the spaces they can access. This search functional-
ity can be further narrowed down with additional conditions and timeframes,
which can be used for scenario planning and analysis. Given that BIMs can
represent relationships between objects, they can be used to analyse and identify
inconsistencies at a policy level.
6.3.3 Easy to use analysis of access history
The audit mode of this tool can be used on physical access control logs in con-
junction with BIMs. This addresses the third goal identied in Section 6.1,
performing user friendly analysis on past access history recorded in large access
log les. In this mode of operation administrators can visualise past access logs
superimposed as access paths (Figure 6.8) or aggregated spaces (Figure 6.9b) on
a BIM visualisation.The following functionalities of the demonstrator implemen-
tation are utilised in this mode of operation.
Access log: The log entries are assumed to be imported from an external
physical access control system. The minimal entities for each access log are a
timestamp, a user ID and a resource ID. The resource ID corresponds to the
GUID of a door in the meta-model.
Generate access path: This tool can generate access paths for each user
based on the log entries by connecting the relevant doors. In the event of multiple
path options when connecting two doors, the shortest path option is chosen. This
connected path can be visually overlaid on a BIM along with the policy rules for
the corresponding user. In the event of missing door access logs that results in
disconnected path a warning is returned, which can be further analysed against
existing policy rules.
Analyse access log: The analysis functionality takes access log entries and
compares them with existing policy rules. This can be useful in identifying any
shortcoming in the enforcement arrangement such as tailgating or reversed doors.
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These functionalities are used to implement the access control audit require-
ments. The access logs can be searched to narrow down accesses by a particular
user or to a given space within a given timeframe. BIMs can be used as both
visualisation front ends and to provide the base for spatial analysis for access
audits. In case of physical access logs, they can be used to generate the access
path for a given user within a given time, using the list of doors accessed. This
can be visually overlayed on a BIM visualisation as a tentative path connect-
ing these doors. This capability can be used by administrators as a post event
analysis tool and can be extended to provide monitoring for path deviations and
access errors. For example, we can show access errors for a selected user and
which doors they have tried to access for which they do not hold access privilege.
The user logs can also be aggregated and visualised as a set of spaces and zones
instead of individual paths. For example, administrators can select a user or a
role and visually compare the spaces they can access from the policy and the
spaces they have used in the past from the logs. This can be useful in identifying
redundant access privileges that accumulate over time. The same access audits
can also be used in other operational analysis such as time spent by a user in
a given space. For example, assuming egress is also controlled, it is possible to
extract the length of time a maintenance technician spends in a given space and
compare it with their job assignments.
6.3.4 Abstract policy authoring
A signicant contribution introduced as part of our authorisation framework that
facilitates authorisation management is abstract policy authoring. This mode of
operation utilises named groupings of objects in BIMs along with BIM-XACML
semantics to enable authoring access control policies at an abstract level that
can be later compiled into various low level policy sets with transformation func-
tions and information contained in BIMs. For example, space objects can be
grouped into labelled zones that can be seen and hierarchical layers of increasing
abstraction. The space objects are mapped to labelled zones in IFC. The policy
semantics introduced with BIM-XACML introduced in Chapter 5 are used to
map these object relationships. Security administrators can write access policy
rules based on these zones which can decrease workload on administrators es-
pecially for changes in spatial arrangements. In the event of space arrangement
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changes, administrators can simply change the space-zone associations and re-
compile the policy rule sets. In addition to improving the eciency in performing
policy updates, it can also prevent potential human errors that arise from manual
changing of policy rules.
D
C
B
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Figure 6.10: Adjacent spaces with dierent security requirements { Rooms A
and B are in secure zone, Rooms C and D are in open access area
This mode of operation can be easily explained with a simple example sce-
nario. Let us assume that in the oor plan shown in Figure 6.10, rooms A and B
are currently associated with a secured zone and rooms C and D are associated
with open access areas. In this setting, consider a scenario where room C is
repurposed for operations that require it to be associated with the secured zone.
Even with this simple setting, this change would require changing access rules for
all the associated spaces and doors. However, with the proposed approach using
BIMs, a security administrator can change the space association parameter for
room C through the visual interface. These changes do not have any impact on
the high level policies as they use zone labels as object identies and changes are
reected only at zone-space association level in BIM. These high level policies
with the mapped changes in BIM can be then used to recompile required low
level policies at individual door levels for physical access control systems.
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6.4 Discussion
We experienced a number of challenges while implementing our proof-of-concept
demonstrator and we have also identied other potential challenges in adopt-
ing a similar system based on our authorisation framework in real operational
environments. In this section, some of these general concerns are listed along
with our own challenges relating to using building information models for access
control. We also make a note of some of the shortcomings and omissions of our
demonstrator implementation.
Let us begin by identifying some of the general concerns related to our pro-
posal. A signicant concern in adopting a system such as our administration
tool and our authorisation framework in currently operational environments is
these four major challenges related to building information models.
First, the assumption is made that an up-to-date BIM of a facility will be
available to our framework as a fundamental requirement. Even though this
would be the case for many recently built and new building environments, the
availability of useful BIMs is limited in older buildings. In our involvement with
the Airports of the Future project, we encountered this as a common case across
many airports. However, with the same project we were able to demonstrate
with the assistance of our partners that a usable building information model can
be generated from existing building drawings and the building information model
used in this demonstrator is an outcome of this process.
Second, maintaining and updating BIMs with changes in facility can be an-
other challenge related to having up-to-date BIMs for our requirements. This
requires a holistic approach and use of BIMs across various domains of building
operations, such as facility management and asset management. Such an ap-
proach would ensure any changes with the facility are duly updated in to BIMs.
Even though this is not yet the case in many environments, we assume the use of
BIMs in such a fashion will become more common in the future, especially with
recent government endorsements in Australia, Europe, and the US [20, 43, 90].
Third, building information models being the `repositories of everything' in
a building can become quite large and complex for most realistic critical infras-
tructures. Given that BIMs have previously not been used in this context, it is
essential to make sure such BIMs are generated eciently by any system used.
In our demonstrator implementation, we have tested this by using a building in-
formation model from a real airport terminal which is complex and large enough
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to test this challenge. Another aspect of this would be interfacing BIMs with
systems and processes such as facility management systems that would ensure
ongoing use of the up-to-date BIM data, but it would also result in the size of
BIM repositories growing over time. Managing and controlling the size of such
BIMs is also an associated challenge when ensuring the availability of ecient
BIMs.
Fourth, the building information models must be stored securely. In our au-
thorisation framework, we proposed how it can be used for access control for
data contained within BIMs. This is a signicant improvement from current
security measures. However, there are other possible avenues for improvement
in terms of secure storage of BIMs, including use of encryption. In the wake of
recent security breaches such as the one involving the Australian Security Intel-
ligence Organisation, where secret building plans were accessed by hackers [52],
the need for securing building information models as a whole is an essential
requirement. This is an area of research with signicant potential especially con-
cerning selective encryption of BIM data. Given how BIMs are organised and
the interconnected nature of objects, it is a challenge that needs more research
in the future.
As we have previously seen, a BIM model server is the fundamental compo-
nent of our authorisation framework. Its main function is to update, store, and
share BIM data across multiple systems. There are a number of dierent ways of
implementing BIM servers, and given that, there is no current industry standard
for BIM servers. The types of BIM servers can range from simple le servers
to relational databases and object oriented data stores. BIM servers also dier
in terms of the data format used for storage, some directly using IFC standard,
while others having their intermediate format that is generated from IFC based
BIMs. The ability to handle dynamic BIMs is a key capability of BIM servers
that can be identied as a requirement for our authorisation framework. It is
essential to have a BIM server that can be concurrently used and updated by
multiple systems, which can provide an up-to-date version of the BIM for the
authorisation framework. The concept of a BIM server or BIM collaboration
tools is very new and there is only limited number of such BIM servers cur-
rently available. BIMserver is an open source building information model server
that enables IFC based BIM collaboration [96]. The features of BIMserver are
similar to those of the RaaS tool that was used in our implementation, but
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we choose to base our demonstrator on the RaaS tool due to familiarity and
availability of resources. The only currently available commercial BIM server is
from Graphisoft [60], who also develop the BIM CAD software ArchiCAD [59].
The Graphisoft BIM Server mainly serves as a collaboration tools for planners,
architects, and designers. Both of these BIM servers are intended to be used
by planners, architects, and designers during the inception phase of a building,
rather than as a facility management tool during the operational phase of a
building, which is the focus of our research.
The key objective of this demonstrator implementation of the physical access
control administration tool presented in this chapter was to demonstrate the
technical feasibility of various concepts proposed throughout this thesis. Even
though the current version of our demonstrator is not intended to be a nal prod-
uct to be used in an operational environment, it serves as a practical evidence to
support our claim of using building information models in this context. The set
of features and functionalities implemented in our demonstrator can be mapped
to dierent components of our authorisation framework presented in Chapter 3.
As previously noted, a conscious decision was made to leave out certain compo-
nents of our framework, such as external interfaces, in our implementation due
to resource constraints.
In our authorisation framework, the external interfaces enable integration
with various systems including existing security tools within an operational en-
vironment. We have not dened any of these interfaces in detail, but we have
identied some of the requirements such as the need to used standard proto-
cols in implementing these interfaces. Access control decision making is another
feature that was not implemented in our demonstrator. However, we designed
our policy model to be mapped to XACML and we envisage using an available
XACML PDP and extend it for a decision making implementation. We have also
not considered any internal security implications of our tool, such as securing the
tool itself.
We were able to gather feedback on our demonstrator from industry security
practitioners during our interactions with our industry partners in the Airport
of the Future project. Except for various concerns we have already noted above
related to the use of such a system in real environments, the proposed func-
tionalities were well received by the security practitioners. The advantages of
using a system similar to our demonstrator for access control administration
were commonly acclaimed.
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The capabilities implemented as part of this demonstrator are a signicant
improvement from the current systems. This presents a better alternative to
physical security administration using oor plans and depending on expert knowl-
edge. The main dierentiator in our approach is that many steps are automated
and human intervention is limited only to decision making. The tedious parts of
the process such as reachability analysis and calculating portals for a low level
PACS are computed automatically using BIM capabilities.
In addition to the functionalities implemented in the demonstrator and the
capabilities discussed in this chapter, the same tool set can be easily extended
to cater to many other useful scenarios. As we alluded to in the early chapters
of this thesis, this authorisation framework and the BIM capabilities can be very
useful as tools for security planning in large secure facilities. They can be used as
interfaces for security simulations to test out space arrangements, security mea-
sures, and other organisational changes before these capabilities are implemented
in real environments. These capabilities can be seamlessly integrated with fa-
cility management systems and provide an up-to-date integration between the
security systems and other systems within a facility.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented a proof-of-concept demonstrator of a physical access con-
trol administration tool, demonstrating the technical feasibility of using building
information models in the context of access control functions. The implemen-
tation of this demonstrator was aimed at three access control administration
challenges: intuitive PAC policy creation, automated/assisted PAC policy man-
agement, and easy to use analysis of access history.
The demonstrator implementation was based on the authorisation frame-
work introduced in Chapter 3. The implementation also made use of the BIM
graph based functions presented in Chapter 4 and the policy model proposed in
Chapter 5. The core implementation was based on the Eclipse Modelling Frame-
work and various existing components mapping to our authorisation framework
were used. In addition to existing components BIM graph based access con-
trol functions and access control administration and policy functionalities were
implemented specically for the demonstrator.
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The main reason for this testing was to ensure that the proposed functionali-
ties can be executed with a close to realistic BIM in acceptable execution times.
The implemented proof-of-concept demonstrator was tested on a test environ-
ment setup with modest hardware and a building information model from a real
airport terminal with close to reality object representation was used for testing
the demonstrator functionalities.
The results from testing the demonstrator indicate the technical viability of
the concepts proposed throughout this thesis. There are also several challenges
in implementing such a system in real operational environment and some of
these issues and possible solutions are also discussed in this chapter. In the next
chapter, we further discuss some of these challenges and associated constraints
and limitations of our proposal informed through this implementation experience.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
Smart buildings and security-sensitive critical infrastructures rely on various elec-
tronic systems for their day-to-day operation, which are increasingly connected
and controlled through networks, making it possible to integrate disparate sys-
tems. This connected nature of smart buildings increases our reliance on infor-
mation networks to access and control both physical and information resources
in these environments. The reliance on network connected and integrated sys-
tems in smart buildings also creates its own set of challenges for access control
and security operations. In addition to the connectedness, buildings are becom-
ing larger both in terms of height as well as total occupied area, making indoor
navigation and access control more complex in these environments.
The central contention of this thesis is that using building information mod-
els to facilitate access control can improve the security of these environments in
general by enabling exible and ecient access control processes. The second key
argument is that a convergence of physical and logical access control is necessary
in order to make the emerging network connected activities in smart building
environments safer and more secure. The notion of using building information
models in the context of security applications is a new idea that has been in-
troduced in this thesis, building on our observations concerning the security and
access control challenges in complex smart building environments. Thus it is not
well understood how to design an integrated approach for access control in such
environments using building information models. This thesis addresses a range
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of challenges in access control in complex environments and makes a number of
contributions, as summarised in the following section.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 provides a list of
achievements and contributions of the thesis. In Section 7.2, a thematic summary
of the contributions of the thesis is given. Section 7.3 discusses limitations and
open questions from the thesis and suggests future research directions. Finally,
Section 7.4 provides concluding remarks.
7.1 Summary of contributions and achievements
This section lists the principal contributions and achievements of this thesis and
maps them to the research objectives that were dened in the beginning of this
thesis in Chapter 1 Section 1.1.
Research Objective 1: Identifying the advantages and challenges in using
building information models for access control.
 We did a detailed study of building information models and associated
data representation standards in the context of using them as spatial data
models for access control. In terms of achieving interoperability in repre-
sentation we choose IFC as the data specication standard for BIMs.
 We also proposed a graph theory based formal representation of building
information models, BIM graph, that represents how building information
models can be used and manipulated in various access control applications.
This graph model lls the lack of a formal model for BIMs and serves as a
basis for presenting technology independent function representations.
 We developed a proof-of-concept demonstrator that utilises building in-
formation models to facilitate security administration for a physical access
control system. The implementation of this tool was based on the proposed
authorisation framework. This demonstrator showcases the viability of the
concept of using building information models for access control.
Research Objective 2: Designing an authorisation framework using building
information models as its core spatial data model.
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 We identied various challenges in access control in smart buildings and
critical infrastructure environments and proposed to use building informa-
tion models to facilitate access control in these environments. This proposal
was informed by the survey of existing access control models for spatiotem-
poral authorisation systems, which identied features and shortcomings of
these models in the context of critical infrastructure environments.
 We proposed a novel authorisation framework, which uses building infor-
mation models in access control policy specication, policy administration,
and decision making. This proposed framework improves administration
eciency and process accuracy of access control in complex environments
by taking advantage of visualisation and spatial information manipulation
capabilities provided using BIMs.
Research Objective 3: Investigating the concept of converged physical and
logical access control and analysing this approach in terms of high-level abstract
policy specication and ecient authorisation management.
 We achieve improved accuracy and eciency in terms of policy specication
by using abstract labels for spatial constructs in policy rules and relying
on the BIM to provide an up to date mapping between the labels and
the referenced objects. This provides the ability to dene access control
policies at a high level of abstraction. This is based on our proposal to use
the IFC vocabulary for spatial authorisation policies based on a detailed
analysis the IFC specication.
 In terms of policy specication requirements of the proposed authorisation
framework, we proposed a building information models specic extension
to XACML called BIM-XACML. This introduces BIM specic data types
and functions based on the IFC specication.
7.2 Summary of outcomes and conclusions
This section summarises the thesis contributions into dierent thematic research
areas by discussing various outcomes and providing concluding remarks.
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7.2.1 Securing smart buildings and critical infrastructure
Chapter 2 provided background on access control for securing smart building
and critical infrastructure environments and related spatial access control mod-
els. It highlighted similarities between physical and logical access control to
explore the applicability of using a converged approach for access control in such
environments.
The notion of a smart building is not a well-dened concept, and the def-
initions vary for dierent domains of the building industry. The key feature
of smart buildings is the connected nature of otherwise disparate systems and
processes operating within those environments. This connectedness gives a wide
range of advantages to the operators of those facilities both economically as well
as in terms of operational eciency. This is also the main factor aecting access
control in critical infrastructures with large, complex, and smart buildings. We
identied the basic characteristics of critical infrastructures and discussed the
unique security and access control challenges in such environments.
In terms of access control, both provision of timely access and preserving
the security of sensitive resources are paramount. The major problem for access
control in these environments is the current dependency on human administrators
to reason about the implications of provision or revocation of sta access to
resources with spatial context within these facilities. We emphasised the need for
a user friendly approach to security administration, especially for access control
administration and management.
There are access control models that address similar security problems with
spatial access control capabilities. A set of features necessary for access control
using building information models were identied from the literature and from
our project partners in Airports of the Future project. Chapter 2 systematically
analysed the authorisation requirements for critical infrastructures and smart
buildings against existing access control models. With a view to addressing
these requirements, a survey of relevant spatiotemporal access control models was
presented, focusing on applicable features and highlighting capability gaps. We
identied that addressing the access control challenges in critical infrastructures
is not the motivation behind any of the existing access control models. This
chapter also provided a discussion on access control policy specication, which
identied shortcomings in existing policy models in the context of identied
features and requirements.
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7.2.2 Understanding building information models
In Chapter 2, we also introduced the concept of using building information mod-
els to facilitate access control in smart building and critical infrastructure envi-
ronments. It also provided a detailed discussion on building information models
and associated technology standards to better understand their suitability as
spatial data models for access control.
A Building Information Model is an electronic repository of structured, three-
dimensional data that captures both the physical and dynamic functional charac-
teristics of a facility. Based on current endorsements from industry and govern-
ments around the world, we established that building information models based
on the IFC specication would be the commonly accepted spatial data model for
smart buildings. Building information models can eectively represent complex
building environments with a more granular detail level that is useful when using
them as spatial data models for access control. Given the suitability of building
information models as spatial data models for access control, we also established
that none of the existing access control models focus on building information
models directly.
Another associated concept that forms the basis for this research is the IFC
specication, which is the open industry standard for representing building in-
formation models. We provided an in-depth analysis of the IFC specication
in Chapter 4 by outlining key concepts associated with common access control
scenarios and discussing how they can be expressed and interpreted in IFC. The
IFC specication provides the data types required to represent BIM classes and
objects. The specication includes terms, concepts and data specication items
originating from disciplines of architecture, engineering, and construction indus-
try sectors. IFC forms the basic vocabulary for access control using building
information models as spatial data models and this introduction of the selected
portion of the specication set the stage for later chapters where IFC is signi-
cantly utilised.
In Chapter 4, we proposed a graph theory based formal model for building
information models, BIM graph, addressing the lack of any formal models for
building information models specically for access control purposes. The use
of graph-based techniques is common in many navigation and path nding ap-
plications and it is the most common approach for existing indoor navigation
applications. The use of BIMs for such applications is not widely developed,
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thus we do not have any existing graph models for BIMs. The proposed graph
model for building information models encapsulates objects associated with most
access control applications in a building. This graph model serves as a starting
point for testing access control related functions using BIMs before these are
implemented.
7.2.3 Utilising building information models
Chapter 3 proposed a framework to utilise building information models as spa-
tial data model for access control. The authorisation framework using building
information models was a novel approach for spatial access control and the rst
to utilise building information models in this role. With the adoption of build-
ing information models across industry, especially for facility management, this
authorisation framework presents a starting point for incorporation of the same
tools for security and access control administration. This authorisation frame-
work was intended as a solution for complex access control issues within critical
infrastructures, as identied in Chapter 2, both in terms of administration and
technology.
The unication of access control processes was one of the key aspects and ad-
vantages of the authorisation framework using building information models. The
term unication was used to emphasise the possibility of using a common frame-
work to address dierent types of access control requirements. This authorisation
framework was based on a classication proposed for resources associated with
buildings in the context of using building information models. Two categories of
resources were identied based on access control requirements for various infor-
mation ows in such an environment. The unication aspect of this framework
was aimed at addressing these two major categories: BIM content and external
resources. Access control for BIM content includes all information contained
within a BIM repository. This covers building elements as well as information
feeds from systems that are stored as part of a BIM repository. Access control
for external resources includes systems and information feeds that are accessible
through the spatial context provided by BIMs. This also includes physical access
control to spaces within a building.
The convergence of access control for physical and logical resources was
achieved in the authorisation framework by using a shared object vocabulary
structure provided through BIMs. The same IFC based entity types are used
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for referencing object types in access control policy rules and authorisation re-
quests. All physical objects including space objects that are part of the building
will have reference objects in a BIM that can be directly used in policy rules
and for logical objects such as information resources, the same BIM objects can
serve as location attributes to provide spatial context for these objects. For ex-
ample, a video feed from a CCTV camera can be given an attribute reference to
a space object where the particular camera is located within the building. This
convergence of physical and logical access control enabled the use of the same
processes in both domains of access control.
The proposed authorisation framework utilises building information models
in disparate processes of access control to provide a unied access control im-
plementation across various system environments. Building information models
and associated capabilities provide new possibilities in dierent stages of access
control. The three key stages of access control that use BIMs are policy speci-
cation, policy administration, and decision-making. Each of these processes use
dierent set of components of the authorisation framework along with BIMs to
achieve desired results.
The components of the authorisation framework are conceptually divided
into two categories: external spatial modules and authorisation framework mod-
ules. External spatial modules are components that predominantly interact with
building information models directly. Authorisation framework modules facili-
tate the access control processes of policy specication, policy administration,
and decision-making. The framework also serves to provide a converged ap-
proach for physical and logical access control. In addition to this, supporting
legacy systems through policy transformation is an aspect of the framework that
can ensure adoption of such a system within environments that already have
dierent functional systems.
7.2.4 Representing spatial access control policies
In Chapter 5, we identied requirements for a policy model for the authorisation
framework presented in Chapter 3. We specically sought to identify the neces-
sary entities for access control policies when using building information models
as spatial data models.
Access control using building information models requires a policy model
that supports BIM specic object types and conditional functions. In addition
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to representing objects, a key to an eective access control policy model for
BIMs lies in the appropriate use of relationships that exist between objects in
a BIM. None of the existing policy models address the specic requirements for
BIMs or their data representation specication IFC. This chapter presented an
access control policy model using building information models to address the
BIM specic requirements.
Based on the identied requirements, a policy structure was described for
when building information model entities are used in access control policies. An
object in this access control policy model can be a BIM object class, an individual
object in a BIM or an external data object that references or relates to a BIM
object. Policy conditions can be either relationship based or object based when
specifying access restrictions. This chapter also provided a semantic model for
data types and functions that are necessary for an access control system using
building information models.
The main achievement of this chapter was BIM-XACML, a policy language
extending XACML by introducing BIM object and function constructs. This
policy extension enabled using IFC based entity types in access control policies
to encapsulate BIM objects and relationships between BIM objects. The policy
model presented in this chapter combined the XACML architecture with the
authorisation framework proposed in Chapter 3. This policy model formed the
basis for implementing the policy architecture of the proof-of-concept demon-
strator presented in Chapter 6.
7.2.5 Managing physical access control systems
Chapter 6 presented the implementation of a proof-of-concept demonstrator that
brought together the concepts introduced in previous chapters of the thesis. This
implementation demonstrated the technical feasibility of using building informa-
tion models in the context of access control functions.
The proof-of-concept tool utilised building information models to facilitate
security administration for a physical access control system. The demonstrator
was developed as a client-server application that can be accessed through any
modern web browser. The web client functions as a thin client within a browser
which connects to the application server that implements all the underlying func-
tionalities. The application framework was based on various bespoke and custom
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software components. This chapter provided a detailed account of the compo-
nents that were written and generated as part of this implementation and all
the pre-existing tools and components that were used as part of the software
infrastructure of this implementation.
The features and components that are specically developed for the proof-
of-concept demonstrator map to various concepts and components of the au-
thorisation framework presented in Chapter 3. We further elaborated on the
implementation of the proof-of-concept demonstrator and discussed how various
access control administration related functions have been developed using the
approaches proposed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The proof-of-concept demon-
strator included various functions that map to the spatial reasoning module of
the authorisation framework. These functions were implemented using the BIM
graph presented in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4.
We also provided a detailed description of the test environment and associ-
ated test conditions that were used in testing the demonstrator. The building
information model used for this testing was based on the Brisbane Airport Inter-
national Terminal. With this test environment and the test building information
model, we were able to make certain observations related to the performance
of dierent functions in our demonstrator implementation. The goal for testing
these functions was not to ascertain exactly how fast the functions can operate as
there are no comparison cases (and performance is hardware dependent), but to
ensure the functions are technically feasible and operate at a practically accept-
able speed. The tests indicated that a complicated path with signicant path
length passing through a number of doors and spaces can be executed with sub
second speeds. This justied a level a condence that the functions and methods
used in the demonstrator can produce usable results at practical speeds.
Finally, we also discussed various practical limitations of the demonstrator
implementation as well as other development omissions due to resource con-
straints. We also listed some of the general concerns as well as challenges relating
to using building information models for access control. In the following section,
we discuss these challenges experienced while implementing our proof-of-concept
demonstrator and other potential challenges in adopting a similar system based
on our authorisation framework in real operational environments.
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7.3 Limitations, open questions and opportuni-
ties for future research
This section provides a discussion on potential opportunities for future research
on the proposals presented so far in this thesis. It also summarises various
limitations and open questions identied in the previous chapters.
7.3.1 Building information modelling
We outlined the key factors inuencing our choice of IFC, namely it was designed
for building environments, its openness as a standard, and foremost its ability
to represent a wide range of objects and processes within building environments
throughout the lifecycle of a building. We expect such compatible BIMs are
made available for an implementation based on the IFC specication, which
would ensure the functionalities proposed based on IFC could be utilised.
Building information models are a central component of this framework and
many of its capabilities rely on a well-formed BIM with certain objects and re-
lationships. This can be seen as a key external requirement of the framework
and we assume such a BIM will be available. We made the assumption that an
up-to-date BIM of a facility will be available to our framework as a fundamental
requirement. Even though this would be the case for many recently built and new
building environments, the availability of useful BIMs is limited in older build-
ings. A key factor inuencing the availability of up-to-date BIMs is an overall
facility management approach, where BIMs are used by various systems within
a facility and feeding back up-to-date information of resources back into BIMs.
Such approaches are in their early stages of development, but are increasingly
being adopted in many smart building environments that use BIMs [39].
Building information models being the `repositories of everything' in a build-
ing, they can become quite large and complex for most realistic critical infras-
tructures. Managing and controlling the size of such BIMs is also an associated
challenge when ensuring the availability of ecient BIMs. Given that BIMs have
previously not been used in this context, it is essential to make sure such BIMs
are generated eciently by any system used.
Another important security concern is the secure storage of building infor-
mation models. The proposed authorisation framework was designed to support
access control for data contained within BIMs, which is a signicant improve-
ment from current security measures. This includes controlled access to BIM
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repository data like accessing databases which is a common application for many
systems utilising shared BIMs. However, there are other possible avenues for
improvement in terms of secure storage of BIMs, including use of encryption of
BIMs and selective encryption of partial BIM data. Given how BIMs are or-
ganised and the interconnected nature of objects, this is an interesting challenge
that has signicant potential for future research.
7.3.2 Authorisation framework
The authorisation framework proposed in Chapter 3 relies on the dierent com-
ponents discussed in Section 3.2, however we have not specied any standards
except for BIMs. We assume the components and subsystems that are part of
this framework would support the required functionality to achieve the over-
all goal of the framework. The authorisation framework also does not favour
any underlying access control models or concepts. For example, the choice of
how roles must be dened or whether environment variables must be used to
dene roles is not dened as part of the authorisation framework. This makes
it possible to have application specic choices for standards and techniques to
be chosen for implementation. In an ideal implementation of this authorisation
framework, existing communication protocols used in the building industry for
interaction between systems, such as BACnet and OSIPS, should be utilised to
achieve greater interoperability.
In the policy language model proposed in Chapter 5, we briey discussed
how a XACML policy decision point can be extended and modied to support
authorisation decision making for BIM access control. In that discussion we did
not provide details on how such a PDP could be implemented. It should be able
to evaluate BIM specic spatial conditional functions through a spatial reasoning
component of the authorisation framework. This is one of the interesting future
research directions that could signicantly inuence the implementation of the
authorisation framework as a whole.
In our proposal of policy model, we identied only a limited number of access
control conditional functions using BIMs based on the scenarios we had already
identied. But it could be possible to explore further in dierent operational
scenarios to extend the set of functions to support a diverse range of operational
environments. In terms of IFC object and relationship types we did not specify
a denitive list that must be included in an implementation as it will be an
application specic requirement. Thus we have only provided the high level
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abstraction for both objects and relationships and developers can choose specic
entity types based on their applications. Another key concern in the context of
the policy model is representing entity types and relationship conditions without
any ambiguity. Given that some concepts can be represented with dierent
entity types in IFC, it is essential to have a mechanism to streamline the process
of creating and maintaining the BIMs that are used in the applications.
7.3.3 Implementation and testing
The key objective of the demonstrator implementation of the physical access
control administration tool presented in Chapter 6 was to demonstrate the tech-
nical feasibility of various concepts proposed throughout this thesis. We made
a conscious decision to leave out certain components of our framework, such
as external interfaces, in our implementation due to resource constraints. Even
though the current version of our demonstrator is not intended to be a nal
product to be used in an operational environment, it serves as a practical evi-
dence to support our claim of using building information models in this context.
We demonstrated the viability of the proposed concepts at a technical level and
presented arguments on how they address the research aim.
One of the important future directions for this research is implementing the
proposed authorisation framework as a whole or partially as the administration
tool demonstrator in an operational environment. It should be an environment
with buildings that have complex spatial arrangements as well as complex access
control requirements, such as an airport or any similar critical infrastructure.
This would enable us to test and evaluate our contentions of using building
information models for access control in realistic scenarios and prove the practical
viability of the capabilities proposed in this thesis. Another associated step would
be to explore various avenues to extend the current framework to integrate with
other systems within facilities and enable an overarching access control operation
in such environments combining physical and logical access control.
In addition to testing the technical capabilities of the proposal, it is also
necessary to test the usability such a system with end users. A central assumption
to our work is that three-dimensional representations of buildings can improve
the experience with security administration tools for security administrators.
This assumption is based on literature on the advantages of three-dimensional
interfaces in general [123], but the claim has not been experimentally veried for
security applications.
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Some informal evaluation was undertaken by demonstrating the system live
to groups of stakeholders that was followed by discussions around the new pro-
posals. The stakeholders were comfortable with the demonstrated functionalities
and gave positive indications on the value of such a system in their organisations.
In addition to this, some preliminary experimentation was performed with lim-
ited number of security administration sta at our partnering airport, and the
preliminary results were positive. Further testing is desirable, but this would re-
quire integration with live commercial systems, and that was not feasible within
the scope of this thesis.
A potential next step would be to undertake a eld trial to produce empirical
results to evaluate and support our claims by integrating a number of opera-
tional systems in a critical infrastructure environment with the authorisation
framework. This would require building a system with appropriate user inter-
faces and testing it among sta that are normally tasked with similar tasks of
access control administration. This was not possible in the setting in which this
research was conducted due to tight regulatory and security controls imposed
on operational airports. In addition to the required systems development and
integration, it is also necessary to nd appropriate skilled people to participate
in such a study. For these reasons such a eld trail was beyond the scope of the
thesis.
7.4 Concluding remarks
Using network connected information systems to control and manage processes
and operations within buildings has resulted in the development of what can
essentially be dened as smart buildings. This thesis addresses an intrinsic chal-
lenge in research associated with controlling access to physical and logical re-
sources by investigating and developing integrated techniques for access control
using building information models.
Given the challenges posed by the increasing adoption of smart buildings
in critical infrastructures it is important to nd eective measures to provide
integrated access control for physical and logical resources with a spatial context.
The work described in this thesis has attempted to contribute to this eort. It
remains to extend the evaluation of this work with larger practical testing and
to enhance and deploy these ideas in the real operational environments.
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Appendix A
Demonstrating the Demonstrator
This appendix describes how the proof-of-concept demonstrator tool implemented
as part of the research can be used to perform dierent access control admin-
istration functionalities. This is intended as a run through of the implemented
tool and presents the functionalities through demonstrated scenarios along with
screen-captured videos. For more detailed account of the implementation of the
demonstrator refer to Chapter 6.
The three operating modes supported by this physical access control admin-
istration tool are:
 Creating access control rules from BIM visualisation
 Visualising and analysing access control rules using BIMs
 Performing access control audits and analysis using BIMs
The capabilities demonstrated with this tool can enable administrators to
visually manage access control policy rules from the BIM visualisation. This
3D visualisation can be rotated and navigated more intuitively compared to 2D
maps that are commonly used for physical access control administration. This
approach essentially reduces the amount of prior knowledge required by security
administrators of their environment and assists them by reducing errors and
mistakes.
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A.1 Demonstration 1: Overview of the tool
The user interface of the demonstrator contains three main panels for internal
constructs, associated properties and BIM visualisation. The layout of these
panels can be further customised based on operational modes, but for the purpose
of this demonstration we will be using the basic layout with three panels.
The demonstrator tool encapsulates some of the key functionalities that are
central to access control and policy administration. It supports basic constructs
of subjects (users and roles), objects (spaces in the case of physical access con-
trol), actions (accessing the spaces), and conditions. Conditions can be based on
attributes associated with subjects or objects. It also supports time based con-
ditions for permission assignments. In addition to these the tool also supports
specifying separation of duty constrains as a way to demonstrate the capability
of analysing policy rules using BIMs.
The video run through of the overview of the demonstrator tool can be found
at: http://nimal.info/thesis/demo/video1.mp4
A.2 Demonstration 2: Creating access control
rules from BIM visualisation
The main operating mode of the demonstrator that uses key BIM capabilities
is creating access control policy rules. Physical access control administrators
need to know the appropriate path a user needs to take in order to perform a
task when assigning physical access control permissions. This can become quite
complex when the concerned building space is large. In this operating mode, our
tool can be helpful to administrators in choosing among multiple path options
that are implemented based on the path nding function presented in Chapter 4.
The process of nding the optimal path is simplied through visualisation and
further constraints can be applied to this search through the properties panel for
the search conguration. To start, the administrator selects the starting point
and the end point. Without any constraints applied to the search conguration,
the shortest path between the selected spaces is shown. The search conguration
can be modied to suit the requirements based on shortest distance, least number
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of doors, or least security clearance. Another condition that can be applied to the
search is forcing the path to pass only through doors that are CCTV monitored.
Once the search conguration is modied, the search can be applied again and
the relevant changed path can be shown. When the administrator is satised
with the generated path option, the associated spaces covering the path can be
added to a user or a role as a permission assignment. In addition to adding
spaces from path searches, administrators are able to directly add individual
space assignments for users and roles.
The video run through of creating access control rules from BIM visualisa-
tion using the demonstrator tool can be found at: http://nimal.info/thesis/
demo/video2.mp4
A.3 Demonstration 3: Visualising and analysing
access control rules using BIMs
In this demonstrator, three distinct functions are implemented under the op-
erational mode of visualising and analysing. First, administrators can simply
click on a user or role and visually see all the spaces they can access based on
the permission assignments. This can serve as a quick overview when there is
large number of privileges attached to the subject. Second, all the users and
roles that have access to a particular space can be reported directly by selecting
from the visualisation. This can be used in identifying and removing unwanted
permissions easily.
Third, we can analyse all the permission assignments against set conditions
and BIM data. This demonstrator implements two such inconsistency conditions:
exclusivity inconsistency (or separation of duty) and non-accessibility inconsis-
tency. Exclusivity inconsistency checks to make sure user has access to only one
of the two dened spaces. Non-accessibility inconsistency checks for any spaces
of lower security clearance surrounded by spaces with higher security clearance
requirement, making them non-accessible to users even with appropriate clear-
ance level. These inconsistencies are implemented to showcase the capabilities
achieved through BIM analysis.
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The video run through of visualising and analysing access control rules using
BIMs with the demonstrator tool can be found at: http://nimal.info/thesis/
demo/video3.mp4
A.4 Demonstration 4: Performing access con-
trol audits and analysis using BIMs
In terms of performing access control audits, the demonstrator tool implements
two key functions: access logs and analysing access logs. The main feature
in this operational mode is visualising past access logs superimposed as access
paths on BIM visualisation. Access logs are implemented as a basic list of door
identiers with times to simulate the input from a physical access control systems
for demonstration purposes, which can be attached to users.
By selecting a user, past access logs can be listed and visualised as a path con-
necting sequential paths. The thickness of the path corresponds to the frequency
of access and clicking on any parts of the path shows the associated log entry.
This functionality can also be used for multiple users at once. This is useful in
identifying permissions users may have but that they rarely use or spaces that
are never being used over a long period.
The tool can also be used to list which roles and users have access to a selected
space. This can further limited based on time constraint based on permission
assignment. This combined with visualisation of access logs can be used in
analysing and identifying any breaches in security such as tailgating and handling
anti-pass back area setups.
The video run through of visualising and analysing access control rules using
BIMs with the demonstrator tool can be found at: http://nimal.info/thesis/
demo/video4.mp4
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